Historical truth, national myths and liberal democracy: On the coherence of liberal nationalism

Journal of Political Philosophy

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 291-313

  Abizadeh, Arash ^a  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 4243089337     PISSN: 09638016     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2004.00201.x     Document Type: Review

References (74)

1. I understand liberal democracy to be a political association between free and equal citizens in which the exercise of political power is legitimated by appeal to the principle that citizens must be able to see the terms of their association, and the decisions affecting their well-being, as the outcome of free and reasoned public deliberation among equals. See Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and democratic legitimacy," The Good Polity, ed. A. Hamlin & Philip Pettit (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 21, and Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy," Democracy and Difference (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 68.
2. I understand liberal democracy to be a political association between free and equal citizens in which the exercise of political power is legitimated by appeal to the principle that citizens must be able to see the terms of their association, and the decisions affecting their well-being, as the outcome of free and reasoned public deliberation among equals. See Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and democratic legitimacy," The Good Polity, ed. A. Hamlin & Philip Pettit (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 21, and Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy," Democracy and Difference (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 68.
3. Rogers M. Smith, "Citizenship and the politics of people-building," Citizenship Studies, 5 (2001), 73-96, argues that the creation and maintenance of all "political peoples" (i.e., groups that claim the ultimate allegiance of their members) require "constitutive stories" that characterize the people's distinctive characteristics.
4. Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?," Oeuvres complètes de Ernest Renan, ed. Henriette Psichari (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947 [1882]), vol. 1, p. 902. Translations are mine.
5. Ibid., pp. 903-4.
6. Ibid., p. 905.
7. Ibid., p. 904.
8. Ibid., p. 905.
9. Ibid., p. 891.
10. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 12.
11. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. edn (London: Verso, 1991), p. 6, all italics mine, except for italics in the Gellner quote.
12. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 34-5.
13. Ibid., pp. 35-6.
14. Ibid., p. 36.
15. Ibid., p. 42, emphasis added.
16. Cf. Charles Jones: "Insofar as nations as ethical communities are historical fictions, they cannot legitimately generate any obligations on the part of compatriots for one another." "Revenge of the philosophical mole: another response to David Miller on nationality," Journal of Applied Philosophy, 13 (1996), 73-86 at p. 79.
17. Miller's position that mythical sacrifices could incur obligations on others seems, among other things, to require denying the reason-dependence of the value of an end or goal. Compare, for example, with Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 141-2.
18. Here I am dealing with arguments that purport to show that shared national identities constituted by myths are instrumentally valuable as indispensable means to social cooperation, integration, etc. I do not deal with arguments that claim that shared national identity is a good in itself - a claim that, if true, might be taken to imply that myths have constitutive, non-instrumental value. But a similar point could be made even if it were assumed that the myths have constitutive, non-instrumental value, by virtue of being an integral part of a putatively valuable state of affairs. It would now have to be shown that the putative value of the state of affairs would not be compromised by the falsity of its constitutive myths.
19. Miller, On Nationality, p. 39.
20. For Miller's defence of deliberative democracy, see David Miller, Market, State, and Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), ch. 10; David Miller, "Deliberative democracy and social choice," Prospects for Democracy, ed. David Held (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 74-92; and Miller, On Nationality, pp. 96, 150-1.
21. For Miller's defence of deliberative democracy, see David Miller, Market, State, and Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), ch. 10; David Miller, "Deliberative democracy and social choice," Prospects for Democracy, ed. David Held (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 74-92; and Miller, On Nationality, pp. 96, 150-1.
22. For Miller's defence of deliberative democracy, see David Miller, Market, State, and Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), ch. 10; David Miller, "Deliberative democracy and social choice," Prospects for Democracy, ed. David Held (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 74-92; and Miller, On Nationality, pp. 96, 150-1.
23. Miller, On Nationality, p. 40, emphasis added.
24. Obviously, I am using "myth" in a broader sense than Percy S. Cohen, "Theories of myth," Man, 4 (1969), 337-53, who defines myths as a narrative, at least some of whose events or objects only exist in the narrative, which refers to origins or transformations, and which has a sacred quality (p. 337). Nor do I restrict the term to an account that is "vague in its specifications of time and space," as Peter Munz does, in "History and myth," Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (1956), 1-16 at p. 2. Mary Fulbrook provides a definition that resonates with my use of the word: "myths are stories which are not necessarily true, nor even believed to be true, but which have symbolic power" ; "Myth-making and national identity: the case of the G.D.R.," Myths and Nationhood, ed. Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 72-87 at p. 73. Cf. George Schöpflin, "The functions of myth and a taxonomy of myths," Myths and Nationhood, ed. Hosking and Schöpflin, pp. 19-35 at p. 19.
25. Obviously, I am using "myth" in a broader sense than Percy S. Cohen, "Theories of myth," Man, 4 (1969), 337-53, who defines myths as a narrative, at least some of whose events or objects only exist in the narrative, which refers to origins or transformations, and which has a sacred quality (p. 337). Nor do I restrict the term to an account that is "vague in its specifications of time and space," as Peter Munz does, in "History and myth," Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (1956), 1-16 at p. 2. Mary Fulbrook provides a definition that resonates with my use of the word: "myths are stories which are not necessarily true, nor even believed to be true, but which have symbolic power" ; "Myth-making and national identity: the case of the G.D.R.," Myths and Nationhood, ed. Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 72-87 at p. 73. Cf. George Schöpflin, "The functions of myth and a taxonomy of myths," Myths and Nationhood, ed. Hosking and Schöpflin, pp. 19-35 at p. 19.
26. Obviously, I am using "myth" in a broader sense than Percy S. Cohen, "Theories of myth," Man, 4 (1969), 337-53, who defines myths as a narrative, at least some of whose events or objects only exist in the narrative, which refers to origins or transformations, and which has a sacred quality (p. 337). Nor do I restrict the term to an account that is "vague in its specifications of time and space," as Peter Munz does, in "History and myth," Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (1956), 1-16 at p. 2. Mary Fulbrook provides a definition that resonates with my use of the word: "myths are stories which are not necessarily true, nor even believed to be true, but which have symbolic power" ; "Myth-making and national identity: the case of the G.D.R.," Myths and Nationhood, ed. Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 72-87 at p. 73. Cf. George Schöpflin, "The functions of myth and a taxonomy of myths," Myths and Nationhood, ed. Hosking and Schöpflin, pp. 19-35 at p. 19.
27. Obviously, I am using "myth" in a broader sense than Percy S. Cohen, "Theories of myth," Man, 4 (1969), 337-53, who defines myths as a narrative, at least some of whose events or objects only exist in the narrative, which refers to origins or transformations, and which has a sacred quality (p. 337). Nor do I restrict the term to an account that is "vague in its specifications of time and space," as Peter Munz does, in "History and myth," Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (1956), 1-16 at p. 2. Mary Fulbrook provides a definition that resonates with my use of the word: "myths are stories which are not necessarily true, nor even believed to be true, but which have symbolic power" ; "Myth-making and national identity: the case of the G.D.R.," Myths and Nationhood, ed. Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 72-87 at p. 73. Cf. George Schöpflin, "The functions of myth and a taxonomy of myths," Myths and Nationhood, ed. Hosking and Schöpflin, pp. 19-35 at p. 19.
28. What Munz, "History and myth," has in mind when he calls myth a "concrete universal" is related to this. For Munz, myths identify universal features of significance and embody these in a particular story. Myths provide the standard, for Munz, of what counts as significant, and hence included in historical accounts.
29. J. Kehaulani Kauanui, "'For get' Hawaiian Entitlement: Configurations of Land, 'Blood,' and Americanization in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1921," Social Text, 59 (1999), 123-44.
30. As suggested by the UN report recommending that Hawaii be returned to the UN List of Non-Self-Governing Territories; cited by Kauanui, "'For get' Hawaiian entitlement," p. 140, n. 4.
31. It is true that we sometimes come to believe fictions by dint of having repeated them to ourselves over and over again, but such belief would not withstand the full scrutiny of critical discourse, which is what is at issue here.
32. If they are embellishments that are understood to be embellishments and not truths, then we have a myth-as-story component here. Also, note that I am not suggesting that identities necessarily require shared beliefs to exist. I am simply saying these shared beliefs may be one way that the power relations which obtain in a collective identity might be legitimated.
33. See David Archard's discussion of the "sexual lottery" tale that Plato wants the guardians to tell the ruled in the Republic, in "Myths, lies and historical truth: a defence of nationalism," Political Studies, 43 (1995), 472-81 at p. 480.
34. Notice that the case of myth-as-story does not raise these problems for Miller's deliberative democracy account. The actors presumably narrate their stories, do not understand themselves to be advancing truth claims, and are not understood to be doing so by their interlocutors. There is something about the internal logic of the speech acts involved that rules out the appeal to truth as a criterion for evaluation: to do so would simply be to have misunderstood the speech acts themselves.
35. It is Jon Elster who uses this episode from the Odyssey as a metaphor for the phenomenon of rational precommitment, in Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
36. Imagine, for instance, an egalitarian democratic polity, made up of two social groups, that has just successfully won a defensive war against an enemy bent on enslaving its neighbours. Postwar celebrations suffer a blow when it is revealed that the polity's minority group had been courted by the enemy, and that many of its members had in fact betrayed their fellow citizens, sending large numbers to their deaths. That the betrayals occurred only under pressure of death mitigates to some extent the anger of the majority, but there is a lingering and lasting bitterness. The minority, for its part, has feelings of shame mixed with resentment, and increasing alienation from the polity at large. Everyone realizes that it would be in everyone's best interests to bury this incident, and the fact that the betrayals were committed under duress makes the burial palatable to the majority. So that future generations are not marred by the memory, it is collectively and democratically decided to construct an alternative history, backed by faked documents, and to restrict public access to the evidence contradicting it.
37. Bernard Williams, Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers, 1982-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 166.
38. Thomas Scanlon, "A theory of freedom of expression," Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1 (1972), 204-26 at p. 215.
39. Ibid., p. 216.
40. Ibid., pp. 216-17.
41. Scanlon, ibid., p. 219, concedes that an autonomous person aware of his own poor judgment on some matters may rationally and legitimately seek, in these matters, to rely on the judgment of others. Such a person, Scanlon suggests, may even temporarily "enter into an agreement, subject to periodic review by him, empowering them to shield him from any sources of information likely to divert him from their counsel on the matters in question." But what he could not do, and remain autonomous, is concede such powers to others (such as the state) as part of the normal and permanent course of affairs; nor could it be in the state's powers to effect such arrangements whenever it judged them to be advisable. Nonetheless, the concession might suggest that while it would be illegitimate to create permanent institutions restricting the expression of (or the public's access to) historical truths (or records), temporary measures curtailing standard liberal democratic procedures might still be permissible. So in the example about the two-group democratic polity in footnote 30, while it may be illegitimate to set up permanent institutions restricting public access to the historical evidence, it may nonetheless be possible to engage in a one-shot doctoring of the records, for example, by collectively and democratically deciding to destroy historical records that compromise the desired myth. This is what Carl Schmitt's defence of a "commisarial dictatorship" in Die Diktatur would suggest; see Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2000), p. 32. But of course such a "temporary" measure has permanent effects and, even under the assumption of harmony of interests, would still raise difficult questions about the non-instrumental value of historical knowledge, about intergenerational justice, and so on. And once we consider future generations, the assumption of harmony of interests becomes extremely problematic in light of the fact that interests change in unpredictable ways. But as Carl Schmitt teaches us, the problem that cases like this pose for liberal democracy is real.
42. Scanlon, ibid., p. 219, concedes that an autonomous person aware of his own poor judgment on some matters may rationally and legitimately seek, in these matters, to rely on the judgment of others. Such a person, Scanlon suggests, may even temporarily "enter into an agreement, subject to periodic review by him, empowering them to shield him from any sources of information likely to divert him from their counsel on the matters in question." But what he could not do, and remain autonomous, is concede such powers to others (such as the state) as part of the normal and permanent course of affairs; nor could it be in the state's powers to effect such arrangements whenever it judged them to be advisable. Nonetheless, the concession might suggest that while it would be illegitimate to create permanent institutions restricting the expression of (or the public's access to) historical truths (or records), temporary measures curtailing standard liberal democratic procedures might still be permissible. So in the example about the two-group democratic polity in footnote 30, while it may be illegitimate to set up permanent institutions restricting public access to the historical evidence, it may nonetheless be possible to engage in a one-shot doctoring of the records, for example, by collectively and democratically deciding to destroy historical records that compromise the desired myth. This is what Carl Schmitt's defence of a "commisarial dictatorship" in Die Diktatur would suggest; see Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2000), p. 32. But of course such a "temporary" measure has permanent effects and, even under the assumption of harmony of interests, would still raise difficult questions about the non-instrumental value of historical knowledge, about intergenerational justice, and so on. And once we consider future generations, the assumption of harmony of interests becomes extremely problematic in light of the fact that interests change in unpredictable ways. But as Carl Schmitt teaches us, the problem that cases like this pose for liberal democracy is real.
43. According to Robert Parry, when the Reagan administration in the US set up a propaganda apparatus in the 1980s designed to manipulate public opinion, it was initially named "Project Truth"; see his Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the Press & 'Project Truth' (Arlington, Va.: Media Consortium, 1999).
44. The Office of Strategic Influence debacle in the United States in February 2002 illustrates this second order cognitive problem rather well: in order for propaganda to work, it cannot be actively known to be such by its targets. The US Pentagon's plans were to create an office that would plant news stories of strategic interest to the US in the non-US media (which could then be picked up, of course, by US media). But when a senior Pentagon official told the New York Times that the Office's head envisioned operations that go "from the blackest of black programs to the whitest of white" (Maureen Dowd, "Office of Strategic Mendacity" New York Times section A, p. 21, column 1, 2002/02/20), implying that the Office would feed the media disinformation and lies, the revelation not only created an uproar, but it positively undermined the Office's capacity to function. The Pentagon immediately began denying that the Office would lie (James Dao, "New Agency Will Not Lie, Top Pentagon Officials Say" New York Times section A, p. 14, column 5, 2002/02/21). But the damage was done, and within a week US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld declared the Office shut, citing the fact that the reports of disinformation had made its functioning impossible (Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Says He May Drop New Office Of Influence" New York Times Section A; Page 13; Column 6, 2002/02/25; Eric Schmitt, "Bush Seals Fate of Office Of Influence In Pentagon" New York Times section A, p. 17, column 6, 2002/02/26; Eric Schmitt and James Dao, "A 'Damaged' Information Office Is Declared Closed by Rumsfeld" section A, p. 1, column 5, 2002/02/27).
45. The Office of Strategic Influence debacle in the United States in February 2002 illustrates this second order cognitive problem rather well: in order for propaganda to work, it cannot be actively known to be such by its targets. The US Pentagon's plans were to create an office that would plant news stories of strategic interest to the US in the non-US media (which could then be picked up, of course, by US media). But when a senior Pentagon official told the New York Times that the Office's head envisioned operations that go "from the blackest of black programs to the whitest of white" (Maureen Dowd, "Office of Strategic Mendacity" New York Times section A, p. 21, column 1, 2002/02/20), implying that the Office would feed the media disinformation and lies, the revelation not only created an uproar, but it positively undermined the Office's capacity to function. The Pentagon immediately began denying that the Office would lie (James Dao, "New Agency Will Not Lie, Top Pentagon Officials Say" New York Times section A, p. 14, column 5, 2002/02/21). But the damage was done, and within a week US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld declared the Office shut, citing the fact that the reports of disinformation had made its functioning impossible (Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Says He May Drop New Office Of Influence" New York Times Section A; Page 13; Column 6, 2002/02/25; Eric Schmitt, "Bush Seals Fate of Office Of Influence In Pentagon" New York Times section A, p. 17, column 6, 2002/02/26; Eric Schmitt and James Dao, "A 'Damaged' Information Office Is Declared Closed by Rumsfeld" section A, p. 1, column 5, 2002/02/27).
46. The Office of Strategic Influence debacle in the United States in February 2002 illustrates this second order cognitive problem rather well: in order for propaganda to work, it cannot be actively known to be such by its targets. The US Pentagon's plans were to create an office that would plant news stories of strategic interest to the US in the non-US media (which could then be picked up, of course, by US media). But when a senior Pentagon official told the New York Times that the Office's head envisioned operations that go "from the blackest of black programs to the whitest of white" (Maureen Dowd, "Office of Strategic Mendacity" New York Times section A, p. 21, column 1, 2002/02/20), implying that the Office would feed the media disinformation and lies, the revelation not only created an uproar, but it positively undermined the Office's capacity to function. The Pentagon immediately began denying that the Office would lie (James Dao, "New Agency Will Not Lie, Top Pentagon Officials Say" New York Times section A, p. 14, column 5, 2002/02/21). But the damage was done, and within a week US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld declared the Office shut, citing the fact that the reports of disinformation had made its functioning impossible (Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Says He May Drop New Office Of Influence" New York Times Section A; Page 13; Column 6, 2002/02/25; Eric Schmitt, "Bush Seals Fate of Office Of Influence In Pentagon" New York Times section A, p. 17, column 6, 2002/02/26; Eric Schmitt and James Dao, "A 'Damaged' Information Office Is Declared Closed by Rumsfeld" section A, p. 1, column 5, 2002/02/27).
47. The Office of Strategic Influence debacle in the United States in February 2002 illustrates this second order cognitive problem rather well: in order for propaganda to work, it cannot be actively known to be such by its targets. The US Pentagon's plans were to create an office that would plant news stories of strategic interest to the US in the non-US media (which could then be picked up, of course, by US media). But when a senior Pentagon official told the New York Times that the Office's head envisioned operations that go "from the blackest of black programs to the whitest of white" (Maureen Dowd, "Office of Strategic Mendacity" New York Times section A, p. 21, column 1, 2002/02/20), implying that the Office would feed the media disinformation and lies, the revelation not only created an uproar, but it positively undermined the Office's capacity to function. The Pentagon immediately began denying that the Office would lie (James Dao, "New Agency Will Not Lie, Top Pentagon Officials Say" New York Times section A, p. 14, column 5, 2002/02/21). But the damage was done, and within a week US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld declared the Office shut, citing the fact that the reports of disinformation had made its functioning impossible (Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Says He May Drop New Office Of Influence" New York Times Section A; Page 13; Column 6, 2002/02/25; Eric Schmitt, "Bush Seals Fate of Office Of Influence In Pentagon" New York Times section A, p. 17, column 6, 2002/02/26; Eric Schmitt and James Dao, "A 'Damaged' Information Office Is Declared Closed by Rumsfeld" section A, p. 1, column 5, 2002/02/27).
48. The Office of Strategic Influence debacle in the United States in February 2002 illustrates this second order cognitive problem rather well: in order for propaganda to work, it cannot be actively known to be such by its targets. The US Pentagon's plans were to create an office that would plant news stories of strategic interest to the US in the non-US media (which could then be picked up, of course, by US media). But when a senior Pentagon official told the New York Times that the Office's head envisioned operations that go "from the blackest of black programs to the whitest of white" (Maureen Dowd, "Office of Strategic Mendacity" New York Times section A, p. 21, column 1, 2002/02/20), implying that the Office would feed the media disinformation and lies, the revelation not only created an uproar, but it positively undermined the Office's capacity to function. The Pentagon immediately began denying that the Office would lie (James Dao, "New Agency Will Not Lie, Top Pentagon Officials Say" New York Times section A, p. 14, column 5, 2002/02/21). But the damage was done, and within a week US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld declared the Office shut, citing the fact that the reports of disinformation had made its functioning impossible (Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Says He May Drop New Office Of Influence" New York Times Section A; Page 13; Column 6, 2002/02/25; Eric Schmitt, "Bush Seals Fate of Office Of Influence In Pentagon" New York Times section A, p. 17, column 6, 2002/02/26; Eric Schmitt and James Dao, "A 'Damaged' Information Office Is Declared Closed by Rumsfeld" section A, p. 1, column 5, 2002/02/27).
49. See also Jonathan Seglow, "Universals and Particulars: The Case of Liberal Cultural Nationalism," Political Studies 46 (1998): 963-77, at pp. 972-3.
50. Miller, On Nationality, p. 39.
51. Ibid., p. 70.
52. Their own recognition of this fact is evidenced, for example, in their calling themselves Canada's "First Nations."
53. Arthur Danto, Narration and Knowledge, rev. and exp. edn of Analytical Philosophy of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 113.
54. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
55. Ibid., p. xii; cf. p. 143.
56. Ibid., p. 18.
57. Ibid., p. xii.
58. Ibid., pp. 114-15.
59. Ibid., p. 132.
60. Ibid., pp. 15, 169.
61. Ibid., p. 114.
62. Ibid., p. 117.
63. Danto, ibid., gives the following example of an account that meets the first three conditions but is still not a narrative: "Naram-Sin built the Sun Temple at Sippar as a consequence of pressure brought on him by the priestly class; then Phillip III exiled the Moriscos because of his religious convictions; then Urguiza defeated the forces of Buenos Aires at Cepada because he was better equipped; then Arthur Danto woke on the stroke of seven, 20 October 1961, because he wanted to get an early start for excavations at Cerbetri."
64. Ibid., p. 11.
65. Ibid., p. 134.
66. Ibid., p. 140.
67. In fact, for Danto the two problems are intimately related. We cannot imagine, even in principle, a historical narrative qua narrative produced by an "Ideal Chronicler" who is a. witness to and simply describes every event as it happens. And Danto's reasoning brings us back to his first argument for why a complete account is impossible. Because the Ideal Chronicler does not know the future, when describing the current events to which he stands witness, he is unable to use the whole class of narrative sentences, which make reference to the future. He is also unable to use what Danto calls "project verbs" - verbs that describe temporally structured human actions that make reference to future anticipated results, and that frequently last over a period of time that breaks the action up into discontinuous events linked only by those anticipated results (such as, "he is writing his book this month.") This inability to use "project words" renders the Ideal Chronicler "incapable of describing what men are doing" (p. 162). And project verbs presuppose criteria of significance that tell historians which temporally disconnected acts are part of the same ongoing action.
68. For these two rival myths of European unity and their political implications, see Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, "The myth of European unity," Myths and Nationhood, ed. Hosking and Schöpflin, pp. 60-71. For an illuminating example of how historical narratives (and their truth claims and criteria of significance) buttress identity claims that served to legitimate political outcomes, see James Clifford's extended discussion of the Mashpee case in The Predicament of Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), ch. 12.
69. For these two rival myths of European unity and their political implications, see Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, "The myth of European unity," Myths and Nationhood, ed. Hosking and Schöpflin, pp. 60-71. For an illuminating example of how historical narratives (and their truth claims and criteria of significance) buttress identity claims that served to legitimate political outcomes, see James Clifford's extended discussion of the Mashpee case in The Predicament of Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), ch. 12.
70. See Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), and James Knowlton and Truett Cates, eds, Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? The Dispute about the Germans' Understanding of History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1993).
71. See Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), and James Knowlton and Truett Cates, eds, Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? The Dispute about the Germans' Understanding of History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1993).
72. I say "at least implicitly" because often the ethical aspects of the debate, about criteria of significance, are not treated separately from the historical aspects of the debate, about what happened. One way to dispute criteria of significance is to thematize the criteria explicitly and argue that they are inappropriate; another way is to present an alternative historical narrative, with different criteria of significance, and ask whether the narrative itself does not provide a more appropriate history.
73. I am grateful for this point and example to an anonymous referee.
74. "Myths, lies and historical truth," pp. 477-8.