Zhuangzi and the nature of metaphor

Philosophy East and West

Volumn 56, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 370-391

  Chong, Kim Chong ^a  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

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EID: 43249150768     PISSN: 00318221     EISSN: 15291898     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/pew.2006.0033     Document Type: Review

References (52)

1. See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)
2. Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind - The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987)
3. and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh - The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999)
4. Some readers might think it necessary to state at the outset what the term "metaphor" refers to in this essay. Thus, for instance, a metaphor has been technically and narrowly defined as being distinct from a simile. In the latter case a comparison is made between two things, for example "O my love's like a red, red rose." In a metaphor, instead of a comparison "a word or expression that in literal usage denotes one kind of thing is applied to a distinctly different kind of thing." Using the same example, we would have the metaphor "O my love is a red, red rose" (see M. H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, 7th ed. [Boston: Heinle and Heinle, 1999], p. 97). I shall use the term "metaphor" more broadly in this essay, and, as we shall see, the nature of metaphor is itself a matter of contention. A broader use of "metaphor" is shared by all the writers discussed. Thus, Robert Allinson describes metaphor as "a reduced myth" (A34). Davidson, while observing the technical distinction between metaphor and simile, stresses that his view of what a metaphor is depends "on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they comprise" (D247)
5. It has been observed that "by drawing the meaning/use distinction in the way Davidson intends for it to be drawn, it becomes possible to view metaphor as importantly similar to a wide variety of other linguistic phenomena" (see Marga Reimer, "Davidson on Metaphor," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 [2001]: 143)
6. Mark Johnson, too, has stated, "I will not be using 'metaphor' in the traditional sense as merely a figure of speech; rather I shall identify it as a pervasive, indispensable structure of human understanding by means of which we figuratively comprehend our world" (see Johnson, The Body in the Mind, p. XX)
7. With the exception of a "dead metaphor," which is defined as "one which, like 'the leg of a table' or 'the heart of the matter,' has been used so long and become so common that its users have ceased to be aware of the discrepancy between vehicle and tenor" (see Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, p. 98)
8. Lakoff and Johnson, however, warn against being too quick in thinking of certain metaphors as "dead" (see Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, pp. 124-126)
9. For discussions of whether Zhuangzi is a relativist, see Allinson, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation, especially chapter 8
10. and Philip J. Ivanhoe, "Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?" in Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds., Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996)
11. Both Allinson and Ivanhoe discuss authors who attribute a relativistic position to Zhuangzi, for example Chad Hansen, "A Tao of Tao in Chuang-tzu," in Victor H. Mair, ed., Experimental Essays on Chuangtzu (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1983)
12. and David Wong, Moral Relativity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)
13. A. C. Graham refers to Zhuangzi as holding an "uncompromising moral relativism" (G4). My view is that Zhuangzi is not a relativist, at least in the sense that he does not propositionally state any thesis of relativism. The debate regarding skepticism and relativism in the Zhuangzi has been carried forward in Scott Cook, ed., Hiding the World in the World - Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003)
14. Reimer, "Davidson on Metaphor," p. 145
15. Reimer cites Richard Moran, "Metaphor," in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), as putting forth this objection to Davidson
16. Moran refers to Robert Stalnaker, "Pragmatics," in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., Semantics of Language (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972)
17. The "Qiwulun" is the second chapter of the seven "Inner Chapters" of the Zhuangzi, and this chapter is generally considered to be the work of Zhuangzi himself. Graham notes that "The last word in the title [lun] is sometimes understood as 'discourse' ('The discourse on evening things out'), sometimes in its more basic sense of 'sort out (in coherent discourse).' Comparison with the three-word titles of the other Inner chapters favours the latter alternative" (G48). Graham also speculates that "it was a Syncretist editor of the second century B.C. who devised the headings" of the Inner Chapters (G29). I shall not be concerned with philological matters such as these; readers who are interested should consult Harold Roth, "Who Compiled the Chuang Tzu?" in Henry Rosemont, Jr., ed., Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts (La Salle: Open Court, 1991)
18. and A. C. Graham, "How Much of Chuang Tzu Did Chuang Tzu Write?" in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986). Nevertheless, some questions of textual reading will arise, and I shall note these in the course of the discussion
19. For the Chinese text, I have consulted Chen Guying (Guuying), Zhuangzi jin zhu jin yi, rev. ed., 2 vols. (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu, 2000)
20. and Guo Qingfan, Zhuangzi jishi, 4 vols, (reprint, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1993)
21. For the English translations, I have consulted Burton Watson, trans., The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu
22. Graham, Chuang-tzǔ: The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the Book Chuang-tzǔ
23. and James Legge, The Texts of Taoism (Oxford University Press, 1891; reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1962). I have modified the translations where I have felt this necessary
24. One might be tempted to say that there are two selves or two levels of the self represented by wu and wo, and that the wo-self is what is disposed of in Nanguo Ziqi's case. However, this positing of two levels of the self may not be necessary. Nanguo Ziqi is perhaps simply saying (as we shall see) that he has freed himself from certain psychological and emotional states. For an interpretation of wu and wo as two levels of self, see David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking from the Han (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 57
25. Harold Oshima describes an important function of metaphor as "the model whereby the abstract idea is actually imagined and pictured. More than just a descriptive analogy decorating an idea, it is the determinative model for the understanding of that idea" (Harold Oshima, "A Metaphorical Analysis of the Concept of Mind in the Chuang-tzu," in Victor H. Mair, ed., Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu, p. 73)
26. The following is from chapter 7, one of the Inner Chapters: The Perfect Man uses his xin like a mirror - going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing. Therefore he can win out over things and not hurt himself zhi ren zhi yong xin ruo jing, bu jiang bu ying, ying er bu cang, gu neng sheng wu er bu shang. (W97; Chen, Zhuangzi jin zhu jin yi, p. 238) The following is from chapter 13: The sage is still (jing) not because he takes stillness to be good and therefore is still
27. Cecilia Wee has alerted me (independently of the papers cited below) to the similarity between Zhuangzi and the Pyrrhonian skepticism of Sextus Empiricus, whose aim was the attainment of ataraxia or peace of mind gained through epochē or the suspension of (dogmatic) judgment. Lisa Raphals makes a distinction between skeptical recommendations and methods on the one hand, and skeptical doctrine on the other. While the latter is self-refuting, the former is not, and Raphals gives an account of Zhuangzi's skeptical method (Lisa Raphals, "Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus," in Kjellberg and Ivanhoe, Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi
28. see also Paul Kjellberg's "Sextus Empiricus, Zhuangzi, and Xunzi" in the same volume). While the stated parallel between Zhuangzi's project of "clarity" and ataraxia is noted, I shall reserve judgment on whether Zhuangzi was a skeptic in any sense. This would call for further investigation that goes beyond the confines of this essay
29. But see Chad Hansen, "Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi," in Scott Cook, ed., Hiding the World in the World
30. The Chinese word used here is yan. Chen reads this as se i.e., sealed or clogged up (Zhuangzi jin zhu jin yi, p. 49 n. 16). The ideal clarity of the xin is elsewhere described as being in an empty mode of "fasting" and as "forgetting."
31. See Harold Oshima, "A Metaphorical Analysis of the Concept of Mind in the Chuang-tzu," p. 77
32. and Antonio Cua, "Forgetting Morality," in his Moral Vision and Tradition (Washington D.C.: Catholic University Press of America, 1998)
33. Shuen-fu Lin, "The Language of the 'Inner Chapters' of the Chuang Tzu," in The Power of Culture: Studies in Chinese Cultural History, ed. Willard J. Peterson, Andrew H. Plaks, and Ying-shih Yü (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1994), p. 65
34. I have benefited greatly from this excellent paper. I have changed Lin's Wade-Giles romanizations to hanyu pinyin. Lin notes A. C. Graham's description of zhi yan as a "spillover saying" and his description that "It is speech characterized by the intelligent spontaneity of Taoist behavior in general, a fluid language which keeps its equilibrium through changing meanings and viewpoints." We should also note Graham's remarks that zhi yan "says most when it says least and least when it says most, that it shifts freely from one standpoint to another" (G65 and 26, respectively). Watson says that zhi yan are words that "adapt to and follow along with the fluctuating nature of the world and thus achieve a state of harmony" (W303, quoted in Lin, "The Language of the 'Inner Chapters' of the Chuang Tzu," pp. 65-66). Lin also notes that zhi yan is a pun on the zhi of zhi li, which refers to certain crippled and deformed characters in the text. This makes zhi yan refer to "words that are jumbled [i.e., deformed], having neither a head not a tail" (Lin, ibid., pp. 66-67). Zhuangzi's words do seem - deliberately - to have this jumbled nature. The jumbled nature of Zhuangzi's words reminds the sensitive reader that, just like deformed characters and gnarled trees, they may still have some use or uses
35. See also Youru Wang, "The Strategies of 'Goblet Words': Indirect Communication in the Zhuangzi," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31 (2) (June 2004): 195-218
36. Originally, instead of, we have (as, e.g., in the Guo Qingfan edition). The reason for the emendation is that pairs with instead of (knowledge) (Chen, Zhuangzi jin zhu jin yi, p. 61 n. 2)
37. The passage above regarding the mutual existence of binary pairs has in recent years been interpreted in deconstructionist ways. For instance, Youru Wang explains it as saying: "The other has its absent presence in the one. This absence, this trace of the other, paves the way for the transformation of everything, and makes possible the subversion of everything" (Youru Wang, "Philosophy of Change and the Deconstruction of Self in the Zhuangzi," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27 [3] [2000]: 350)
38. The following Derridean readings have appeared in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy: Michelle Yeh, "The Deconstructive Way: A Comparative Study of Derrida and Chuang-tzu," vol. 10 (1983): 95-126
39. Chung-ying Cheng, "A Taoist Interpretation of 'Difference' in Derrida," 17 (1990): 19-30
40. Chi-hui Chien, "'Theft's Way': A Comparative Study of Chuang Tzu's Tao and Derridean Trace," 17 (1990): 31-49
41. Wayne D. Ownes, "Tao and Difference: The Existential Implications," 20 (1993): 261-277
42. See Also Mark Berkson, "Language: The Guest of Reality - Zhuangzi and Derrida on Language, Reality, and Skillfulness," in Kjellberg and Ivanhoe, Essays on Skepticism, Relativisim, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi
43. Yuet Keung Lo, "To Use or Not to Use: The Idea of Ming in the Zhuangzi," Monumenta Serica 47 (1999): 150
44. See also p. 18 of Watson's "Introduction." It might be objected that this example cannot be attributed to Zhuangzi, since it is from chapter 22 of the Zhuangzi, one of the "Outer Chapters" and not from the "Inner Chapters," which are generally attributed to Zhuangzi himself. As Harold Roth puts it, chapters 17-22 contain material "which often imitates the themes and style of the 'Inner Chapters,' which ... scholars conclude represents the writings of later followers of Chuang Tzu" (Roth, "Who Compiled the Chuang Tzu?" p. 81). Nevertheless, the example is congruent with Zhuangzi's philosophy of non-adherence to any particular value, let alone any "higher" value
45. Youru Wang, "Philosophy of Change and the Deconstruction of Self in the Zhuangzi," p. 3, has a fine discussion of the infinite transformation of things
46. Robert Allinson's more recent essay "On Chuang Tzu as a Deconstructionist with a Difference," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 30 (3/4) (September/December 2003): 487-500, despite its title, still talks of a movement from lower to higher, a one-way transformation, and a point of "truth." Referring to the "myth of a fish that is deconstructed as a fish and reconstructed as a bird" in the first chapter of the Zhuangzi, he says: The deeper, analogical truth that is prefigured here is a one-way transformation, from bound vision to unbound vision. It is not an endless, cyclical transformation of fish into birds and birds back into fish. It is a movement from lower to higher, from that which is bound to that which is free. It is also not a transformation from a state of knowledge to a state of confusion. It is a transformation from a point of view that is limited to a point of view that is unrestricted and far seeing, (p. 488) And in the next paragraph, he goes on: "The bird that flies upward into the air symbolizes the attainment of a higher state...." Referring to a dream story in the "Qiwulun" that mentions a "Great Awakening," Allinson says: "But the dream story is, after all, only a metaphor. It is a metaphor that on a physical level stands for a mental awakening on a higher level" (p. 493)
47. Hans-Georg Möller, "Zhuangzi's 'Dream of the Butterfly' - A Daoist Interpretation," Philosophy East and West 49 (4) (1999): 439-450
48. A term used by Mark Johnson in The Body in the Mind, p. 72
49. See especially chapter 2, "The Cognitive Unconscious." The reference to "unconscious conceptual systems" is on p. 13, and "the hidden hand" on p. 14
50. As has been done by Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action - Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003)
51. Just to give an example of how Lakoff and Johnson's methodology is applied, consider the following. Slingerland detects in the Zhuangzi a combination of the SELF AS CONTAINER and the ESSENTIAL SELF metaphorical schemas, giving rise to the following conceptual structure (the arrows depict a conceptual projection or mapping from a sensorimotor domain to the abstract domain of self): Inside of Container → Real Self (Fits Subject/Essence) Outside of Container → False Self (Does Not Fit Subject/Essence) Citing Confucius' (Confucius as figuratively portrayed in the Zhuangzi) warning Yan Hui against trying to set a certain king straight: "Outwardly he will accord with you, but inside he will be unrepentant," Slingerland comments, "In other words, he will falsely ('on the surface,' as we would say in English) agree with Yan Hui's advice, but he will not really take it to heart. As in English and the other Warring States texts we have examined, this coordination of 'inner' with the Essential Self and 'outer' with the False Self seems to be a universally accepted convention that would not need to be justified or explained to the reader" (Slingerland, Effortless Action, p. 187)
52. I have discussed Slingerland's application of conceptual metaphor to Chinese philosophy in another paper titled "Metaphorical Use versus Metaphorical Essence: Examples from Chinese Philosophy," in Davidson's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement, edited by Bo Mou (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006)