Elections and popular resistance in rural China (Revised version)

China Information

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 89-107

  lianjiang, li ^a  

^a HONG KONG BAPTIST UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84996145631     PISSN: 0920203X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0920203X0201600104     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. Kevin J. O'Brien, “Implementing Political Reform in China's Villages,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 32 (July 1994): 57.
2. Melanie F. Manion, “The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside,” American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996): 736-48.
3. Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O'Brien, “The Struggle Over Village Elections,” in The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 142.
4. Tyrene White, “Village Elections: Democracy from the Bottom up,” Current History 97, issue 620 (September 1998): 267.
5. Gao Xinjun, “Woguo xian xiang liangji zhengzhi tizhi gaige de shuguang-Henan sheng Xinmi shi cunji minzhu zhengzhi zhidu jianshe diaocha” (The twilight of the reform of political institutions at county and township levels-An investigation report on the construction of village democracy in Xinmi county, Henan Province), Jingji shehui tizhi bijiao (Comparative economic and social systems), no. 6 (December 1998): 5.
6. Sha Guowu and Qi Wenjin, “Zhongshuo fenyun hua zhixuan,” 30.
7. He Baogang and Lang Youxing, “The Impact of Village Elections on Village Power Structure and Its Operation,” Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences, no. 16 (Spring 2000), 115-17.
8. Xu Wang, “Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry,” World Development 25, no. 9 (September 1997): 1440.
9. Allen C. Choate, “Local Governance in China: An Assessment of Villagers Committees,” Working Paper No. 1 (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 1997), 16.
10. Xu Wang, “Mutual Empowerment”; Anne F. Thurston, Muddling Toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), v.
11. Lin Changsheng, Dalu nongcun cunmin zizhi zhidu yanjiu (A study of the villagers’ self-government system on the mainland) (Taipei: Xingzhengyuan dalu weiyuanhui, 1995), 164
12. Village and township names have been altered.
13. The Regulation stipulates that the amount of village fees c(un t)iliu and township levies x(iang t)ongchou should not exceed 5% of villagers’ net income for the previous year (Art. 6). For discussions of peasant burdens, Xiaobo Lu, “The Politics of Peasant Burden in Reform China,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 25, no. 1 (October 1997): 113-38; and Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, “Taxation without Representation: Peasants, the Central and the Local States in Reform China,” The China Quarterly, no. 163 (September 2000): 742-63.
14. Interviews, Hunan, April 2000.
15. There are altogether 27 townships in Yizhang county.
16. Interviews, Hunan, April 2000.
17. Interviews, Hunan, April 2000.
18. Interview with a county official from Shandong, October 1999. For a Western report on leaders who put forward collective complaints winning elections, see Michael Laris, “Chinese Village Officials Arrest 4 Elected Leaders,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 12 November 1999, A28.
19. Interview, Beijing, October 1999.
20. Sha Guowu and Qi Wenjin, “Zhongshuo fenyun hua zhixuan” (Various opinions on direct elections), Neibu wengao (Internal essays), no. 17, 10 September 1998, 31.
21. Meng Bai, “Guanyu dangqian Henan nongcun shehui wending wenti de diaocha yu jianyi” (Investigation of social stability in rural Henan and policy advice), Zhongguo nongcun jingji (Chinese rural economy), no. 12 (December 1998): 70.
22. Li Chun and Guo Lingji, “Shixing cunmin zizhi xu chuli hao san chong guanxi” (Three relationships must be handled well when implementing villagers’ self-government), Neibu canyue (Internal references), no. 30, 4 August 1999, 2-3.
23. Bai Gang and Zhan Chengfu, “Guanyu qieshi jiaqiang jiceng minzhu zhengzhi jianshe de jidian jianyi” (A few suggestions regarding how to earnestly strengthen the construction of grassroots democracy), Neibu wengao (Internal essays), no. 5, 10 August 1998, 21.
24. Interviews, Hunan, April 2000.
25. See “Hunan sheng di san ci cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju gongzuo shishi fang'an” (Implementation scheme of the third round of elections of villagers’ committees of Hunan Province), in 1995-1996 niandu quanguo cunweihui huanjie xuanju ziliao huibian (Collection of materials on the 1995-1996 elections of villagers’ committees), comp. Minzhengbu jiceng zhengquan jianshesi nongcunchu (Beijing: Minzhengbu jiceng zhengquan jianshesi, 1996): 71-73.
26. Interview, Hunan, April 2000.
27. For more discussions of making appeals to cadres in rural China, see John P. Burns, Political Participation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 151.
28. For discussions of different types of appealing, see Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 45; and Kevin J. O'Brien, “Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People's Congress Deputies,” China Quarterly, no. 138 (June 1994): 359-80.
29. For a discussion of this concept, see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 17-18 and chap. 5.
30. On the use of local probability samples, see Melanie Manion, “Survey Research in the Study of Contemporary China: Learning from Local Samples,” The China Quarterly, no. 139 (September 1994): 741-65.
31. On nomination procedures and their importance, see Choate, “Local governance in China,” 10; Jørgen Elklit, “The Chinese Village Committee Electoral System,” China Information 11, no. 4 (1997): 7-9; and Thurston, Muddling Toward Democracy, 26.
32. For a discussion of the importance of primaries, see Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Accommodating ‘Democracy’ in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China,” The China Quarterly, no. 162 (June 2000): 465-66.
33. See Tianjian Shi, “Economic Development and Village Elections in Rural China,” Journal of Contemporary China 8, no. 22 (1999): 433-35.
34. See Zhao Shukai, “Cunji zuzhi de kunjing” (Difficult situations of village-level organizations), Diaocha yanjiu baogao (Investigation and research reports), no. 169, 10 December 1999, 4-5. An abridged version of this report appears in Neibu wengao (Internal essays), no. 5, 10 March 2000, 13-15.
35. On selecting nominees and potential abuses, see Jude Howell, “Prospects for Village Self-Governance in China,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 25, no. 3 (April 1998): 97; O'Brien, “Implementing Political Reform,” 55; Elklit, “The Chinese Village Committee Electoral System,” 8-9; Daniel Kelliher, “The Chinese Debate over Village Self-Govemment,” The China Journal, no. 37 (January 1997): 82; Choate, “Local Governance in China,” 10; and Robert A. Pastor and Qingshan Tan, “The Meaning of China's Village Elections,” China Quarterly, no. 152 (June 2000): 495-96.
36. For a similar observation, see O'Brien and Li, “Accommodating ‘Democracy’,” 486.
37. On campaigning, see Pastor and Tan, “The Meaning of China's Village Elections,” 496-97.
38. The other eight options are: (1) complain in private; (2) go directly to the township government to raise objections; (3) reject these decisions; (4) write letters of complaints to higher levels of government; (5) go directly to higher levels of government to lodge complaints; (6) join other villagers to lodge complaints at higher levels of government; (7) other reactions; and (8) do not know what to do. For discussions of peasant political attitudes and behaviors, see Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O'Brien, “Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China,” Modern China 22, no. 1 (January 1996): 28-61; and Yali Peng, “Democracy and Political Discourses in China,” Modern China 24, no. 4 (October 1998): 408-44.
39. The odds of an event occurring are defined as the ratio of the probability that it will occur to the probability that it will not occur. In other words, when p is the probability of an outcome, the odds of the same outcome are p/(1-p). The odds ratio is the ratio of the odds of an outcome when one particular predictor is, say, 1, compared with the odds of an outcome when that predictor is, say, 0. The odds ratio, always predicated on a particular independent variable, is the increase (or decrease) in the odds of an outcome when that independent variable increases by one. For a detailed discussion of odds and the odds ratio, see Tamas Rudas, Odds Ratios in the Analysis of Contingency Tables, Sage University Papers Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, Series No. 07-119 (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications Inc., 1998).
40. Bivariate analysis shows that the correlation between respondents’ age and their intent to appeal is not curvilinear.
41. Respondent no. 974.
42. Li and Guo, “Shixing cunmin zizhi,” 2.
43. Li Junde, “‘Jianfu yingxiong’ za cheng le fanzui xianyiren” (How did heroes of reducing burdens become crime suspects), Banyuetan (neibuban) (Semi-monthly) (Internal edition), no. 2, February 2000, 14.
44. Cf. Kelliher, “The Chinese Debate,” 73.
45. Gao, “Woguo xian xiang,” 10.
46. Guo Zhenglin, “Cunweihui xuanju hou de kunhuo, douzheng he quanli geju” (Confusion, struggle, and configuration of power after village elections), Unpublished paper, 10.
47. For analyses of institutional constraints of local officials in China, see Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” Comparative Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1999): 167-86; and Andrew Wedeman, “Agents and Fiscal Dependence in Central-Provincial Relations in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 8, no. 20 (1999): 119.
48. Interview, Fujian, July 1997.
49. See Li and O'Brien, “The Struggle over Village Elections,” 142. Also see Shao Jingjun, “Liaocheng shi dangzhishu canxuan cunweihui zhuren diaocha” (Investigation report on the participation of Party secretaries in the election of directors of villagers’ committees in Liaocheng city), Neibu canyue (Internal references), no. 6, 18 February 2000, 9.
50. Interview with an official of the Guangdong provincial bureau of civil affairs, Guangzhou, October 1999.
51. Liu Jian, Jiang Shan, Lu Guoqing, Chen Xianfa, and Duan Xianju, “Nongcun wending: yige ningzhong de huati” (Rural stability: A grave topic), Banyuetan (neibuban) (Semimonthly) (Internal edition), no. 4, April 1999, 12.
52. Xiang Jiquan, “Lun woguo nongcun cunmin xuanju de shijian jixiao ji qi yingxiang” (The practical achievements and influences of village elections in our country), in Xiangtu Zhongguo de minzhu xuanju (Democratic elections in rural China), ed. Xu Yong and Wu Yi (Wuhan: Huazhong Normal University Press, 2001), 555. Also see Jin Taijun, “Guanyu cunmin zizhi ruogan guanxi wenti de shenceng sikao” (Some in-depth reflections on several questions concerning villagers’ self-government), Kaifang shidai (Open times), no. 1 (2000): 91.
53. Xin Qiushui, “57 ming xiangzhen ganbu zai zuotanhui shang tichu cunmin zizhi yihou cunzai zhe 14 ge zenmoban” (57 township officials raised 14 questions about what should be done after the establishment of villagers’ self-government), Unpublished paper, 1999,6.
54. Gao, “Woguo xian xiang,” 15.
55. See Tang Jianguang, “Zhixuan xiangzhang” (The direct election of a town mayor), Nanfang zhoumo (Southern weekend), 15 January 1999, 2. For discussions of the Buyun election, see Li Fan et al., Chuangxin yu fazhan (Innovations and development) (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 2000); Shi Weimin, Gongxuan yu zhixuan (Public elections and direct elections) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2000), 428-53; Yawei Liu, “The Buyun Election and Its Meaning,” in The Carter Center Report on Chinese Elections: Observations on The Township People's Congress Elections January 5-15, 1999 and Cooperative Activities with the Ministry of Civil Affairs August 1, 1998-January 15, 1999 (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 1999), Appendix 4. For criticism of the Buyun election, see Zha Qingjiu, “Minzhu bu neng chaoyue falü” (Democracy must not surpass laws), Fazhi ribao (Legal daily), 19 January 1999, 1. Editors Loegfal Daily were divided on this issue. A week after the publication of Zha's article, the newspaper published a short commentary entitled “Shishi quandian” (Comments on current affairs), 23 January 1999, which compared Buyun town to Xiaogang village in Anhui, from where the Household Responsibility System originated. But this commentary was published without the endorsement of the chief editor, who later vowed to go after the responsible party. For the chief editor's angry reaction, see Chen Yingge, “Buneng xuanchuan weixian shijian” (Unconstitutional events must not be publicized), Neibu tongxin (Internal communications), no. 5 (1999): 11. For a response to Zha's criticism by a county official from Suining city, see Li Lu, “Buyun de gushi fabiao yihou” (After the publication of the Buyun story), Huasheng yuebao (China's voices monthly), no. 3, March 1999, 20.
56. See Li Fan, “‘turan xiji’-Buyun xiang” (A surprise visit to Buyun town,” Zhongguo shehui daokan (Chinese society journal), no. 9 (September 2000): 40.
57. See Kevin J. O'Brien, “Rightful Resistance,” World Politics 49, no. 1 (October 1996): 31-55.
58. For a discussion of Peng Zhen's support for villagers’ self-government, see Li and O'Brien, “The Struggle over Village Elections,” 132.