Bankruptcy law: A mechanism of governance for financially distressed firms

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 253-267

  Blazy, Régis ^a   Chopard, Bertrand ^b   Fimayer, Agnès ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LUXEMBOURG   (Luxembourg)

^b UNIVERSITÉ LOUIS PASTEUR   (France)

Author keywords

Bankruptcy; Governance; Law and economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 42149118378     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-008-9048-8     Document Type: Article

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