Policy advice as an investment problem

Kyklos

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 403-427

  Heine, Klaus ^a   Mause, Karsten ^a  

^a PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC POLICY; INVESTMENT; POLICY MAKING; REFORM PROCESS;

EID: 4143136308     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00260.x     Document Type: Article

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