Should courts enforce credit contracts strictly?

Economic Journal

Volumn 115, Issue 500, 2005, Pages 166-184

  Zazzaro, Alberto ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÀ POLITECNICA DELLE MARCHE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; CREDIT PROVISION; LEGAL SYSTEM; LENDING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 13344286280     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00964.x     Document Type: Article

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