Small states, large unitary states and federations

Public Choice

Volumn 119, Issue 1-2, 2004, Pages 219-240

  Wrede, Matthias ^a  

^a RWTH AACHEN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043174937     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/b:puch.0000024160.01323.8b     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (12)

1. Alesina, A., Angeloni, I. and Etro, F. (2001a). The political economy of international unions. NBER working paper 8645.
2. Alesina, A., Angeloni, I. and Etro, F. (2001b). Institutional rules for federations. NBER working paper 8646.
3. Aumann, R. (1959). Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. Annals of Mathematics Studies 40: 287-324.
4. Barro, R. (1973). The control of politicians: An economic model. Public Choice 14: 19-42.
5. Besley, T. and Coate, S. (2000). Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: A political economy analysis. CEPR discussion paper 2495.
6. Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50: 5-26.
7. Lockwood, B. (2002). Distributive politics and the benefits of decentralization. Review of Economic Studies 69: 313-337.
8. Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (1997). Separation of powers and political accountability. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1163-1202.
9. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000). Political economics: Explaining economic policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
10. Wrede, M. (1996). Vertical and horizontal tax competition: Will unco-ordinated leviathans end up on the wrong side of the Laffer curve? Finanzarchiv N.F. 53: 461-479.
11. Wrede, M. (2002). Vertical externalities and control of politicians. Economics of Governance 3: 135-151.
12. Zodrow, G.R. and Mieszkowski, P. (1986). Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods. Journal of Urban Economics 19: 356-370.