Judicial review without rights: Some problems for the democratic legitimacy of structural judicial review

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 1-32

  Stone, Adrienne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 41349122931     PISSN: 01436503     EISSN: 14643820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqn001     Document Type: Review

References (201)

1. Barry Friedman, 'The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One', 73 New York University Law Review 334, 333-433 (1998).
2. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
3. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
4. See below section 2 (D).
5. Stephen Gardbaum, "The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism', 49 American Journal of Comparative Law 707-760 (2001).
6. Indeed, the blurriness of the distinction supports my argument that structural judicial review and rights-based review are equally problematic for democratic principle. See below nn 147-149 and accompanying text.
7. Typically, though some constitutional rights confer rights against private parties.
8. See R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 affirmed on appeal to the Privy Council in Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529.
9. Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 162.
10. For accounts of rights in the Australian Constitution, see George Winterton, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Common Law Rights' in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1996) at 121
11. Adrienne Stone, 'Australia's Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Interpretive Disagreement', 27 Sydney Law Review 29-48 (2005).
12. For arguments in support of a bill of rights, see Hilary Charlesworth, Writing in Rights (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2002). For arguments against, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'The Constitutional Protection of Rights in Australia' in Greg Craven (ed.), Australian Federation, Towards the Second Century (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 1992).
13. For recent contributions from both sides of the debate, see 'Symposium', 25 University of Queensland Law Journal 3-212 (2006). James Allan, 'A Defence of the Status Quo' in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 175.
14. See Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 262.
15. For a review of some of the principal contributions to the debate, see Sujit Choudhry, 'Review: Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism', I International Yournal of Constitutional Law 379 390 (2003).
16. Kent Roach makes the point that 'Canadians expressed concerns about judicial activism long before anyone heard of the Charter'. Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Urwin Law, 2001) at 50.
17. I note here the decision of the government of Quebec not to participate in argument before the Supreme Court of Canada in the Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217. While doubtless that decision reflected an objection to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the particular question at issue there (the circumstances in which a province could secede from the Canadian federation), that decision does not seem to reflect a more general objection to judicial review within the context of a written, federal constitution.
18. Roach, above n 14.
19. See Charlesworth, above n 11, at 73.
20. See for example: John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981)
21. and Mark Tushnet Taking the Constitution Away ftom the Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) arguing respectively for and against judicial review in both the structural and rights spheres.
22. For a recent review of the long scholarly debate about the historical and textual foundations of judicial review under the United States' Constitution, see William Treanor, 'Judicial Review Before Marbury', 58 Stanford Law Review 455-462, 455-462 (2005).
23. Indeed, the power of judicial review was first assumed in a non-rights context: Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
24. Bradley Selway and John Williams, 'The High Court and Australian Federalism', 35 Publius 467-488 (2005)
25. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Canada: Carswell, 2004) at 126.
26. Waldron, above n 3.
27. In addition to the arguments of Jeremy Waldron, I also have in mind arguments advanced by Tom Campbell, Prescriptive Legal Positivism: Law, Rights and Democracy (UCL Press: New York, 2004) 171-188
28. Goldsworthy, above n 11, at 168-169; and some of the arguments made by James Allan, above n 11 (Allan also makes arguments that rely on doubts about the philosophical foundations of some rights claims).
29. For a longer exposition of these ideas, see Adrienne Stone, 'Disagreement and an Australian Bill of Rights: Review Essay: Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement', 26 Melbourne University Law Review 478-497, 487-497 (2002).
30. Dworkin, above n 2.
31. Waldron, above n 3, at 224-227. Goldsworthy, above n 11, at 168-169.
32. Allan, above n 11, at 187.
33. Waldron, above n 3, at 176-186.
34. Allan, above n 11, at 186
35. Waldron, above n 3, at 181.
36. In particular, these arguments reject claims that judicial review reinforces democratic values. See, e.g. Waldron, above n 3, at 282-312.
37. See also, Goldsworthy, above n 11, at 169-170.
38. See, e.g. the critical literature responding to Jeremy Waldron including Thomas Cristiano, 'Waldron on Law and Disagreement', 19 Law and Philosophy 513-543 (2000)
39. Aileen Kavanagh, 'Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron', 22 Law and Philosophy 451-486 (2003)
40. Dale Smith, 'Disagreeing With Waldron: Waldron on Law and Disagreement', 7 Res Publica 57-84 (2001).
41. Thus, when John Hart Ely sought to demonstrate the comparative specificity of some provisions of the United States Constitution he found his best examples in its structural provisions, such as the requirement that the President must 'have attained to the Age of thirty five years' (Art II, s 5): Ely, above n 18, at 13.
42. West Virginia State Bd of Educ v Barnette 319 US 624, 639 (Jackson J).
43. Consider Art 1 of Protocol 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that '[t]he death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed'. This illustration is given by Richard Kay, 'Rights, Rules and Democracy' in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 117,131.
44. Any rule operates by reference to a generalized class of things. Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules (Oxford: Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1991) at 24.
45. Andrei Marmor, 'On the Limits of Rights', 16 Law and Philosophy 1-18, 14-15 (1997).
46. Thus, during the framing of the Australian Constitution a long and bitter debate over the use of river waters was resolved by the insertion of the word 'reasonable' into s 100. See J. A. La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1972) at 211.
47. Hogg above n 21, at 125-126.
48. Section 51(i) grants the Commonwealth power to make laws with respect to 'trade and commerce with other countries or among the States'.
49. Section 51(xx) grants the Commonwealth a power to make laws with respect to 'foreign corporations and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth'.
50. Section 51(xxix) grants the Commonwealth power to make laws with respect to 'external affairs'.
51. Sanford Kadish, 'Judicial Review in the High Court and the United States Supreme Court', 2 Melbourne University Law Review 4-34 (1959)
52. Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th edn, Sydney: Butterworths, 1997) at 352-353.
53. See Frederick Schauer, 'Constitutional Invocations', 65 Fordham Law Review 1295-1312, 1303-1305 (1997).
54. Famously, the reference 'Armies' in the United States Constitution is understood to include an airforce: Laird v Tatum 408 US 1 (1972).
55. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation', 25 Federal Law Review 1-50, 30-32 (1997).
56. See the essays in Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed.), Interpreting Constitutions (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
57. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed.), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (Sydney: Federation Press, 1994)
58. Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Implications (I): Nature, Legitimacy, Classification, Examples', 24 Melbourne University Law Review 645-676 (2000).
59. Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31
60. Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185
61. Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW) v Ex parte Defence Housing Authority (Henderson's Case) (1997) 190 CLR 410.
62. Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 1
63. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
64. See Fiona Wheeler, 'Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court', 32 Federal Law Review 205 224 (2004).
65. See Winterton, above n 10
66. Stone above n 10, at 34 36.
67. Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193
68. Kartinyeri v Commonwealth 1998) 195 CLR 337, 381 ('Kartinyeri)
69. PlaintiffS15712002 v The Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513.
70. Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217.
71. Sujit Choudhry and Robert Howse, 'Constitutional -Theory and the Quebec Secession Reference', 8 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 143-169 (2000).
72. Waldron, above n 3, at 180-185, 124-127
73. Goldsworthy, above n 11, at 169-170.
74. Section 51 (vii) of the Constitution grants the Commonwealth parliament power over 'lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys'.
75. Section 51 of the Constitution also grants the Commonwealth parliament power over 'trade and commerce' 51(i), 'external affairs' 51 (xxix), and 'banking' 51 (xiii).
76. Like 'marriage' Australian Constitution s 51(xxi)], 'divorce' 51(xxii) and 'bankruptcy and insolvency' 51(xvii).
77. The 'executive', 'legislative' and 'judicial power' are at least partially 'descriptive concepts of political science' understood by reference to historical and contemporary political practice: Christopher Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) at 52.
78. Judges may, for example, subject laws to more or less searching scrutiny, according to their assessment of the relative institutional capacities of the court and the Parliament.
79. On this distinction see Jeremy Waldron, 'Ego Bloated Hovel', 94 Northwestern University Law Review 597-625, 612-614 (2000) and the sources cited therein.
80. See above nn 47-51 and accompanying text.
81. In this respect, the failure of the Australian High Court's attempts to confine the implied freedom of political communication, a structural implication derived from representative and responsible government, are particularly revealing. See Adrienne Stone, 'The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure', 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668-708 (1999).
82. Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.
83. Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times (1994) 182 CLR 106
84. Stephens v West Australian Newspapers (1994) 182 CLR 211
85. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
86. See Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1.
87. Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193.
88. Gummow and Hayne JJ in Kartinyeri appear to contemplate that the 'rule of law' may place substantive limits on the Commonwealth's legislative power: Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 381. I have made this point elsewhere in more detail;
89. see Stone, above n 10, at 36.
90. See the examples in United States constitutional law given by Schauer, above n 43, at 1304.
91. Section 51 (xxvi) of the Constitution grants Parliament the power to make laws with respect to: 'The people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws'.
92. John Williams and John Bradsen, The Perils of Inclusion: -Tbe Constitution and the Race Power', 19 Adelaide Law Review 95-142, 105-110 (1997).
93. Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 411 (Krby J), 365 368 (Gaudron J).
94. For a strong argument, on originalist grounds, against the implied freedom of political communication, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Constitutional Implications and Freedom of Political Speech', 32 Monash University Law Review 362-374 (1997).
95. For instances of this debate compare Harold Laski, 'The Obsolescence of Federalism', 98 The New Republic 367-369 (1939)
96. with Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, 'The 1944 Ventotene Manifesto: Towards a Free and United Europe' both extracted in Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman, Theories of Federalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
97. So much so that some commentators on the Australian Constitution have suggested that federalism takes the place of a Bill of Rights. Brian Galligan, Rainer Knopff and John Uhr, 'Australian Federalism and the Debate over a Bill of Rights', 20 Publius 53-69 (1990).
98. Decentralized political structures are said to enhance the voters' 'voice' by reducing the size of political units.
99. Erwin Chemerinsky, 'The Values of Federalism', 47 Florida Law Review 499-540 (1995).
100. Will Kymlicka, 'Federalism, Nationalism and Multiculturalism' in Karmis and Norman above n 74, at 269.
101. Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1961) at 121.
102. See above nn 35-38 and accompanying text.
103. Though there may be abstract references to the idea of federalism (as in the preamble to the Australian Constitution which describes the creation of a 'federal commonwealth') or to very general principles governing its nature. See also, Eisgruber, above n 59, at 190-191.
104. Zines, above n 42, at 277-286.
105. For a full discussion of the 'external affairs' power see Zines, above n 42.
106. Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 221 ('Tasmanian Dam Case').
107. See the discussion in Zines, above n 42, at 277-278.
108. Compare the views of Dennis Rose, 'Comment on the External Affairs Power', 14 Federal Law Review 216-218 (1984)
109. and the Australian Constitutional Commission, Final Report of the Constitutional Commission (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988) vol 2, 740-744
110. with R. D. Lumb, 'The Franklin Dam Decision and the External Affairs Power', 13 University of Queensland Law Journal 138-142 (1984).
111. (1982) 153 CLR 168, 229 ('Koowarta').
112. See also, Sir Anthony Mason, "The Australian Constitution 1901-1988', 62 Australian Law Journal 752-760, 755 (1988): 'Conduct of international affairs would be a nightmare if legislative implementation of Australia's treaty obligations were to become a matter for each State to decide.'
113. Koowarta (1982) 153 CLR 168, 229.
114. For similar views held by other judges see Koowarta (1982) 153 CLR 168, 214 215, 218 (Stephen J); 241 (Murphy J).
115. Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 129.
116. Ibid, 169-170.
117. Ibid, 221.
118. New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 503 (' Seas and Submerged Lands Case')
119. Koowarta (1982) 153 CLR 168, 241.
120. Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 262.
121. Ibid, 99-100 (Gibbs J).
122. See also 197 (Wilson J), 303-304 (Dawson J).
123. For academic criticism along these lines, see Greg Craven 'The New Centralism' in Democratic Experiments: Lectures in the Senate Occasional Lecture Series (Canberra: Research Section, Procedure Office Department of the Senate, 2006).
124. A vision that can be traced to the Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 ('Engineers' Case') in 1920 and which was very recently affirmed in New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I ('WorkChoices Case').
125. Consider for example the shift from a 'cooperative' to a 'coordinate' conception of federalism that is usually said to underscore the High Court's decision in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 ('Re Wakim').
126. See Nicholas Aroney, 'The Constitutional Demise of the Cross-Vesting Scheme', 7 Insolvency Law Journal 116-131, 130 (1999)
127. Graeme Hill, 'Revisiting Wakim and Hughes: The Distinct Demands of Federalism', 13 Public Law Review 205-227 (2002).
128. See above nn 26-28 and accompanying text.
129. Waldron, above n 3, at 178-187.
130. See, e.g. above n 87 and accompanying text.
131. Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 128 (Mason J)
132. citing Jumbunna Coal Mine ML v Victorian Coal Miners' Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 367-368.
133. Ibid, 128 (Mason J), relying upon a principle established in the Engineers' Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 149.
134. Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29, 81
135. cited in Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 127 (Mason J).
136. Ibid, 124 (Mason J).
137. See, above nn 91-93 and accompanying text.
138. That is, the position taken by Stephen J in Koowarta that the power to implement treaties pursuant to s 51(xxix) arises only when the subject matter of the treaty is of 'international rather than merely domestic concern': (1982) 153 CLR 168, 216.
139. Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 124-125 (Mason J).
140. WorkChoices Case (2006) 231 ALR 1.
141. The case is significant in two respects. First, the law upheld in that case, a comprehensive federal employment law, represents a radical new direction in Australian employment and industrial relations law. Second, the broad reading of the Commonwealth's legislative power with respect to 'corporations' (see above n 40), which underlies the High Court's decision to uphold the law, gives the Commonwealth extensive, almost unlimited power to regulate the activities of those corporations and through that power, an extensive general power of regulation.
142. Cf. WorkChoices Case (2006) 231 ALR 1, 150 [554]-[556]
143. (Kirby J); 224 225 [774]-[775] (Callinan J).
144. See for example, Re Wakim (1999) 198 CLR 511, 556: 'Cooperative federalism is not a constitutional term. It is a political slogan, not a criterion of constitutional validity' (McHugh J).
145. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Devotion to Legalism' in Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed.), Interpreting Constitutions (2006) at 106-160, above n 46.
146. Jeremy Waldron, 'The Core Case Against judicial Review', 115 Yale Law Journal 1346-1406, 1382-1383 (2006).
147. See above nn 105-106 and accompanying text.
148. The Engineers' Case (1920) 28 CLR 129.
149. The view that this case was driven by the need to respond to Australia's emerging national status and the need for greater national powers in modern conditions seems now to be accepted by a majority of the High Court. See WorkChoices Case (2006) 231 ALR 1, 58 [193], 117 [442].
150. These questions are the subject of theoretical and empirical study in a large body of economic literature. See Larry E Ribstein and Bruce H Kobayashi, 'The Economics of Federalism' (January 6, 2006) U. Illinois Law and Economics Research Paper No LE 06-001, available at .
151. See above n 87 and accompanying text.
152. See, Michael Dorf, 'Whose Ox is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism', 21 St John's Journal of Legal Commentary 497-525 (2007).
153. Democracy-based opponents of constitutional rights are, typically, legal positivists for whom judging inevitably involves the appeal to standards other than those legally binding upon them.
154. The Australian High Court has been unusually insistent that such forms of reasoning do not figure in its constitutional decision-making and thus have left the task of exposing the relevance of matters of value to others, principally scholars of the constitution. See Zines above n 42, at 449-458
155. and Adrienne Stone, 'The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure', 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668-708 (1999)
156. 'The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure Revisited', 28 University of New South Wales Law Journal 842-851(2005).
157. Allan, above n 11, at 193.
158. The WorkChoices Case (2006) 231 ALR 1. See above nn 105-106 and accompanying text.
159. Enacted principally in reliance upon the Commonwealth' power to regulate certain corporations granted by s 51 (xx) of the Constitution.
160. Allan, above n 11, at 193.
161. See Greg Craven, 'Industrial Relations, the Constitution and Federalism: Facing the Avalanche', 29 University of New South Wales Law Journal 203-215 (2006).
162. Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victoria Coal Miners' Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 368.
163. Hence the Court rejected the argument that s 51 (xxxv), granting the Commonwealth power with respect to '[c]onciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State', indicated the extent of the Commonwealth's power over industrial relations. See WorkChoices Case (2006) 231 ALR 1, 65 [221]-[222].
164. Engineers' Case (1920) 28 CLR 129.
165. For this reason, adherents of traditional federalism values have broken with the conservative Howard government in relation to federalism. Professor Greg Craven said of the prospect of a Commonwealth victory in the WorkChoices Case: 'It is basically the end game for federalism.... We would remain a federation, but the states would become sort of service agencies of the Commonwealth', Chris Merritt, 'Federalism on Notice', The Australian, 20 May 2006, 27.
166. Most legislative power is understood to be 'concurrent', meaning that, subject to the paramountcy of Commonwealth law in cases of inconsistency, as provided by s 109, both the states and the Commonwealth can legislate on a given subject matter.
167. R v Credit Tribunal; Ex parte General Motors Acceptance Corporation (1977) 137 CLR 545.
168. Cheryl Saunders, 'Federal Fiscal Reform and the GST', 11 Public Law Review 99-105 (2000).
169. R v Public Vehicles Licensing appeal Tribunal (Tas); Ex parte Australian National Airways Pty Ltd (1964) 113 CLR 207, 225-226.
170. The division of powers under the Canadian Constitution, for example, is not generally understood to be 'concurrent'. Rather the grants of power to the Canadian Parliament (in s 91) and the provincial legislatures (in s 92) are each thought to be 'exclusive', creating two defined areas of legislative power. (Though certain subjects of legislation, or areas of activity, have a 'double aspect' allowing each level of government to exercise some control. See Hogg, above n 21, at 371-372).
171. On current authority, the powers of the Australian states to legislate 'extra-territorially' are more limited than the Commonwealth's powers so that if the High Court were to curtail the Commonwealth's powers to legislate extra-territorially (as a minority of current judges would prefer) such a lacuna might arise. See XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 ALR 495.
172. (1999) 198 CLR 511 ('Re Wakim'). For detailed explanations, see Aroney, above n 96 and Hill, above n 96.
173. For a recent reiteration in the High Court of Australia, see Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 229 ALR 223.
174. AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th edn, London: Macmillan, 1915) at xcv xcvi.
175. See also, Allan, above n 11, at 192.
176. Switzerland, in which only cantonal, and not federal, laws are subject to judicial review on federalism grounds, provides perhaps the strongest example. But even in federal states like Australia where there are more extensive powers of judicial review, as a practical matter federal boundaries are often maintained by political rather than legal limits.
177. NLRB v Jones and McLaughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1 (1937)
178. United States v Darby, 312 US 100 (1941)
179. Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111 (1942) are credited as the key decisions in expanding the commerce clause doctrine: Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (2nd edn, New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2002) at 252 254.
180. United States v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995)
181. United States v Morrison, 520 US 598 (2000).
182. See nn 100-102 and accompanying text. See generally, Zines, above n 42, at 347-353.
183. Above, section 2(D).
184. Waldron, above n 3, at 29 33.
185. Waldron, 'The Core Case against Judicial Review', above n 110
186. Jeremy Waldron, 'Compared to What? Judicial Activism and the New Zealand Parliament', New Zealand Law Journal 441-445 (2005).
187. I am grateful to Carolyn Evans for putting this form of the argument to me.
188. See above section 3 B (iii).
189. See R v Brisbane Licensing Court; Ex parte Daniell (1920) 28 CLR 23.
190. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer make an argument for judicial supremacy along these lines. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, 'On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation', 110 Harvard Law Review 1359-1387 (1997)
191. 'Defending judicial Supremacy: A Reply', 17 Constitutional Commentary 455-482 (2000). 'Their argument is directed toward a different end than the one I consider here. (They oppose a system of 'coordinate interpretation' which would accord non-judicial institutions equal authority in constitutional interpretation). However, their insight that judicial decision-making serves the values associated with settlement raises the possibility that these values might also provide a reason to have judicial review in the first place.
192. With the obvious qualification that the Constitution contains some 'rights' provisions.
193. I develop this argument more fully in Adrienne Stone, 'The Means and Ends of Constitutional Reticence', 25 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 157-166 (2000).
194. Ely, above n 18.
195. Ibid.
196. For an overview, see Cardbaum above n 5.
197. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Judicial Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy' in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), above n 34, at 263.
198. See above n 141.
199. Leslie Zines doubts the applicability of American doctrines of deference in federal cases to the Australian Constitution. Zines, above n 42, at 484-485.
200. Compare Jeremy Kirk who, in a different context, emphasizes the strength of the institutional safeguards for federalism in Australia. Jeremy Kirk, 'Rights, Review and Reasons for Restraint', 23 Sydney Law Review 19-52, 24 (2001).
201. In addition, in Australia it might be possible to accept judicial review for the purely pragmatic reason that it is the system we have and there is little chance of upsetting it. Allan, above n 11, at 176-181. On this argument, however, constitutional rights are opposed only as an undesirable extension of an already sub-optimal constitutional institution.