A public good version of the collective household model: An empirical approach with an application to British household data

Review of Economics of the Household

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 169-191

  Klaveren, Chris ^a,b   Praag, Bernard ^a,b   Maassen van den Brink, Henriette ^a,b  

^a Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Collective household models; Household behavior; Intra household; Labor supply; Time allocation

Indexed keywords

EID: 42249092680     PISSN: 15695239     EISSN: 15737152     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11150-007-9028-8     Document Type: Article

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