The strategies of "goblet words": Indirect communication in the Zhuangzi

Journal of Chinese Philosophy

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 195-218

  Wang, Youru ^a  

^a ROWAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 60950687761     PISSN: 03018121     EISSN: 15406253     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6253.2004.00150.x     Document Type: Article

References (105)

1. See The Rhetoric of Aristotle, translated by Lane Cooper (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1932), pp. 6, 8-9
2. Aristotle demarcates three components of communication: the speaker, the message, and the receiver. The purpose of communication, as a transfer of information, is to persuade the listener to accept the information in a direction and manner desired by the speaker. This conception of communication is also related to his correspondence theory of language. See Aristotle De lnterpretatione, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol. 1, p. 25
3. Here I refer to the following philosophical discussions: Heidegger's criticism of the traditional concept of communication as the conveying of experience from the interior of one subject into the interior of another (see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson [New York: Harper & Row, 1962], pp. 197, 205)
4. Merleau-Ponty's assertion that all language is indirect (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, translated by Richard C. McCleary [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964], pp. 42-44)
5. Derrida's refutation of communication as telecommunication (Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982], pp. 311-321)
6. Wittgenstein's confirmation of interpretive guesswork on the part of listener in communication (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe [New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1953], pp. 210,304,363). Due to limited space, in this paper, I cannot discuss all these philosophers' views in detail
7. I adopt Kuang-ming Wu's translation of yuyan as "dwelling words." See his "Goblet Words, Dwelling Words, Opalescent Words - Philosophical Methodology of Chuang Tzu," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 15,no. 1 (1988),p. 5
8. I also adopt one of his translations of chongyan as "double-layered words." See his The Butterfly as Companion (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 263
9. I do not conceal the fact that this study benefits from Kuang-ming Wu's precursory discussion of Zhuangzi's indirect communication in his Chuang Tzu: World Philosopher at Play (New York & Chicago: The Crossroad Publishing Company & Scholars Press, 1982). However, readers may find that the ensuing investigation is more systematic and comprehensive when compared with Wu's discussion. Furthermore, this examination of Zhuangzi's strategy of indirect communication is presented in a postmodern context. It addresses issues that have been the primary concerns of postmodern discourse
10. A. C. Graham, trans., Chuang-tzu: The Seven Inner Chapters (hereafter CSC) (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 25
11. and his Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989), p. 200
12. See his A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (New York: Oxford University of Press, 1992), chapter 8. I take a more comprehensive attitude toward the textual materials of different chapters of the Zhuangzi Contrary to Hansen's ignorance of the value of the outer and the mixed chapters for the study of Zhuangzi's thought, I find no reason to neglect the significant content of those chapters in my investigation. However, I maintain the principle of consistency between useful materials in those chapters and Zhuangzi's thought present in the inner chapters that have been conventionally considered the core of Zhuangzi's philosophy
13. Disputers of the Tao, p. 201
14. Cf. Zhang Mosheng, Zhuangzi Xinshi (Taipei: Tiangong Shuju, 1993), pp. 16-17
15. Qian Mu, Zhuangzi Zuanjian (Taipei: Dongda Book Company, 1985), p. 228
16. Huang Jinhong, Xinyi Zhuangzi Duben (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju, 1974), p. 320
17. Wang Shumin, Zhuangzi Jiaoquan (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiusuo, 1988), vol. 2, pp. 1090-1091
18. Shuen-fu Lin, "Confucius in the 'Inner Chapters' of the Chuang Tzu" Tamkang Review 18, no. 1-4 (1988), p. 384
19. Denegation is an untranslated form of French word denegation recently used by some English writers. The cause for this usage is connected to Derrida's essay "How to avoid speaking: Denials." See Mark Taylor, "nO nOt nO," Nots (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 36-37
20. and Toby Foshay, "Denegation, Nondual-ity, and Language in Derrida and Dogen," Philosophy East & West 44, no. 3 (1994), p. 547. More details about the use of this term will be provided in the following discussion
21. For the study of similar strategies used by deconstruction, negative theology, and Eastern religious-philosophical traditions, see Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, eds., Derrida and Negative Theology, and Robert Scharlemann, ed., Negation and Theology (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992)
22. Burton Watson, trans., The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (hereafter CWC) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 303, nl
23. 75/5. The numbers here and throughout the essay are, unless otherwise indicated, the numbers of the pages and lines of the original Chinese text Zhuangzi presented in A Concordance to Chuang Tzu, Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 20 (Taipei: Chinese Materials and Research Aids Service Center, 1966)
24. Cf. CWC, p. 304
25. Victor Mair, trans., Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu (hereafter WW) (New York: Bantam Books, 1994), p. 279
26. James Legge, trans., The Text of Taoism (hereafter TT) (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), vol. 1, p. 196
27. Italics are mine. 7/90-92. The translation is partially based on Mair's and Watson's. See WW, p. 23
28. and CWC, pp. 48-49
29. 4/30-31. Cf. A. C. Graham, CSC, p. 53
30. 89/17. Cf. WW, p. 326
31. 75/8-9. My own translation
32. 93/64-67. My own translation. Cf. WW, p. 343
33. CWC, p. 373
34. CSC, p. 283
35. TT, vol. 2, pp. 227-228
36. Cancha chugui zhici is the re-phrasing of the original Chinese words "qici sui cancha er chugui keguan." 93/67
37. Gao Heng, Zhuangzi Tianxiapian Jianzheng, in Lao Lie Zhuang Sanzi Jicheng Bubian, edited by Yan Lingfeng (Taipei: Chengwen Chubanshe, 1982), vol. 56, p. 44
38. Wang Xianqian, Zhuangzi Jijie (Taipei: Shijie Shuju, 1992), p. 222
39. Gao Heng, Zhuangzi Tianxiapian Jianzheng, p. 44
40. The term chugui carries the same meaning as the term diaogui does. Both refer to paradoxical words. See Wang Shumin, Zhuangzi Jiaoquan, vol. 3, p. 1348
41. and Chen Guying, Zhuangzi Jinzhu Jinyi (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 1990), p. 886
42. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, and The Oxford English Dictionary, second edition
43. 36/65-66
44. 15/4. My translation
45. Lin Xiyi, Nanhua Zhenjing Kouyi, in Zhuangzi Jicheng Chubian, edited by Yan Lingfeng (Taipei: Yiwen Yinshuguan, 1972), vol. 8, p. 1026, "renjiekeyin, yinzhieryouwei.'"
46. Kuang-ming Wu, Chuang Tzu: World Philosopher at Play, p. 18
47. 5/51. WW, p. 18
48. 4/24. My translation. Cf. CSC, p. 52
49. CWC, p. 39
50. See Guo Qingfan, Zhuangzi Jishi (Bejing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1964), p. 948, "suiwuerbian, feizhiyishougu .. . suirencongbian,jiwuchangzhu"
51. This definition is provided by Xuanying, quoted and followed by Wang Xianqian in his Zhuangzi Jijie, p. 181
52. The majority of commentators since Guo Xiang have followed this definition. Also see Watson, CWC, p. 303, nl
53. 75/1. Cf. CWC, p. 303
54. WW, p. 278
55. For a full discussion of Heidegger's position on the concept of metaphor, see Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, translated by Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin, and John Costello (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. 280-284
56. Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Heidegger on Metaphor and Metaphysics," in Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, edited by Christopher Macann (London: Routledge, 1992), vol. 3, pp. 293-320
57. Donald Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean," in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 262
58. Kuang-ming Wu, The Butterfly as Companion, p. 108
59. Here I borrow Derrida's words. See Jacques Derrida, "The Retrait of Metaphor," Enclitic 2, no. 2 (1978), p. 22
60. Shuen-fu Lin, "Confucius in the 'Inner Chapters' of the Chuang Tzu," p. 398
61. The similar interpretation also appears in Liu Guangyi, Zhuangxue Lice (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1986), p. 253
62. 28/63-65. The translation is based on Mair's and involves some changes made by me. The interpretation of the last sentence follows those of Guo Xiang and Cheng Xuanying. See Guo Qingfan, Zhuangzi Jishi, pp. 396-397
63. Huang Jinhong, Xinyi Zhuangzi Duben,p. 152
64. Cao Chuji,Zhuangzi Qianz,hu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1982),p. 157
65. Mair, WW, p. 101
66. Such as an Aristotelian "hearer," whose function in communication is merely a passive "observer," or an "object" of the speaker. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 2159
67. 5/49-51. Watson, CWC, p. 43. I made a slight modification for the translation
68. Elsewhere Zhuangzi says: "Dao cannot be thought of as being, nor can it be thought of as nonbeing." And: "There is no past and no present, no beginning and no end." 73/79-80. 60/73
69. Watson, CWC, pp. 293, 245
70. 60/67-68. My translation. Cf. Mair, WW, p. 220
71. "Taichu youwuwu. . ." 30/37-38
72. My translation. I benefit from reading Charles W Fu's unpublished manuscript of translation. For Fu's interpretation, which I have followed in my translation, see his "Lao-Zhuang, Guoxiang and Chan: A Hermeneutic Approach to the Question of the Ideological Continuity between Daoism and Chan," Cong Xlfang Zhexue Dao Chanfojiao (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1989), p. 392
73. The punctuation and reading of the original Chinese sentence I have adopted in this translation were supported by a number of important Chinese commentators, such as Ma Qichang (Dingben Zhuangzigu [Hefei: huangshan shushe, 1989], p. 84)
74. Yaonai (Zhuangzi Zhangyi, quoted by Ma Qichang, Dingben Zhuangzigu, p. 84)
75. Liu Wendian (Zhuangzi Buzheng [Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe, 1980, reprint], p. 390)
76. Lin Yunming (Zhuangziyin, quoted by Cui Dahua, Zhuangzi Qijie [Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou Guji Chubanshe, 1988], p. 378), etc
77. Also see Wang Shumin, Zhuangzi Jiaoquan, vol. 1, p. 435. Wang mentions some of these commentators' readings but does not follow them
78. Here I restrict my discussion to Zhuangzi's use of denegation as linguistic strategy. Therefore, the contextual meanings of these two passages are not explored sufficiently
79. Mark Taylor, Nots, p. 36
80. Kierkegaard clearly connected negativity with the indirection of communication. He wrote: "The highest principles for all thought can be demonstrated only indirectly (negatively)." See his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 197
81. Dao De Jing, chapter 78, "Zhengyan ruofan." Cf. Lao Tzu/Tao Te Ching, translated by D. C. Lau (London: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 140
82. The soteriological and therapeutic concern in the Dao De Jing is not as explicit as in the Zhuangzi This might be one factor, among others, that underlies the contextual differences between Laozi's use of paradoxes and Zhuangzi's. Here I confine myself only to the discussion of Zhuangzi's use
83. "[T]here is something whose nature is changeless. .. . [I]f anything is of necessity, it will not be both so and not so." Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. IV, chap. 5 (1010a-1010b), translated by W. D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, pp. 1595-1596
84. See Joseph Margolis, "Philosophy in the 'New' Rhetoric, Rhetoric in the 'New' Philosophy," in Steven Mailloux, ed., Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 114-115
85. Notably, Nishida Kitaro has also criticized Aristotelian logic as a "substance logic" from the perspective of Eastern philosophy and maintained that historical reality "transforms itself without underlying substance or ground." See his Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, translated by David A. Dilworth (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 62, 75, 126
86. A quite systematic investigation of the limits of traditional logic in dealing with changes and meaningful contradictions can be found in George Melhuish, The Paradoxical Nature of Reality (Bristol: St. Vincent's Press, 1973), see especially pp. 1,18-19
87. 55/34. My translation. Cf. Mair, WW, p. 203
88. 44/46-47. Watson, CWC, p. 182
89. In the "Qi Wu Lun" chapter, Zhuangzi says: "That comes out of this, and this is too conditioned by that, which is to say, that and this give birth to each other." 4/27-28. Cf. CWC, p. 39
90. 4/29-31. CWC, p. 40
91. 4/35. A. C. Graham, CSC, p. 53
92. 6/74. Cf. Mair, WW, p. 21
93. A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao, pp. 142-143
94. See his Zhongguo Zhexue Shijiu Jiang (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1983), p. 142
95. However, Mou Zongsan incorrectly interprets Zhuangzi's paradox as a dialectical paradox similar to Hegel's dialectic. Hegel does utilize paradox. He integrates paradox into his dialectical system, which is based upon the absolute synthesis of Being overcoming all paradoxes. (For a recent examination of Hegel's use of paradox and his system, see Howard P. Kainz, Paradox, Dialectic, and System [University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988].) Zhuangzi does not fabricate a system that supersedes all paradoxes. For Zhuangzi, the world and human existence are paradoxical as they are
96. Zhuangzi regards Hui Shi's use of paradoxes only for wining disputes as "bewildering flamboyance" which should be rejected by the sage (see 5/47, and Mair, WW, p. 18), and as being "confined by things" (see 66/34, and WW, p. 242)
97. Cf. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 222
98. See W. V. Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 5,7
99. I borrow this term from Kuang-ming Wu; see his The Butterfly as Companion, p. 258
100. 6/83. Mair, WW, p. 23
101. 45/88-91. WW, p. 165
102. See A. C. Graham, CSC, "Introduction," p. 9
103. Lyotard uses the term "paralogy" to designate the generally irregular move of language game, which cannot be reduced to the rules of logic and allows for the formation of paradoxes. See his The Postmodern Condition, translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 43, 60
104. According to Thomas Kent's interpretation, paralogy subsumes and lives beyond logic. See his Paralogic Rhetoric (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1993), pp. 4-5. Here I use both "translogical" and "paralogical" to mean that Zhuangzi's paradox works and plays at the boundaries and limits of logic. It cannot be reduced to either logic or the illogical
105. For more discussions of Zhuangzi's liminological play, see Youru Wang, "An Inquiry into the Liminology of Language in the Zhuangzi and in Chan Buddhism," International Philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 2 (1997), pp. 161-178