Political externalities, federalism, and a proposal for an interstate environmental impact assessment policy

Harvard Environmental Law Review

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 49-94

  Hall, Noah D ^a  

^a WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; FEDERAL SYSTEM;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 43049154710     PISSN: 01478257     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (388)

1. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2346 (1996) ("[T]he rationale for federal regulation premised on the problem of interstate externalities is analytically unimpeachable.").
2. See also Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 140 (2005) ("The strongest case for federal involvement comes in the context of interstate spillovers, such as when pollution crosses state lines and the affected states are unable to resolve the conflict on their own.").
3. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) ("Given the inherent difficulties in regulation by any single state, transboundary pollution would seem to present a clear case for shifting regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of governance.").
4. See generally id. at 947 (the federal adjudicative system has not given "the kind of sustained attention to the problem [of transboundary pollution] that is probably necessary if a coherent body of decisional law is to emerge"); 959-61 (describing the shortcomings of federal statutory law); 965-67 (describing the shortcomings of regional compacts and agreements).
5. See generally Revesz, supra note 1 (providing a new approach to interstate air pollution as a model for federal policy on interstate environmental harms).
6. See Merrill, supra note 2.
7. Merrill provides a new liability scheme for transboundary pollution based on the "golden rule" that an "affected state is entitled to be treated by the source state in the same way as the affected state treats its own citizens." Id. at 936.
8. See generally Noah D. Hall, Toward A New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006) (advancing cooperative horizontal federalism as an approach for states to bind themselves to common substantive and procedural environmental protection standards, implemented individually with regional resources and enforcement).
9. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 976-79.
10. Inefficient interstate environmental harms refer to those environmental harms that are only allowed because the harm is not imposed on the source state.
11. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2003).
12. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 977-78.
13. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000)).
14. See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 154 (2004).
15. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 29 (1996).
16. Compare Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) ("[the state] has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air")
17. with Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 525-26 (1906) (declining to impose liability on the source state based on uncertain evidence of causation and harm).
18. See, e.g., 206 U.S. at 239; 200 U.S. 496.
19. Most notably, both the federal CAA and the federal CWA contain provisions intended to address interstate air and water pollution, respectively. See CAA §§ 110(a)(2)(D), 126(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7426(b) (2000);
20. CWA § 402(b)(3)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3)(5) (2000).
21. In addition to the adjudicative function of the federal courts and the legislative function of Congress, the federal government has attempted to address interstate pollution through executive interpretation and enforcement by EPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2007) (interpreting the CWA to prohibit issuance of a permit to a point source "[w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States");
22. see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (upholding EPA's interpretation of the CWA).
23. See Adler, supra note 1, at 162-63 (criticizing the minimal attention paid to interstate externalities under congressional environmental statutes, the limitations of the federal courts in the application of interstate nuisance, and EPA's poor record in addressing interstate harms).
24. See also Revesz, supra note 1, at 2346 (noting that the problem of interstate externalities "has not been effectively redressed in the current [federal] pollution-control scheme");
25. Merrill, supra note 2, at 947, 959-61, 965-67;
26. Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11086, 11092 (2001) (noting that the "EPA has not done a very good job of addressing transboundary pollution").
27. See Hall, supra note 6, at 410-11.
28. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2375.
29. See also Hall, supra note 6, at 454 ("For a compact to be enacted, it requires uniform ratification by each state's legislative body and approval by a simple majority in both houses of Congress, which can modify the terms of the compact to protect national interests. The process for enacting a compact is thus a political obstacle course.").
30. A recent survey indicated that thirty-two states have some form of an environmental impact assessment policy modeled after NEPA. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 617-18 (2001).
31. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
32. Id. at 817.
33. See Butler & Macey, supra note 13, at 29.
34. Benton tried unsuccessfully to use a social utility defense, stating that "the building of the house for hogs was necessary for the sustenance of man." William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817, 821-22. Essentially this argument is based on the premise that Benton's activities have positive externalities for society that outweigh the negative externalities to Aldred.
35. For the primary works on the efficiency and distributive justice of addressing externalities, see Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) and Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
36. For a thorough (but still partial) list of the subsequent academic discussion of pollution in the law and economics tradition, see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 n.2 (2004).
37. See discussion of inevitable interstate environmental harms at Part I.B., infra.
38. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2351.
39. See SAMUEL J. WILLIAMSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF AIR POLLUTION 219-25 (1973).
40. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2351.
41. The upstream/downstream siting incentives may also apply in the air pollution context, especially in locations where prevailing winds consistently blow in one direction. States may have an incentive to induce air pollution sources to locate close to their downwind borders to externalize the air pollution harms, although direct evidence of states providing such incentives is lacking. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2351, 2353.
42. See Daniel E. Ingberman, Siting Noxious Facilities: Are Markets Efficient?, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. S-20, S-23 (1995).
43. See also Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 421 (1995).
44. Robert B. Wiygul & Sharon C. Harrington, Environmental Justice in Rural Communities Part One: RCRA, Communities, and Environmental Justice, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 405, 437-38 (1993).
45. See id. at 409.
46. See id. at 410.
47. Buzbee, supra note 9, at 10.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See also Lincoln L. Davies, Just a Big, 'Hot Fuss'? Assessing the Value of Connecting Suburban Sprawl, Land Use, and Water Rights Through Assured Supply Laws, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. _ (forthcoming 2008).
51. These cities are included in the following Metropolitan Statistical Areas ("MSAs") and Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas ("CMSAs"): New York - Northern New Jersey - Long Island (NY, NJ, CT, PA CMSA), ranking 1; Chicago - Gary - Kenosha (IL, IN, WI CMSA), ranking 3; Washington - Baltimore (DC, MD, VA, WV CMSA), ranking 4; Philadelphia - Wilmington - Atlantic City (PA, NJ, DE, MD CMSA), ranking 6; Boston - Worcester - Lawrence (MA, NH, ME, CT CMSA), ranking 7; St. Louis (MO, IL MSA), ranking 18; Portland - Salem (OR, WA CMSA), ranking 23; Cincinnati - Hamilton (OH, KY, IN CMSA), ranking 24; Kansas City (MO, KS MSA), ranking 26; Norfolk - Virginia Beach - Newport News (VA, NC MSA), ranking 31; Las Vegas (NV, AZ MSA), ranking 32. CENSUS 2000 PHC-T-3. Ranking Tables for Metropolitan Areas: 1990 and 2000, tbl. 3: Metropolitan Areas Ranked by Population: 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).
52. Id.
53. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 970.
54. For an excellent analysis of the problem of protecting a multi-jurisdictional commons, see generally Buzbee, supra note 9.
55. I do not mean to suggest that pecuniary and psychological interstate harms "are somehow less 'real' than physical spillovers." Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 594 (1996). However, these problems are different in nature and warrant different legal and policy solutions.
56. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 968-70.
57. Id. at 969.
58. Compare Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) with Esty, supra note 43.
59. Merrill, supra note 2, at 969.
60. Professor Esty considers this problem a "choice of public" issue. See Esty, supra note 43, at 594.
61. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 968 n.184.
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., Cindi Lash, Lumber Firm Wants Use of Blackwater Falls State Park's Trail, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 5, 2006, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06309/ 735778-85.stm (describing a dispute over a logging company's attempts to turn a trail through Blackwater State Park, located in West Virginia, about three hours south of Pittsburgh, into a logging road; the park and its environs are "a popular recreation and vacation area for families and outdoors enthusiasts from West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C.").
64. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,388, 26,398 (June 19, 1978).
65. See The Geography of Rhode Island, http://www.netstate.com/states/ geography/ri_geography.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
66. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2343.
67. See, e.g., Dan Shine, Groups to Fight Garbage Imports, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 10, 2003, at B1 (reporting that nearly two dozen environmental, religious, and neighborhood groups launched a campaign to stop dumping of out-of-state trash in Michigan);
68. Jane Gordon, Our Air, Their Air: Most of It Is Bad, N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 10, 2002, § 14CN, at 1 (reporting that Connecticut residents protested construction of a cement plant in Greenport, New York, whose emissions would impact New England states). Professor Davies provides an excellent case study of these issues in the context of the dispute between Virginia Governor James S. Gilmore III and New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani over trash importation.
69. See Lincoln L. Davies, If You Give the Court a Commerce Clause: An Environmental Justice Critique of Supreme Court Interstate Waste Jurisprudence, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 280-89 (1999).
70. See Esty, supra note 12, at 154 ("In broad terms, 'path dependence' means that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the historical path leading to it.");
71. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 603-04 (2001).
72. Compare Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (Autumn 1995) (supporting the notion of improving both economic and environmental outcomes through the use of innovation) with Noah Walley & Bradley Whitehead, It's Not Easy Being Green, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1994, at 46 (arguing that there are very limited opportunities for improving environmental outcomes without incurring economic costs).
73. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 36-37 (2004) (citing Charles Wurster, Op-Ed, Of Salt .... N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1978, at A21).
74. Id.
75. It should be noted that this use of the term "political externality" differs substantively from the term's usage in public choice theory scholarship, in which the term describes the costs imposed on a dissident minority by the collective decisions of the majority within one political system. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 89 (1965) ("The member of the dissident minority suffers external effects of collective decisions enforced on him ...."). This concept has been applied to environmental policymaking by Professor Zywicki in describing the rent-seeking behavior of environmental advocacy groups that use their political power in governmental lobbying to pursue their preferences while imposing the costs of those preferences on other individuals and firms.
76. See Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 856-74 (1999).
77. See also Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 318 (2002).
78. The term "political externality" has also been used to describe the positive political and societal benefits of civil disobedience. See Eric Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace of Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257, 334 (1985).
79. Most recently, the term "horizontal political externalities" has been used to describe the situation when "political decisions impact the electoral outcome or approval ratings of other political actors or levels of government that were not involved in the decisionmaking." Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand of Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 109 (2006).
80. Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2054 (1993).
81. ANDRÉ DUA & DANIEL C. ESTY, SUSTAINING THE ASIA PACIFIC MIRACLE: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 59-60 (2d ed. 1997).
82. See Adler, supra note 1, at 140.
83. Id. at 160 ("The federal government is relatively absent when it comes to addressing interstate spillovers").
84. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907);
85. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) ("Missouri II").
86. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.").
87. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929);
88. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230;
89. Missouri II, 200 U.S. 496;
90. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
91. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972);
92. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
93. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
94. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
95. For excellent analyses of the Supreme Court's transboundary pollution case law, see generally Robert V. Percival, The CWA and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004)
96. and Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931 (1997).
97. For similarly excellent analyses of the Supreme Court's interstate waters equitable apportionment case law, see generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 392 (1985)
98. and, more recently, Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primer for Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 155 (2002).
99. Missouri II, 200 U.S. 496;
100. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) ("Missouri I").
101. See Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 212.
102. See id. at 210, 241-42.
103. See Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 517;
104. Missouri 1, 180 U.S. at 208, 212.
105. See Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 510;
106. Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 216.
107. See Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 526;
108. Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 212. The Court ultimately decided the case on the merits of the nuisance claim, and did not entertain the riparian diversion allegation as a sufficient basis for the suit.
109. See Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 216-18.
110. Id. at 241.
111. The Ninth Article of the Articles of Confederation had provided for a tribunal method of state-state dispute resolution, whereby the offended state would petition Congress to assemble the functional equivalent of an arbitration panel to hear and decide the controversy. See id., 180 U.S. at 220-21.
112. See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1;
113. Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books, 1992) ("[T]here are many other sources, besides interfering claims of boundary, from which bickerings and animosities may spring up among the members of the union .... Whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the states, are proper objects of federal superintendence and control.").
115. Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 249 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
116. Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 521.
117. See id.
118. See Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 236-37, 241.
119. See id. at 237-38, 241.
120. Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 522.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 523.
123. See id. at 522-23.
124. Id. at 523.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 523-24.
127. See id. at 522-26.
128. Id. at 523.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 526.
133. For example, the Court's difficulty in understanding complex scientific issues involving causation and its reluctance to address environmental claims was humorously displayed in the recent oral argument before the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). Justice Scalia referred to the situation in which carbon dioxide "leaves the air and goes up into the stratosphere." Counsel for petitioners responded: "Respectfully, Your Honor, it is not the stratosphere. It's the troposphere." Justice Scalia: "Troposphere, whatever. I told you before I'm not a scientist." (Laughter.) "That's why I don't want to have to deal with global warming, to tell you the truth." Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120).
134. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915) ("Georgia II");
135. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
136. Georgia I, 206 U.S. at 236.
137. Id. at 237.
138. See id. at 236-39.
139. See id. at 239.
140. See also Georgia II, 237 U.S. at 475-76.
141. See Georgia II, 237 U.S. at 477-78.
142. Most notably, the Supreme Court has allocated shared interstate waters under its doctrine of equitable apportionment, which considers the relevant state water use laws and equity concerning the competing states. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922);
143. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
144. See also Tarlock, supra note 71;
145. Abrams, supra note 71.
146. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980) ("Wisconsin VI");
147. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426 (1967) ("Wisconsin V");
148. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395 (1933) ("Wisconsin IV");
149. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696 (1930) ("Wisconsin III");
150. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930) ("Wisconsin II");
151. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929) ("Wisconsin I").
152. See Wisconsin I, 278 U.S. at 399-400.
153. See id. at 400.
154. See id. at 399. Hughes was originally appointed to the Supreme Court in 1910, but left the Court in 1916 to make a run for President. From 1921 to 1925, Hughes served as Secretary of State under President Warren G. Harding.
155. See id. at 407.
156. Id. at 408.
157. Id. at 409.
158. See id. at 420-21.
159. See id. at 421.
160. See Wisconsin II, 281 U.S. at 198, 201.
161. See also Wisconsin III, 281 U.S. at 697. Subsequent litigation in the Supreme Court continued over several decades regarding Illinois' compliance with the diversion reduction schedule and the amount of water allowed for domestic pumping, with the ultimate result being that the total allowable diversion was increased to 3200 cubic feet per second, the level at which it is now capped.
162. See Wisconsin VI, 449 U.S. 48;
163. Wisconsin V, 388 U.S. at 427;
164. Wisconsin IV, 289 U.S. 395.
165. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 944-46 (describing the Court's principles in these disputes as elusive).
166. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
167. Id. at 97-98.
168. 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
169. Id. at 342-43.
170. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972);
171. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
172. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) ("Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate federal standards to the courts through application of often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency.").
173. 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
174. Id. at 501.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 503-04.
177. Id. at 504.
178. Id. at 505.
179. Id. at 505.
180. See supra note 100.
181. See Wyandotte Chems., 401 U.S. at 502-03.
182. See also New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921) ("We cannot withhold the suggestion, inspired by the consideration of this case, that the grave problem of sewage disposal presented by the large and growing populations living on the shores of New York Bay is one more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives of the states so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any court however constituted.").
183. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2346;
184. Adler, supra note 1, at 140;
185. Butler & Macey, supra note 13, at 42.
186. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2346 (arguing that federal regulatory efforts should be focused on the problem of interstate environmental externalities);
187. Adler, supra note 1, at 140 ("The strongest case for federal involvement comes in the context of interstate spillovers, such as when pollution crosses state lines and the affected states are unable to resolve the conflict on their own.");
188. Butler & Macey, supra note 13, at 53 ("Interstate externalities are the only area where federal regulation may be superior to local regulation.").
189. The other primary rationales for federalization of environmental law address the 'race-to-the-bottom' phenomenon and advance public choice theory. See Revesz, supra note 46, at 1211-12.
190. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(1) (2000) (discussed below).
191. Id. § 7401.
192. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
193. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 954.
194. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2344.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(1).
196. See id. § 7408.
197. See id. §§ 7410-11, 7521.
198. By 1990, the CAA had resulted in a 40 percent reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions from electric utilities and a 75 percent reduction in total suspended particulate emissions from industrial and utility smokestacks. In addition, the CAA was largely responsible for a 50 percent reduction in carbon monoxide emissions, a 30 percent reduction in emissions of nitrogen oxides, a 45 percent reduction in emissions of volatile organic compounds, and a near elimination of lead emissions from motor vehicles. These reductions were achieved during a period in which population grew by 22.3 percent and the national economy grew by 70 percent. See EPA, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CAA, 1970 TO 1990, EPA-410-R-97-002 (1997), at 8, 15, 26, 55.
199. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2351.
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 7423(a)(1).
201. See also Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 406-11 (5th Cir. 1974),
202. rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
203. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2351.
204. See id. at 2355-58.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i).
206. Id. § 7426(b).
207. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., State and Federal Command-and-Control Regulation of Emissions From Fossil-Fuel Electric Power Generating Plants, 32 ENVTL. L. 369, 410-11 (2002).
208. See id. at 411;
209. Proposed Settlement Agreement, 63 Fed. Reg. 10,874, 10,875 (March 5, 1998).
210. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1036, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
211. Id. at 1067-68.
212. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2362-74;
213. New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
214. See also Merrill, supra note 2, at 960 ("The consistent losing streak of plaintiff states ... under the CAA suggests that even express statutory causes of action for transboundary pollution are of limited utility.").
215. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
216. See id. §§ 1311, 1314.
217. See id. § 1313.
218. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976).
219. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002).
220. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342, 1362(12).
221. Id. § 1342(b).
222. Id. § 1342(b)(3).
223. Id. § 1342(b)(5).
224. Id.
225. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 102 (1992) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)).
226. 679 U.S. 481, 490-91 (citations omitted).
227. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4).
228. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2007).
229. 503 U.S. at 92.
230. Id. at 106.
231. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 937 (citing Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910)).
232. id. at 957-58.
233. While rare, EPA has on occasion objected to a state-issued permit to protect another state's water quality pursuant to the CWA. See Champion Int'l Corp. v. EPA, 648 F. Supp. 1390, 1394 (W.D.N.C. 1986)
234. (permitting EPA to object to a permit issued to a paper mill by North Carolina to protect water quality in Tennessee), rev'd, vacated and remanded, 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988);
235. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D.N.M. 1993) (upholding EPA approval of the water quality standards of an Indian tribe (recognized as state under the CWA) that had imposed limitations on discharges by an upstream state and municipality).
236. Richard B. Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role of the Federal Courts, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 260-61 (1982).
237. Professor Merrill further argues that the failure of EPA to use the CWA to address interstate water pollution is a function of the statute's unrealis- tic strict liability regime. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 960-61, 992-97.
238. For more evidence that reliance on federal regulation to resolve interstate environmental disputes is misplaced, we can look to our neighbors to the north, as federal regulatory efforts in Canada have also failed to address interprovincial environmental impacts. See DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 232 (2003).
239. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
240. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
241. See also Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
242. See Culyer v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981) (congressional consent "transforms an interstate compact ... into a law of the United States").
243. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 128 (allowing prospective equitable relief as well as a legal remedy for past breaches).
244. See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution - A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 699 (1925).
245. See Adler, supra note 1, at 141.
246. Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 4 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002).
247. Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968).
248. Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Wisconsin.
249. Great Lakes Basin Compact, art. II, IV, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414-16 (1968).
250. Id., art. VI(G),(N), 82 Stat. at 417-18.
251. See also Hall, supra note 6, at 423-24.
252. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States and the Struggle Over the 'Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 838-39 (2005).
253. 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928)
254. 53 Stat. 785 (1939).
255. See Hall, supra note 6, at 411-12.
256. Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
257. Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).
258. See Dellapenna, supra note 189, at 837-50.
259. 54 Stat. 752 (1940).
260. See id.
261. Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http:// www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/ Great_Lakes_St_Lawrence_River_Basin_Water_Resources_Compact.pdf.
262. See generally Hall, supra note 6.
263. Id. at 406.
264. See id. at 406-07.
265. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water Law for a New Water Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 47 (2003);
266. Abrams, supra note 71.
267. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000)).
268. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 904, 904 n.1 (2002)
269. (citing COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFMR TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 3 (1997);
270. Lynton K. Caldwell, Implementing NEPA: A Non-Technical Political Task, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 25, 26 (Ray Clark & Larry Canter eds., 1997);
271. Ray Clark, NERA: The Rational Approach to Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 15-16 (Ray Clark & Larry Canter eds., 1997);
272. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW & LITIGATION § 1.01 (2d ed. 1992);
273. Michael C. Blumm, A Primer on Environmental Law and Some Directions for the Future, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 382 (1992);
274. William H. Rogers, Jr., The Most Creative Moments in the History of Environmental Law: "The Whats," 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 31)).
275. Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002).
276. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
277. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
278. Karkkainen, supra note 204, at 904-05 & nn.4-5
279. (Citing SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 251 (1984);
280. Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy Act's Processfor Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 54-55 (1996);
281. Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 693-96 (2000)).
282. Id. at 905.
283. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
284. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1502.9, 1503 (2007).
285. Karkkainen, supra note 204, at 913.
286. The Council on Environmental Quality was established by NEPA as an agency within the Executive Office of the President charged with the task of ensuring that federal agencies meet their obligations under NEPA. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344.
287. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY GUIDANCE ON NEPA ANALYSES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY IMPACTS (July 1, 1997), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/transguide.html.
288. Id. ("NEPA requires agencies to include analysis of reasonably foreseeable transboundary effects...").
289. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cit. 1972);
290. Swinomish Tribal Cmty. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 627 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cit. 1980);
291. Manitoba v. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2005).
292. See Karkkainen, supra note 204, at 905.
293. See Revesz, supra note 21, at 617-18.
294. See id. at 617-20.
295. For a listing of state environmental impact assessment laws, see MANDELKER, supra note 204, § 12.02[1].
296. The states that have a substantive requirement to reduce or mitigate negative environmental impacts identified in the environmental impact assessment are California, New York, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21,002.1(b) (2007);
297. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1) (2007);
298. MINN. STAT. § 116D.04(6) (2007);
299. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 61 (2007);
300. and D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-981 (2007).
301. See also Revesz, supra note 21, at 618-20.
302. The states that subject local governments to environmental impacts assessment requirements are California, New York, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and the state of Washington. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21,003(a), 21,063, 21,151 (defining "public agency" to include "any county, city and county, city, regional agency, public district, redevelopment agency, or other political subdivision");
303. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105 (defining covered "state agencies," as "any ... public authority or commission: and further defining "Local agency" as "[a]ny local agency, board, district, commission or governing body, including any city, county, and other political subdivision of the state);
304. MINN. STAT. § 116D.04(1)(a);
305. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 62 (defining as an "agency" subject to the statute "any authority of any political subdivision which is specifically created as an authority under special or general law");
306. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 43.21C.020 (2007).
307. See also Barrie v. Kitsap County, 613 P.2d 1148 (Wash. 1980).
308. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 10.
309. See Lois J. Schiffer, The National Environmental Policy Act Today, with an Emphasis on its Application Across U.S. Borders, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 325, 327 (2004).
310. See John H. Knox, The Myth and Reality of Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 96 Am. J. INT'L. 291, 294 (2002).
311. See id.
312. See id. at 295-96.
313. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/ Conf. 151/26, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (Principle 19) (1992), available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/ Deafult.aspDocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163.
314. See John H. Knox, Assessing the Candidates for a Global Treaty on Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 153, 155 (2003).
315. See id. at 159.
316. Conventon on Environmental Impact in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800 (1991) [hereinafter Espoo Convention], available at http://www.unece.org/env/eia/documents/conventiontextenglish.pdf.
317. The United States and Canada also signed the Espoo Convention, although the United States has not ratified it. See UNECE, List of Participants for Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, http://www.unece.org/env/eia/convratif.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
318. Espoo Convention, supra note 230, art. 2(2), 30 I.L.M. at 803.
319. See id. at art. 2(6), 30 I.L.M. at 804 ("The Party of origin shall provide, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, an opportunity to the public in the areas likely to be affected to participate in relevant environmental impact assessment procedures regarding proposed activities and shall ensure that the opportunity provided to the public of the affected Party is equivalent to that provided to the public of the Party of origin.");
320. id. at art. 3(8), 30 I.L.M. at 806 ("The concerned Parties shall ensure that the public of the affected Party in the areas likely to be affected be informed of, and be provided with possibilities for making comments or objections on, the proposed activity, and for the transmittal of these comments or objections to the competent authority of the Party of origin, either directly to this authority or, where appropriate, through the Party of origin,");
321. id. at art. 4(2), 30 I.L.M. at 806 ("The Party of origin shall furnish the affected Party, as appropriate through a joint body where one exists, with the environmental impact assessment documentation. The concerned Parties shall arrange for distribution of the documentation to the authorities and the public of the affected Party in the areas likely to be affected and for the submission of comments to the competent authority of the Party of origin, either directly to this authority or, where appropriate, through the Party of origin within a reasonable time before the final decision is taken on the proposed activity.").
322. Id. at preamble, 30 I.L.M. 802.
323. The International Law Commission is the United Nations body charged with codification and development of public international law. See G.A. Res. 174, U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., at 105-10, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
324. See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 366-436, U.N. Doc. No. A/56/10 (2001). The draft articles are available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/ english/draft%20articles/9_7_2001.pdf.
325. Id. at 371.
326. See id. art. 7, 13, at 373, 375.
327. Id. at 375.
328. Carrie Noteboom, Addressing the External Effects of Internal Environmental Decisions: Public Access to Environmental Information in the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 248 (2003).
329. The "where" is, for purposes of this article, limited to the continental United States, although the principles and concepts may apply on a broader scale. The "why" is hopefully answered in the analysis of interstate environmental harms as political externalities (supra Part I) and the failure to address such harms in our federalist system (supra Part II). Thus, this Part focuses on "who, when, and what?"
330. Thirty-two states already have some form of an environmental impact assessment policy which could be amended to incorporate an interstate duty. See Revesz, supra note 21, at 617-18.
331. See supra note 220.
332. 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006) (concerning federal jurisdiction over "isolated" wetlands under the federal CWA).
333. Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curae Supporting Respondents, at 2, Rapartos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006) (Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384), 2006 WL 139208.
334. See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1412-13 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
335. See also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
336. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 204.
337. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 10.
338. See supra note 39.
339. See supra note 221.
340. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 968-70.
341. See id. at 968 n.184.
342. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 896 (2005).
343. See id. at 894-95.
344. Id. at 894.
345. Id. at 895.
346. See id. at 883-84.
347. See generally Karkkainen, supra note 204.
348. Id. at 908.
349. Id. at 925.
350. Id. at 927.
351. Id. at 928
352. (citing PAUL J. CULHANE ET AL., FORECASTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING: THE CONTENT AND PREDICTIVE ACCURACY OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS 111-112 (1987)).
353. Id. at 938.
354. See id. at 941.
355. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 1992 S.C., ch. 37 §§ 2(1), 14, 16(2)(c).
356. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE, §§ 21,100, 21,081.6 (2007).
357. Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act §§ 1-10, 9C U.L.A. 392-98 (1982), available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/ index.cfm?sec=1&sub=lt4.
358. See id. §§ 1-3.
359. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Table of Uniform Statutes Listed by Statute, http://www.ulcc.ca/en/Table_3_En.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2008). The states are Connecticut, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
360. Like most states, the state of Indiana has authority from the EPA to issue National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits. See Envtl. Council of the States, State Delegations - CWA, http:// www.ecos.org/section/states/enviro_talist /states_enviro_talist_cwa (last visited Dec. 17, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
361. Kari Lydersen, Pollution Fight Pits Illinois vs. BP, Indiana, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2007, at A11.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Dan Egan, BP Backpedals on Increasing Lake Pollution, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 2007, at A1.
369. Michael Hawthorne, EPA Will Ask BP to Offset Pollution, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 2007, at
370. Id. The EPA did, however, suggest efforts BP could make, such as restoring wetlands along the Lake Michigan shore near the discharge site.
371. See Andrew Herrmann, Chicago Gagged at Hearing on BP, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, at 1.
372. See id.
373. See id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Tim Evans, BP Can Upgrade Plant for $40M, Report Concludes, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 4, 2007, at 1.
377. Egan, supra note 278.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See id.
381. Muddy Waters, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2007, at 93.
382. See Frances Irwin & Carl Bruch, Information, Public Participation, and Justice, 32 ENVTL. L. REP., 10,784, 10,788 (2002);
383. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Cost of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 185-87 (1997).
384. Noteboom, supra note 240, at 278.
385. Ammon Lehavi, Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 VA. L. REV. 929, 942 (2006).
386. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 504-05 (1970).
387. See CAA §§ 110(a)(2)(D), 126(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7426(b) (2000), CWA §§ 402(b)(3), (5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3), (5) (2000).
388. See Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and Environmental Protection: Some Ethical Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755, 761 (2002) ("Just as no one in particular is rewarded for preserving open-access common resources, no one is rewarded for learning about them either ....").