The democratic efficiency debate and definitions of political equilibrium

Review of Austrian Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 2-3, 2002, Pages 199-209

  Sutter, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Market process; Political equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043093142     PISSN: 08893047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1015766621802     Document Type: Article

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