CEO influence and executive compensation: Large firms vs. small firms

Managerial Finance

Volumn 26, Issue 8, 2000, Pages 3-12

  Joe Ueng, C ^a   Wells, Donald W ^a   Lilly, Juliana D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST THOMAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Accounting research; Performance related pay; Top management; USA

Indexed keywords

EID: 40549142629     PISSN: 03074358     EISSN: 17587743     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/03074350010766800     Document Type: Article

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