Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 140, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 97-125

  Mailath, George J ^a   Nöldeke, Georg ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Competitive pricing; Market breakdown; Separation

Indexed keywords

EID: 43049148741     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.001     Document Type: Article

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