Does the market provide sufficient employment protection?

Labour Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 428-444

  Burguet, Roberto ^a   Caminal, Ramon ^a,b  

^a CSIC   (Spain)

^b Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Author keywords

Employment protection; Experimentation; Layoffs; Severance payments

Indexed keywords

EID: 42649084026     PISSN: 09275371     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2007.06.004     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Alvarez F., and Veracierto M. Severance payments in an economy with frictions. Journal of Monetary Economics 47 (2001) 477-498
2. Bertola G. A pure theory of job security and labour income risk. Review of Economic Studies 71 (2004) 43-61
3. Blanchard, O., Tirole, J., 2004. The optimal design of unemployment insurance and employment protection, mimeo.
4. Booth A. Layoffs with Payoffs: A Bargaining Model of Union Wage and Severance Pay Determination. Economica 62 (1995) 551-564
5. Booth A. Extra-statutory Redundancy Payments In Britain. British Journal of Industrial Relations 25 (1987) 401-418
6. Burguet R., and Caminal R. Does the market provide sufficient employment protection?. CEPR discussion paper vol. 4198 (2005)
7. Burguet R., Caminal R., and Matutes C. Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts. European Economic Review 46 (2002) 1153-1185
8. Epstein L., and Zin S. Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Consumption and Asset Returns: A Theoretical Framework. Econometrica 57 (1989) 937-969
9. Fath J., and Fuest C. Experience Rating versus Employment Protection Laws in a Model where Firms Monitor Workers. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107 2 (2005) 299-314 (16)
10. Fella G. Efficiency wage and efficient redundancy pay. European Economic Review 44 8 (2000) 1473-1490
11. Fuest, C., Huber, B., 2003. Is experience rated unemployment insurance bad for employment in the presence of asymmetric shocks? the role of decentralisation, mimeo University of Cologne.
12. Galdón-Sanchez J., and Güell M. Dismissal conflicts and unemployment. European Economic Review 47 (2003) 323-335
13. Hall R., and Lazear E. The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand. Journal of Labor Economics 2 2 (1984) 233-257
14. Hart O. Optimal Labor Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction. Review of Economic Studies 50 (1983) 3-36
15. Lorences J., Fernandez V., and Rodriguez C. Diferencias interterritoriales de salarios y negociación colectiva en España. Investigaciones Económicas 19 2 (1995) 309-324
16. Myerson R., and Satterthwaite M. Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trade. Journal of Economic Theory 29 (1983) 265-281
17. Nagypál, E., 2000. Learning-by-Doing versus Learning about Match Quality: Can We Tell Them Apart? mimeo.
18. Nagypàl, E., 2002. The cost of employment protection in the presence of match-specific learning, mimeo Northwestern University.
19. Pencavel J. Labour Markets under Trade Unionism (1991), Basil Blackwell, Oxford
20. Pissarides Ch. Employment protection. Labour Economics 8 (2001) 131-159
21. Rosen R. Implicit contracts: a survey. Journal of Economic Literature 23 3 (1985) 1144-1175
22. Saint Paul G. Efficiency Wage, Commitment, and Hysteresis. Annales d'Economie et de Statistique 37/38 (1995) 39-53
23. Shimer, R., Wright, R., 2004. Competitive Search Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information, mimeo University of Chicago.