Protest leadership in rural China

China Quarterly

Volumn , Issue 193, 2008, Pages 1-23

  Li, Lianjiang ^a   O'Brien, Kevin J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GOVERNANCE APPROACH; LEADERSHIP; POLITICAL SYSTEM; POPULAR PROTEST;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST;

EID: 40949161042     PISSN: 03057410     EISSN: 14682648     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0305741008000015     Document Type: Article

References (181)

1. See Ron Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone and Elizabeth J. Perry, "Leadership dynamics and dynamics of contention," in Ronald R. Aminzade et al., Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 126 28;
2. Colin Barker, Alan Johnson and Michael Lavalette, "Leadership matters: an introduction," in Colin Barker, Alan Johnson and Michael Lavelette (eds.), Leadership and Social Movements (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), p. 2;
3. Aldon D. Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg, "Leadership in social movements," in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kries (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), p. 171;
4. Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 332;
5. Sharon Erickson Nepstad and Clifford Bob, "When do leaders matter? Hypotheses on leadership dynamics in social movements," Mobilization Vol. 11, No. 1 (2006), p. 1.
6. For a perceptive organizer's perspective, see Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for Radicals (New York: Vintage, 1971).
7. For discussions of leadership, see Yongshun Cai, "The resistance of laid-off workers in the reform period," The China Quarterly, No. 170 (2002), pp. 327-44;
8. Yongshun Cai, "Collective ownership or cadres' ownership? The non-agricultural use of farmland in China," The China Quarterly, No. 175 (2003), pp. 662 80;
9. Patricia Thornton, "Comrades and collectives in arms: Tax resistance, evasion, and avoidance strategies in post-Mao China," in Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.), State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 87-104;
10. and especially Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003);
11. Yu Jianrong (trans. Thomas Michael), "Conflict in the countryside: The emerging political awareness of the peasants," Social Research, Vol. 73, No. 1 (2006), pp. 141-58;
12. Yu Jianrong, Dangdai Zhongguo nongmin de weiquan kangzheng: Hunan Hengyang kaocha (Farmers' Struggle to Defend Their Rights in Contemporary China: An Investigation of Hengyang, Hunan) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenhua chubanshe, 2007);
13. and Wu Zhang, "Peasant power in China: A comparative study of peasant protest in Hunan in the 1990s," paper presented at the 101st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1-4 September 2005, Washington DC. On "rebel" and "mandarin" styles of leadership in Maoist China, see Aminzade, Goldstone and Perry, "Leadership dynamics," pp. 133-42.
14. On the debate over how repression affects mobilization, see Jennifer Earl, "Repression and the social control of protest," Mobilization Vol. 11. No. 2 (2006), p. 129;
15. Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller, Repression and Mobilization (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
16. Bernstein and Lü, Taxation without Representation, p. 6. In central agricultural provinces popular protest is much more common in some counties than in others. Younger and better-educated county Party secretaries are more likely to seek promotion by launching expensive development projects, which often increase peasant burdens and provoke popular protests. By contrast, county Party secretaries who are near retirement or who do not have sufficient education to justify further promotion of ten choose to accord highest priority to maintaining stability.
17. Our 2005 survey in 100 villages suggested that protest leaders were active in much of the countryside. Of 96 villages where data was collected, 58 had protest leaders. The 100 villages were randomly sampled in 50 townships of 25 counties in Fujian, Hebei, Jilin, Jiangsu and Sichuan. Data were not collected from four villages in two Hebei townships, where county officials did not allow the questionnaire to be administered.
18. On collective incidents, see Gonganbu disi yanjiusuo "quntixing shijian yanjiu" ketizu, "Wogno fasheng quntixing shijian de diaocha yu sikao" ("Investigation and reflection on collective incidents in our country"), Neilnu canyue (Internal Reference , No. 31 (10 August 2001), pp. 18-25;
19. Zhongyang zhengfawei yanjiushi, Weihu shehui wending diaoyan wenji (Collected Essays on Maintaining Social Stability) (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2001). On the number of collective incidents in 2005, see "Gonganbu zhaokai xinwen fabuhui tongbao 2005 nian shehui zhi'an xingshiji huozai xingshi" ("The Public Security Ministry holds a news conference on the public security and fire disaster situation in 2005"), http://www.mps.gov.cn/cenweb[brjlCenweb/jsp/common/ article.jsp?infoid=ABC00000000000001018; accessed 14 August 2006.
20. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003. A riot then broke out, during which two government jeeps were overturned. The man who initiated the action was ultimately sentenced to three years in jail for "gathering a crowd to disturb social order" (Criminal Court Verdict, No. 66, 1999, People's Court of Hengyang County, Hunan Province).
21. See Li Cunbao and Wang Guangming, Yimeng jiuzhang (Nine Chapters on Yimeng), Renmin wenxue (People's Literature), No. 11 (1991), pp. 73-77;
22. Song Zhenyuan, "Zouxiang shichang - xie zai Cangshan 'suantai shijian'fasheng shinian zhihou" ("Marching toward the market: A note written ten years after the 'garlic-shoots incidents' in Cangshan"), Shichang bao (Market), 23 December 1998, p. 7;
23. Ding Xiguo, Wang Jinye and Song Zhenyuan, "Yi zhua keji, er zhua liutong: Nongye jiegou tiaozheng caifang zhaji" ("First to use new technologies, second to improve circulation - notes on agricultural restructuring"), Renmin ribao (Huadong xinwen) (People's Daily, East-China News), I November 2000, p. 1.
24. Interview, rural researcher in Jiangxi, 2001.
25. On leadership tasks more generally, see Aminzade, Goldstone and Perry, "Leadership dynamics," pp. 126-54;
26. Morris and Staggenborg, "Leadership in social movements," pp. 171-96;
27. Melucci, Challenging Codes, pp. 339-40;
28. Nepstad and Bob, "When do leaders matter?" pp. 1-22.
29. Interview, villager, Hebei, 1994.
30. Yu Jianrong, Yuecun zhengzhi (Politics in Yue Village) (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2001), p. 499.
31. Xiang Jidong, "Cong 'xianfa guanhuai' tan qi" ("About 'constitutional concerns'"), in Zhang Yinghong and Qi Zuliang, Zhongguo nongmin yu dangdai zhengzhi (Chinese Peasants and Contemporary Politics) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2005), p. 222.
32. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, Frames of Protest: Social Protest and the Framing Perspective (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
33. Yu Jianrong, Politics in Yue Village, p. 554.
34. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
35. On recruitment using networks, see Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
36. Yu Jianrong, Politics in Yue Village, p. 554.
37. Liu Jian et al., "Nongcun wending: Yige ningzhong de huati" ("Rural stability: A grave topic"), Banyuetan (neibuban) (Fortnightly Chats, internal edition), No. 4 (1999), p. 10;
38. Duan Xianju, Tan Jian and Chen Peng, "'Yingxiong' hai shi 'diaomin'?" ("'Heroes' or 'shrewd, unyielding people'?"), Banyuetan (neibuban) No. 2 (2000), p. 10.
39. Interview, petitioners' representative from Shandong, 2003. For more reports on this man, see Xu Zhiyong, "Xuanju zhi hou - Liji cun cunmin zizhi diaocha" ("After the election: An investigation of villagers' self-government in Liji village"), Zhongguo gaige (nongcun ban) (China's Reforms, rural edition), No. 2 (2003), pp. 10-14;
40. Huang Kaitang and Dong Lanfang, "Cunweihui tao gongzhang zhuanggao zhen zhengfu" ("A villagers' committee sues the township government to obtain the village chop"), Zhongguo gaige (nongcun ban), No. 9 (2003), pp. 35-37;
41. Zhu Ling, Hui can ji shi - caogen minzhu yu qian guize de boyi (Stories of Hui Village: A Game of Grassroots Democracy and Hidden Rules) (Shanghai: Dongfang chuban zhongxin, 2004).
42. Yang Shouyong and Wang Jintao, "'Wending cun' weihe chule da luanzi?" ("Why did a big disturbance occur in a 'stable village'?"), Banyuetan (neibuban), No. 1 (2001), p. 42;
43. Zhang Jun, "Xiang zhengfu yuanhe zao chongji" ("Why was the township government attacked?"), Minzhu yu fazhi (Democracy and Legality), No. 1 (2001), p. 41.
44. Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "The politics of lodging complaints in rural China," The China Quarterly, No. 143 (1995), p. 775.
45. Interview, rural researcher from Beijing, 1999. For a similar case in Anhui, see Xu Jingping, "'Xiaoji wending' niang eguo" ("'Negative stability' leads to disastrous consequences"), Banyuetan (neibuban) No. 12 (2000), p. 40.
46. Interviews, petitioners' representatives, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
47. O'Brien and Li, "The politics of lodging complaints," pp. 773-74;
48. Carl Minzner, "Xinfang: An alternative to the formal Chinese judicial system," Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2006), pp. 103-79;
49. but cf. Yuen Yuen Tang, "When peasants sue en masse: Large-scale collective ALL suits in rural China," China: An International Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2005), pp. 46-49.
50. Interviews, petitioners' representatives, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003; rural researcher in Henan, 2004. Yang Hao, "Nongmin de huhuan" ("Cries of peasants"), Dangdai (Modern Times), No. 6 (November 1999), p. 79;
51. Yu Jianrong, Politics in Yue Village, pp. 548-49;
52. Jiang Zuoping and Yang Sanjun, "Chuanhuan si wei 'lingxiu' niang cheng yi chang fengbo" ("Subpoenaing four 'leaders' results in an incident"), Banyuetan (neibuban), No. 2 (2000), p. 16.
53. Interviews, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003; rural researcher in Jiangxi, 2006; Duan Xianju, "Jujiao jiuyi nongmin de minggenzi" ("Focusing on the life-roots of 900 million farmers"), Banyuetan (neibuban), No. 1 (2002), p. 5;
54. Zhongyang zhengfawei, Collected Essays, p. 245.
55. Zhongyang zhengfawei, Collected Essays, p. 66.
56. Ibid. pp. 98, 153, 221, 324.
57. Interview, rural researcher in Beijing, 2006.
58. Zhongyang zhengfawei, Collected Essays, pp. 245, 262, 277, 302.
59. Zhao Shukai, "Shequ chongtu he xinxing quanli guanxi - guanyu 196 feng nongmin laixin de chubu fenxi" ("Community conflicts and a new type of power relationship - a preliminary analysis of 196 letters of complaints by farmers"), Zhongguo nongcun guancha (China Rural Survey), No. 2 (1999), p. 45;
60. Yu Jianrong, "Zhuanxing Zhongguo de shehui chongtu - dui dangdai Zhongguo weiquan kangzheng huodong de guancha" ("Social conflicts in transitional China - observation of rights-defence activities by workers and peasants in contemporary China"), Gaige neican (Inside Information on Reform), No. 34 (2004), p. 18;
61. Zhou Yuan and Wang Yanping, "Minjian liliang guanli minjian" ("Let civil forces manage communities"), in Zhou Yuan (ed.), Nongmin! Nongmin! (Peasants! Peasants!) (Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, 2004), p. 140.
62. Zhongyang zhengfawei, Collected Essays, p. 277.
63. Jiang and Yang, "Subpoenaing four 'leaders'," pp. 15-16.
64. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
65. Zhonggong Sichuan shengwei zuzhibu ketizu, "Zenyang zhengque chuh quntixing tufa shijian" (How to correctly handle collective and abrupt incidents), Banyuetan (neibuban), No. 1 (2002), pp. 29-32;
66. Bernstein and Lü, Taxation without Representation, pp. 155-56.
67. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 8.
68. Zhongyang zhengfawei, Collected Essays, p. 277.
69. Ibid. p. 302.
70. On one person rarely having the full complement of skills needed to organize contention, see Aminzade, Goldstone and Perry, "Leadership dynamics," p. 152.
71. Interview, rural researcher in Beijing, 2004.
72. Bernstein and Lü, Taxation without Representation, p. 149;
73. O'Brien and Li, "The politics of lodging complaints," pp. 767-68;
74. Wu Zhang, "Peasant power," passim;
75. Yang Hao, "Cries of peasants," p. 79;
76. Zhongyang zhengfawei, Collected Essays, p. 277. Our 2005 survey showed that of 991 ordinary villagers randomly selected in 96 villages, 55 (5.8%) had in the previous decade taken the lead in: Petitioning; going to Beijing to petition; rejecting illegal fees; demanding dialogues with government leaders; or blocking traffic. Of 441 purposively selected incumbent village cadres and heads of villagers' small groups, 22 (5.0%) had done the same. Of 209 purposively selected "public figures," e.g. former village cadres, former candidates of villagers' committees, clan elders, religious leaders and former members of a village election steering committee, 20 (9.6%) had done the same.
77. Interview, petitioners' representative from Zhangpu, Xiamen, 2004; Bao Yonghm, "Dui nongcun sige zhongda wenti de zai renshi" ("Reflections on four major rural issues"), Xiangzhen luntan (Township Forum), No. 7 (1991), p. 15.
78. On the personality traits of rural protest leaders, see Xiaolin Guo, "Land expropriation and rural conflicts in China," The China Quarterly, No. 166 (2001), p. 432;
79. also Wu Zhang, "Peasant power," pp. 43-44;
80. O'Brien and Li, "The politics of lodging complaints," pp. 767-71;
81. Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O'Brien, "Villagers and popular resistance in contemporary China," Modern China, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1996), pp. 28-61;
82. Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Appendix A.
83. Interview, rural researcher in Henan, 2004.
84. Interviews, rural researcher in Jiangxi, 2001; rural researcher at Beijing University, 2005.
85. Interview, petitioners' representative from Shandong, 2003. Bernstein and Lü, Taxation without Representation, pp. 152 53;
86. Lucien Bianco, Peasants without the Party: Grass-roots Movements in Twentieth Century China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe), pp. 250-51;
87. Thornton, "Comrades and collectives in arms," pp. 90, 97-98;
88. Li Junde, "'Jianfu yingxiong' za cheng le fanzm xianyiren" ("How did peasant burden-reduction heroes become crime suspects"), Banyuetan (neibuban), No. 2 (2000), pp. 13-14;
89. Zhang Cuiling, "Zenyang duidai zheli de nongmin shangfang - Anhui Chengzhuang shijian diaocha baogao" ("How to deal with peasants lodging complaints? An investigative report on Anhui's Chengzhuang incident"), Fazhi yu xinwen (Legality and News), No. 1 (2002), pp. 4-8.
90. Thornton, "Comrades and collectives in arms," p. 98.
91. Lianjiang Li, "Elections and popular resistance in rural China," China Information, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2002), pp. 89-107.
92. Yu Jianrong, "Social conflict in rural China today: Observation and analysis on farmers' struggles to safeguard their rights," Social Sciences in China (Autumn 2005), p. 130.
93. Interviews, rural researcher at the Development Research Centre of the State Council, 2006; rural researcher in Beijing, 2006.
94. Li Xuexiang and Xiao Qing, "Cong 'jianfu yingxiong' dao 'zhengfu jianduyuan" ("From a 'burden-reduction hero' to a 'government supervisor'"), Zhongguo gaige (Nongcun ban), No. 9 (2003), p. 40.
95. Ibid. p. 41.
96. Duan et al., "'Heroes' or 'shrewd, unyielding people'?" pp. 10-11.
97. O'Brien and Li, "The politics of lodging complaints," p. 768;
98. O'Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China;
99. Bernstein and Lü, Taxation without Representation, p. 148;
100. Ethan Michelson, "Climbing the dispute pagoda: Grievances and appeals to the official justice system in rural China," American Sociological Review, Vol. 72, No. 3 (2007), pp. 459-85;
101. Ethan Michelson. "Justice from above or below? Popular strategies for resolving grievances in rural China," in this issue of The China Quarterly;
102. Zhao Shukai, "Shangfang shijian he xinfang tixi: Guanyu nongmin jin jing shangfang wenti de diaocha fenxi" ("Petitioning incidents and the letters and visits system: Investigation and analysis of the issue of farmers who lodge complaints in Beijing"), Sannong Zhongguo 2003 (Chinese Agriculture, Countryside and Farmers, 2003), pp. 115-25.
103. Yu Jianrong, Politics in Yue Village, p. 565;
104. Yu Jianrong, "Social conflict," p. 129. Our 2005 survey corroborated some of these observations. A weighted multiple logistic regression showed that, among ordinary villagers, the better educated were significantly more likely to be protest leaders (p <.01). Veterans of the People's Liberation Army split, with those who were Party members significantly less likely to lead popular protests, whereas those who were not Party members significantly more likely to do so (p = .05). Older villagers were marginally more likely to be protest leaders than younger people, and men were more likely to be protest leaders than women (p < .10).
105. Zhou Decai, "Geren jianli" ("A short autobiography", mimeograph, 2002.
106. In October 1975 Zhang Dean was jailed on what he considered a trumped-up charge. On his release date in 1977, Zhang refused to leave the prison at first and demanded an explanation of why he had been detained for 15 months. He told a reporter in 2001: "I have personally tasted the bitterness of losing the basic rights of a citizen, so I cherish those rights." See Xiwu Lapa, "Zhengce he falü shi nongmin de baohushen - nongmin Zhang Dean de jianfu shijian yu sikao" ("Policy and law are farmers' guardians - reflections on burden-reduction practices of farmer Zhang Dean"), Zhongguo gaige (Nongcun ban), No. 1 (2002), p. 7.
107. Interviews, petitioners' representatives, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
108. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
109. Interview, petitioners' representative from Zhangpu, Xiamen, 2004. This protest leader was arrested in 2005 and charged with plotting to abduct two county officials. He vehemently denied the charge. To coerce a confession and deprive him of sleep, the police shone bright lights in his cell around the clock. Despite numerous collective petitions by villagers, he was sentenced to seven years in prison. Personal communication with a rural researcher in Fujian, 26 December 2005.
110. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
111. Ronald R. Aminzade and Doug McAdam, "Emotions and contentious politics," in Aminzade et al., Silence and Voice, pp. 14-30.
112. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
113. Jiang Zuoping, Li Shuzhong and Yang Sanjun, "Jianfu zuzhi wajie ji" ("The dissolution of a burden-reduction organization", Banyuetan (neibuban), No. 4 (2001), pp. 73-74;
114. O'Brien and Li, "The politics of lodging complaints," p. 769.
115. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
116. Interview, petitioners' representative from Shandong, 2003.
117. Jiang Zuoping et al., "The dissolution," p. 73.
118. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
119. Lianjiang Li, "Political trust in rural China," Modern China, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2004), pp. 228-58;
120. but cf. Ethan Michelson, "Social resources and petitioning the state in rural China," unpublished paper, 2 March 2006.
121. On declining faith in the centre, see also O'Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, ch. 4.
122. One protest leader in Hengyang expected to receive an official commendation for his efforts. Another said he was qualified to be a provincial governor. A third believed he could be a good county head. Interviews, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003;
123. petitioner from Henan, 2005;
124. petitioners' representative from Shandong, 2003.
125. Interview, petitioners' representative from Shandong, 2003.
126. Interviews, petitioners' representatives, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
127. On the reluctance of bystanders to take action owing to fear of village cadres and their allies in the township government, see Xiaolin Guo, "Land expropriation," p. 433.
128. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
129. Individual petitions are, of course, most often ignored. That is much more difficult to do for collective complaints that have five or more signatures. Sometimes rural officials also try to buy off protest leaders by offering them a village position or a financial inducement. In Hubei, one villager organized a collective petition demanding lower taxes and fees. But he abandoned his efforts immediately after the township offered to lease him a fishpond at a below-market price. Interview, rural researcher in Wuhan, Hubei, 2006.
130. See also Bernstein and Lü, Taxation without Representation, p. 150.
131. Xiang Jidong, "About 'constitutional concerns'," p. 222;
132. Zhang Cuiling, "How to deal with peasants," p. 8;
133. Guo Yukuan, "Taishi cun: Yichang meiyou shengli zhe de duikang" ("Taishi village: A confrontation without winners"),Gaige neican (Inside Information on Reform), No. 33 (2005), p. 28;
134. Yu Jianrong, Politics in Yue Village, pp. 555-56.
135. Interviews, petitioners' representatives, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003;
136. rural researcher in Hunan, 2004.
137. Anonymous, "Wushi renquan jingyong jizuo fangshi bangjiao duixiang bei kunbang guapai" ("Without regard for human rights, people who should be educated were bound up and publicly exposed in extreme leftist fashion"), Hengyang ribao (Hengyang Daily), 18 October 1999, p. 3.
138. Interviews, petitioners' representatives, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
139. On this more generally, see Earl, "Repression and social control," p. 134.
140. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hebei, 1999.
141. Xiang Jidong, "About 'constitutional concerns'," p. 222;
142. Interview, rural researcher in Hunan, 2004.
143. Interview, rural researcher in Hunan, 2004. On undermining a collective lawsuit by suppressing a small group of informal leaders, see Yuen Yuen Tang, "When peasants sue," p. 47.
144. In Hebei, a township Party secretary ordered the police to "hang" (diao qilai) a petitioners' representative on a telephone pole, facing the sun, with his hands held high. Anticipating that the legality of this punishment would be challenged, the secretary claimed that the county had advised him to be firm in dealing with trouble makers. In a further attempt to pre-empt a legal challenge, he also threatened to sue the petitioner for tampering with the village's electricity transformer. The man then gave up his petitioning. Interview, township Party secretary, Hebei, 1994.
145. A number of protest leaders in Hengyang who were under 35 years old simply left the countryside after a multi-village, collective complaint in 1996 failed to produce relief. Interviews, petitioners' representatives, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
146. Interviews, rural researcher in Henan, 2004; petitioners' representatives, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
147. In China, see Bernstein and Lü, Taxation without Representation p. 149;
148. Yuen Yuen Tang, "When peasants sue," p. 48.
149. On repression backfiring elsewhere, see Jack A. Goldstone and Charles Tilly, "Threats (and opportunities): Popular action and state response in the dynamics of contentious action," in Aminzade et al., Silence and Voice, pp. 80-81;
150. David Hess and Brian Martin, "Repression, backfire, and the theory of transformative events," Mobilization, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2006), pp. 249-67.
151. Nepstad and Bob, "When do leaders matter?" p. 15.
152. Some protest leaders, of course, overestimate the social support they enjoy. In Hengyang, one longterm protest leader was so confident that he would win a villagers' committee election in 2005 that he did not campaign. But he lost badly. Even the main protest leader in the county failed (by a narrow margin) to win in his village, partly because of the township's efforts to delegitimize his candidacy and partly because he did not start soliciting votes until a few days before the election. Prior to the balloting, both men assumed that they would sail to overwhelming victories. Interview, rural researcher in Beijing, 2006.
153. Interviews, petitioners' representatives, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
154. On the enhanced status and recognition that Nelson Mandela, Aung Saan Suu Kyi, Vaclav Havel and Daniel Berrigan won as a result of being jailed, see Neptstad and Bob, "When do leaders matter?" pp. 5, 9.
155. Yang Xianhong, "Zhuanfang Liu Beixing: Jianzheng Sichuan nongmin lingxiu nao geming" ("An interview with Liu Beixing: Witnessing a peasant leader in Sichuan fomenting a revolution"), http://www7.chinesenewsnet.com/gb/MainNews/SinoNews/Mainland/ 2006_7_20_19_43_40_62.html. accessed 21 July 2006.
156. Interview, rural researcher in Hunan, 2004; also Wu Zhang, "Peasant power," pp. 29-30.
157. Duan et al., "'Heroes' or 'shrewd, unyielding people'?" p. 12.
158. For more on what he calls "peasant champions," see Ian Johnson, Wild Grass: Three Stories of Change in Modern China (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), ch. 1.
159. Duan et al., "'Heroes' or 'shrewd, unyielding people'?" p. 9.
160. Ibid. p. 12;
161. Li and Xiao, "From a 'burden-reduction hero'," p. 42;
162. Liu et al., "Rural stability," p. 10.
163. Liu et al., "Rural stability," pp. 10-11;
164. Duan et al., "'Heroes' or 'shrewd, unyielding people'?" p. 11;
165. Yu Jianrong, Politics in Yue Village, pp. 568-69;
166. Yu Jianrong, "Nongrain you zuzhi kangzheng jiqi zhengzhi fengxian" ("Organized peasant resistance and its political risks"), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), No. 3 (2003), p. 2;
167. Jiang and Yang, "Subpoenaing four 'leaders'," pp. 15-16.
168. Duan et al., "'Heroes' or 'shrewd, unyielding people'?" pp. 9-10.
169. Interview, petitioners' representative from Shandong, Guangzhou, 2004.
170. Interviews, petitioners' representative from Hengyang, Hunan, 2003;
171. petitioners' representative from Shandong, 2003.
172. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hebei, 1994;
173. also Wu Zhang, "Peasant power," p. 28.
174. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
175. Interview, petitioners' representative, Hengyang, Hunan, 2003.
176. Duan et al., "'Heroes' or 'shrewd, unyielding people'?" p. 12.
177. For more analysis, see Lianjiang Li, "Political trust and petitioning in the Chinese countryside," Comparative Politics, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2008).
178. Interviews, rural researchers in Beijing, 2004.
179. Ibid. The quotation may sound innocent, but it implies that Huang favours dynastic change and the overthrow of Communist rule. The logic is that since "kings" are not determined by birth, everyone can be a king.
180. Zhou Decai, "Zhi zhongyang bangongting, guowuyuan bangongting, rendaihui bangongting bing Jiang Zemin zongshuji, Zhu Rongji zongli, Li Peng weiyuanzhang" ("A letter to the general offices of the Central Party Committee, the State Council, and the National People's Congress and to General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and Chairman Li Peng"), mimeograph, 2002.
181. See Li, "Political trust in rural China."