Authority migration in federations: A framework for analysis

PS - Political Science and Politics

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2004, Pages

  Bednar, Jenna ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b Department of Political Science ^*

^c Center for Political Studies   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344646286     PISSN: 10490965     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (11)

1. Bednar, Jenna. 2004. "Is Full Compliance Possible? Conditions for Shirking with Imperfect Monitoring and Continuous Action Spaces." Unpublished manuscript, available at www.umich.edu/~jbednar/papers.htm.
2. Bednar, Jenna, and William N. Eskridge, Jr. 1995. "Evaluating the Court's 'Unsteady Path': A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism." Southern California Law Review 68: 1447-1491.
3. Filippov, Mikhail, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova. 2004. Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
4. Hardin, Russell. 1989. "Why A Constitution?" In The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism, eds. Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman. New York: Agathon, 100-120.
5. Kramer, Larry D. 2000. "Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safe-guards of Federalism." Columbia Law Review 100: 215-293.
6. Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action." American Political Science Review 92(1): 1-22.
7. Rakove, Jack N., ed. 1999. James Madison, Writings. New York: Library of America.
8. Riker, William H. 1964. Federalism; Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
9. Sunstein, Cass R. 2001. Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do. New York: Oxford University Press.
10. Wechsler, Herbert. 1954. "The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government." Columbia Law Review 54: 543-560.
11. Yoo, John C. 1997. "The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism." Southern California Law Review 70: 1311-1405.