Partisan politics and stock market performance: The effect of expected government partisanship on stock returns in the 2002 German federal election

Public Choice

Volumn 135, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 131-150

  Füss, Roland ^a   Bechtel, Michael M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

Elections; GARCH modeling; Government partisanship; Political information; Price formation; Stock market performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 42449154725     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9250-1     Document Type: Article

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