Toward a synthesis of models of regulatory policy design with limited information

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 5-21

  Armstrong, Mark ^a   Sappington, David E M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043174905     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:REGE.0000028011.71612.70     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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