Experience rating versus employment protection laws in a model where firms monitor workers

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 107, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 299-314

  Fath, Julia ^a   Fuest, Clemens ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Efficiency wages; Experience rating; Layoff costs; Unemployment

Indexed keywords

EMPLOYMENT; LABOR POLICY; WORKING CONDITIONS;

EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; WORLD;

EID: 24644491858     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00409.x     Document Type: Article

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