The legislator as political entrepreneur: Investment in political capital

Review of Austrian Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 2-3, 2002, Pages 211-228

  López, Edward J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Market processes; Models of legislators; Political capital

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344626882     PISSN: 08893047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1015770705872     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Banks, J. (1990) "A Model of Electoral Competition with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, 50(2): 309-325.
2. Bender, B. and Lott, J. R. Jr. (1996) "Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature." Public Choice, 87(1-2): 67-100.
3. Böhm-Bawerk, Eugen von. [1959 (1888)] The Positive Theory of Capital, Translated by George Huncke. South Holland, Ill: Libertarian Press.
4. Campbell, N. D. and López, E. J. (2002a) "Legislator Vote Records and Campaign Expenditures in a Price-Theoretic Model of Congressional Seats?" Working paper, University of North Texas Department of Economics.
5. Campbell, N. D. and López, E. J. (2002b) "Are Campaign Expenditures and Political Signals Complements?" Working Paper, University of North Texas Department of Economics.
6. Coker, D. C. and Crain, W. M. (1994) "Legslative Committees as Loyalty Generating Institutions." Public Choice, 81: 195-221.
7. Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (1993) Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.
8. Crain, W. M., Leavens D. R., and Tollison, R. D. (1986) "Final Voting in Legislatures," American Economic Review, 76(4): 833-841.
9. de Figueiredo, J. M. and Tiller, E. H. (2000) "The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission." NBER Working Paper N.w7726 (June 2000).
10. Denzau, A. T. and Munger, M. C. (1986) "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented." American Political Science Review, 80(1): 89-106.
11. Dougan, W. R. and Munger, M. C. (1989) "The Rationality of Ideology." Journal of Law and Economics, 32(1): 119-142.
12. Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins.
13. FEC (Federal Election Commission). (2001) "FEC Reports on Congressional Financial Activity for 2000." Press release dated May 15, 2001. www.fec.gov.
14. Godwin, R. K. and Seldon, B. J. (2001) "What Corporations Really Want from Government: The Public Provision of Private Goods." University of Texas at Dallas, Political Economy Working Paper 11/01.
15. Grier, K. B. and Munger, M. C. (1991) "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions." Economic Inquiry, 29: 24-43.
16. Groseclose, T. and Stewart, C. III. (1998) "The Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-91." American Journal of Political Science, 42(2): 453-474.
17. Heckman, J. J. and Snyder, J. M. (1997) "Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators." Rand Journal of Economics, 28(0): S142-S189.
18. Kalt, J. P. and Zupan, M. A. (1984) "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics." American Economic Review, 74(3): 280-300.
19. Kalt, J. P. and Zupan, M. A. (1990) "The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators : Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions." Journal of Law and Economics, 33: 103-131.
20. Kau, J. B. and Rubin, P. H. (1979) "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting." Journal of Law and Economics, 22: 365-384.
21. Kau, J. B. and Rubin, P. H. (1993) "Ideology, Voting, and Shirking." Public Choice, 76(1/2): 151-172.
22. Koford, K. (1989) "Dimensions in Congressional Voting." American Political Science Review, 83: 949-962.
23. Kroszner, R. S. and Stratmann, T. (1999) "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees." American Economic Review, 88(5): 1163-1187.
24. Langlois, R. (1994) "Risk and Uncertainty." In: Boettke, P. J. (Ed.) The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics. Cheltanham, UK and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishers, pp. 118-122.
25. Leighton, W. A. and López, E. J. (2002) "Committee Assisngments and the Cost of Party Loyalty." Political Research Quarterly, 55(1): 59-90.
26. López, E. J. (1997) "The Political Economy of Congressional Term Limits." Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, George Mason University.
27. López E. J. and Sutter, D. (2002) "Policy Correction: Senate Voting on the Endangered Species Act." Working paper, presented at 2002 Public Choice Society Meetings.
28. Lott, J. R. Jr. (1987). "Political Cheating." Public Choice, 53: 169-186.
29. Lott, J. R. Jr. (1989) "Explaining Challengers' Campaign Expenditures: The Importance of Sunk Nontransferable Brand Name." Public Finance Quarterly, 17(1): 108-118.
30. Lott, J. R. and Bronars, S. G. (1993) "Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives." Public Choice, 76(1/2): 125-149.
31. Lott, J. R. Jr. and Davis, M. L. (1992) "A Critical Review and Extension of the Political Shirking Literature." Public Choice, 74: 461-484.
32. McCormick, R. E. and Tollison, R. D. (1981) Politicians Legislation and the Economy: An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government. Boston: Martinus-Nijhoff.
33. Menger, Carl. [1871(1981)] Principles of Economics, Translated by James Dingwall and Bert F. Hoselitz. New York: New York University Press.
34. Moser, P. (1999) The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions. Cheltenham, UK and Northhampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishers.
35. O'Driscoll, G. P. and Rizzo, M. J. (1985) The Economics of Time and Ignorance. London: Routledge.
36. Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
37. Peltzman, S. (1976) "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation." Journal of Law and Economics, 19: 211-240.
38. Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1997) Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
39. Rogoff, K. (1990) "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles." American Economic Review, 80(1): 21-36.
40. Tullock, G. (1967) "The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft." Western Economic Journal, 5: 224-232.
41. von Mises, L. [1966(1949)] Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, 3rd revised edn., New Haven: Yale University Press.
42. Wohlgemuth, M. (1999) "Entry Barriers in Politics, or: Why Politics, Like Natural Monopoly, Is Not Organised as an Ongoing Market-Process." Review of Austrian Economics, 12(2): 175-200.
43. Wright, M. B. (1993) "Shirking and Political Support in the U.S. Senate, 1964-1984." Public Choice, 76(1/2): 103-123.