Tax competition, rent-seeking and fiscal decentralization

European Economic Review

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 19-40

  Sato, Matohiro ^a  

^a HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Capital tax competition; Fiscal decentralization; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); DECENTRALIZATION; RENT SEEKING; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 0037305737     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00183-0     Document Type: Article

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