Truth-bonding and other truth-revealing mechanisms for courts

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 307-327

  Cooter, Robert ^a   Emons, Winand ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Litigation; Perjury; Truth revealing mechanism; Witness

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043118925     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:EJLE.0000028643.10059.9f     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. Arthur, R. O. & Reid, J. E. (1954). "Utilizing Lie Dectector Techiques to Determine the Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases." J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police Sci. 45, 213.
2. Aycock, G. W. III. (1993). "Nothing but the Truth: A Solution to the Current Inadequacies of the Federal Perjury Statutes." Val. U.L. Rev. 28, 247.
3. Barnes, J. A. (1994). "Telling and Detecting Lies." In A Pack of Lies: Towards a Sociology of Lying. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Baumbach, A. & Hefermehl, W. (1996). Wettbewerbsrecht. München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
5. Bernardo, A., Talley, E. & Welch, I. (2000). "A Theory of Legal Presumptions." J. of Law, Economics, and Organization. 16, 1-49.
6. Chin, G. & Wells, S. (1998). "The 'Blue Wall of Silence' as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury." U. Pittsburg Law Review. 59, 233.
7. Cooper, C. J. (1999). "A Perjurer in the White House? The Constitutional Case for Perjury and Obstruction of Justice as High Crimes and Misdemeanors." Harvard J. Law & Public Policy. 22, 619.
8. Cooter, R. & Emons, W. (2003). "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts." J. of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 159, 259-279.
9. Cooter, R. & Ulen, T. (1999). Law and Economics, 3rd ed., New York: Addison Wesley.
10. Craswell, R. (1999). "Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and its Alternatives." Michigan Law Review. 97, 2185-2238.
11. Dripps, D. (1996). "Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy." J. Crim. L. & Criminology. 86, 693.
12. Emons, W. (1994). "The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures Under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechnism Design." International Review of Law and Economics. 14, 479-491.
13. Emons, W. (2001). "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony." Working Paper, Dept. of Economics, University of Bern, http://www.vwi.unibe.ch/theory/papers/emons/tru_0901.pdf.
14. Emons, W. & Sobel, J. (1991). "On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules When Agents are Not Identical." Review of Economic Studies. 58, 375-390.
15. Fisher, G. (1997). "The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector." Yale L. J. 107, 575-713.
16. Fitzpatrick, B. & Torraco, J. (1999). "False Statements." American Criminal Law Review. 36, 607.
17. Fluet, C. (2003). "Enforcing Contracts: Should Courts Seek the Truth." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (forthcoming).
18. Gordon, M. (1980). "The Invention of a Common Law Crime: Perjury and the Elizabethan Courts." American J. of Legal History. 24, 145-170.
19. Hoffman, E. & Spitzer, M. (1985). "Experimental Law and Economics: An Introduction." Columbia Law Review. 85, 991-1035.
20. Hunter, M. (1973). Justice, British Section of the International Commission of Jurists, False Witness: The Problem of Perjury. London, Stevens and Sons.
21. Hurwicz, L. (1973). "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation." American Economic Review. 63, 1-30.
22. Kainen, J. L. (1992). "Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules: Policies, Principles and Politics." Stan. L. Rev. 44, 130-172.
23. Keeton, P., Dobbs, D., Keeton, R. & Owen, D. (1984). Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th ed., West. Publ. Co.
24. Kislak, R. & Donoghue, J. J. (1999). "Perjury." American Criminal Law Review. 36, 957.
25. Kocieniewski, D. (1997). "Perjury Dividend-A Special Report; New York Pays a High Price for Police Lies." New York Times. 5 January 1997, Sunday, Lated Edition, Section 1, p. 1.
26. Mandel, M. J. (1999). "Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses." J. Economics Perspectives. 13, 113-120.
27. Marcus, R. (1998). "Paying the Price for Civil Perjury; Prosecution May Be Unusual, But It Can Mean Prison." Washington Post. 3 March 1998, A Section page A04.
28. McClurg, A. J. (1999). "Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying." U.C. Davis Law Review. 32, 389-453.
29. Myerson, R. B. (1985). "Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction." In L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler & H. Sonnenschein (eds.), Social Goals and Social Organization, Essays in Memory of Elisha A. Pazner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 229-259.
30. Nagel, R. F. (1998). "Lies and Law." Harvard J. Law & Public Policy. 22, 605-616.
31. Plescia, J. (1970). The Oath and Perjury in Ancient Greece. Tallahassee: Florida State Univ. Press.
32. Polinsky, A. M. & Shavell, S. (2000). "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law." Journal of Economic Literature. 38, 45-76.
33. Posner, R. & Mandel, M. J. (1999). "The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness." J. Economics Perspectives. 13, 91-99.
34. Rappaport, D. (1993). The Alger Hiss Trial, 1st ed., New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers.
35. Reuben, W. (1983). "Footnote on an Historic Case." In Re Alger Hiss, No. 78 Civ. 3433. New York, NY: Nation Institute.
36. Samuelson, P. (1954). "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure." Review of Economics and Statistics. 36, 387-389.
37. Samuelson, P. (1955). "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditures." Review of Economics and Statistics. 37, 350-356.
38. Sanchirico, C. W. (2000). "Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History." American Law & Economics Review. 16, 342-380.
39. Sexton, J. (1994). "Types of Perjury Common Among Police Officers are Detailed." New York Times, 23 April 1994, Saturday, Late Edition, Section 1, p. 27.
40. Shellenberger, J. A. (1988). "Perjury Prosecutions After Acquittal: The Evils of False Testimony Balanced Against the Sanctity of Determinations of Innocence." Marquette Law Review. 71, 703-747.
41. Slobogin, C. (1996). "Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It." U. Colorado Law Review. 67, 1037.
42. Slottje, D. J. (ed.) (1999). The Role of the Academic Economist in Litigation Support. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
43. Spier, K. E. (1994). "Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules." Rand J. Econ. 25(2), 197-214.
44. Suro, R. & Miller, B. (1998). "Perjury: A Tought Case to Make; Though a Central Issue in Starr's Impeachment Referral, Lying is Seldom Prosecuted." Washington Post. September 24, 1998, A14.
45. Thornton, R. & Ward, J. (1999). "The Economist in Tort Litigation." J. Economic Perspectives. 13, 101-112.
46. Tiersma, P. (1990). "The Language of Perjury: 'Literal Truth', Ambiguity, and the False Statement Requirement." S. Cal. L. Rev. 373(63), 373.
47. Underwood, R. H. (1996). "Perjury: An Anthology." Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 13, 307-379.
48. Underwood, R. H. (1998). "Perjury! The Charges and the Defenses." Duq. L. Rev. 36, 715-794.
49. Zimring, F. E. (1999). "What is the Aim of Criminal Law?" Los Angeles Times. NA/Thrusday, January 14, 1999, A15.
50. "Perjury by Defendants: The Uses of Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel." Harvard Law Review. 74, 752.
51. "Constitutional Law: Collateral Estoppel Held Inapplicable to Subsequent Perjury Prosecution of Criminal Defendant." Minnesota Law Review. 60, 597-609.
52. "Civil Remedies for Perjury." Arizona Law Review. 19, 349.