Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 366-369

  Wichardt, Philipp C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Existence; Imperfect recall; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 41649112946     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.007     Document Type: Article

References (5)

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4. Nash J. Extensive games and the problem of information. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 36 (1950) 48-49
5. Piccione M., and Rubinstein A. On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall. Games Econ. Behav. 20 (1997) 3-24