Learning to deliberate: Aristotle on truthfulness and public deliberation

Political Theory

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 449-467

  Nieuwenburg, Paul ^a  

^a LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Aristotle; Deliberation; Publicity; Shame; Truthfulness

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043064287     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591703261390     Document Type: Review

References (42)

1. Jon Elster, "The Market and the Forum," in Deliberative Democracy, ed. by James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 12. Elster, however, lists several objections to the claim.
2. Ian Shapiro, The Moral Foundations of Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 113.
3. James D. Fearon, "Deliberation as Discussion," in Deliberative Democracy, ed. by Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 52-55, ascribes to the 'hypocritical' deliberator something like "a desire not to appear selfish," there being "something embarrassing or even shameful about statements like 'we don't care what anyone else gets: we just want more for ourselves'."
4. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London: Longman's Green and Co., 1876), 84. To be sure, what Mill is driving at in this passage is how publicity constrains the private deliberations of individual agents. For the relation between public and private deliberation, see Robert E. Goodin, "Democratic Deliberation Within," Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (2000) : 81 -109; Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 53ff. Cf. Joshua Cohen, "Democracy and Liberty," in Deliberative Democracy, 188.
5. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London: Longman's Green and Co., 1876), 84. To be sure, what Mill is driving at in this passage is how publicity constrains the private deliberations of individual agents. For the relation between public and private deliberation, see Robert E. Goodin, "Democratic Deliberation Within," Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (2000) : 81 -109; Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 53ff. Cf. Joshua Cohen, "Democracy and Liberty," in Deliberative Democracy, 188.
6. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London: Longman's Green and Co., 1876), 84. To be sure, what Mill is driving at in this passage is how publicity constrains the private deliberations of individual agents. For the relation between public and private deliberation, see Robert E. Goodin, "Democratic Deliberation Within," Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (2000) : 81 -109; Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 53ff. Cf. Joshua Cohen, "Democracy and Liberty," in Deliberative Democracy, 188.
7. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London: Longman's Green and Co., 1876), 84. To be sure, what Mill is driving at in this passage is how publicity constrains the private deliberations of individual agents. For the relation between public and private deliberation, see Robert E. Goodin, "Democratic Deliberation Within," Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (2000) : 81 -109; Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 53ff. Cf. Joshua Cohen, "Democracy and Liberty," in Deliberative Democracy, 188.
8. I shall freely, but not irresponsibly, use texts from the entire Aristotelian corpus, including the Eudemian Ethics. There is some controversy about the relation of this latter work to the Nicomachean Ethics, which is generally (but not universally) considered to be the more mature work. However, my use of the Eudemian Ethics is justified in that (1) it (as opposed to the Magna Moralia) is generally believed to be a genuinely Aristotelian work and (2) the passages I adduce are not from contexts significantly different from the lore of its Nicomachean counterpart.
9. For references, see note 9.
10. Symptomatic of this neglect is Robin Smith, Aristotle: Topics, Books I and VIII (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1997), 80.
11. Jonathan Barnes, "Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics," Revue internationale de la philosophie 34 (1981): 498-500. Barnes gives a nice example from a speech by Demosthenes (VIII.66 = X.68).
12. Traditionally, endoxos is construed as either probability, plausibility, or a blend of these. J. M. Le Blond, Logique et Méthode chez Aristote, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1970), 10-11; for criticisms, see J. D. G. Evans, Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78 , and Barnes, "Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics," 498, n. 14. Smith, Aristotle, 42 , has 'acceptable'. The rendition 'reputable' has been criticized on the ground that what is reputed (de facto) is not necessarily reputable (de iure). Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988), 492, n. 42; Jacques Brunschwig, Aristote: Topiques I-IV (Paris: Société d'édtion "Les Belles Lettres," 1967), 113-14 . For incorporation of the notion in modern political theory, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 51 and n. 26.
13. Traditionally, endoxos is construed as either probability, plausibility, or a blend of these. J. M. Le Blond, Logique et Méthode chez Aristote, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1970), 10-11; for criticisms, see J. D. G. Evans, Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78 , and Barnes, "Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics," 498, n. 14. Smith, Aristotle, 42 , has 'acceptable'. The rendition 'reputable' has been criticized on the ground that what is reputed (de facto) is not necessarily reputable (de iure). Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988), 492, n. 42; Jacques Brunschwig, Aristote: Topiques I-IV (Paris: Société d'édtion "Les Belles Lettres," 1967), 113-14 . For incorporation of the notion in modern political theory, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 51 and n. 26.
14. Traditionally, endoxos is construed as either probability, plausibility, or a blend of these. J. M. Le Blond, Logique et Méthode chez Aristote, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1970), 10-11; for criticisms, see J. D. G. Evans, Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78 , and Barnes, "Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics," 498, n. 14. Smith, Aristotle, 42 , has 'acceptable'. The rendition 'reputable' has been criticized on the ground that what is reputed (de facto) is not necessarily reputable (de iure). Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988), 492, n. 42; Jacques Brunschwig, Aristote: Topiques I-IV (Paris: Société d'édtion "Les Belles Lettres," 1967), 113-14 . For incorporation of the notion in modern political theory, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 51 and n. 26.
15. Traditionally, endoxos is construed as either probability, plausibility, or a blend of these. J. M. Le Blond, Logique et Méthode chez Aristote, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1970), 10-11; for criticisms, see J. D. G. Evans, Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78 , and Barnes, "Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics," 498, n. 14. Smith, Aristotle, 42 , has 'acceptable'. The rendition 'reputable' has been criticized on the ground that what is reputed (de facto) is not necessarily reputable (de iure). Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988), 492, n. 42; Jacques Brunschwig, Aristote: Topiques I-IV (Paris: Société d'édtion "Les Belles Lettres," 1967), 113-14 . For incorporation of the notion in modern political theory, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 51 and n. 26.
16. Traditionally, endoxos is construed as either probability, plausibility, or a blend of these. J. M. Le Blond, Logique et Méthode chez Aristote, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1970), 10-11; for criticisms, see J. D. G. Evans, Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78 , and Barnes, "Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics," 498, n. 14. Smith, Aristotle, 42 , has 'acceptable'. The rendition 'reputable' has been criticized on the ground that what is reputed (de facto) is not necessarily reputable (de iure). Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988), 492, n. 42; Jacques Brunschwig, Aristote: Topiques I-IV (Paris: Société d'édtion "Les Belles Lettres," 1967), 113-14 . For incorporation of the notion in modern political theory, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 51 and n. 26.
17. Traditionally, endoxos is construed as either probability, plausibility, or a blend of these. J. M. Le Blond, Logique et Méthode chez Aristote, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1970), 10-11; for criticisms, see J. D. G. Evans, Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78 , and Barnes, "Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics," 498, n. 14. Smith, Aristotle, 42 , has 'acceptable'. The rendition 'reputable' has been criticized on the ground that what is reputed (de facto) is not necessarily reputable (de iure). Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988), 492, n. 42; Jacques Brunschwig, Aristote: Topiques I-IV (Paris: Société d'édtion "Les Belles Lettres," 1967), 113-14 . For incorporation of the notion in modern political theory, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 51 and n. 26.
18. Traditionally, endoxos is construed as either probability, plausibility, or a blend of these. J. M. Le Blond, Logique et Méthode chez Aristote, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1970), 10-11; for criticisms, see J. D. G. Evans, Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78 , and Barnes, "Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics," 498, n. 14. Smith, Aristotle, 42 , has 'acceptable'. The rendition 'reputable' has been criticized on the ground that what is reputed (de facto) is not necessarily reputable (de iure). Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988), 492, n. 42; Jacques Brunschwig, Aristote: Topiques I-IV (Paris: Société d'édtion "Les Belles Lettres," 1967), 113-14 . For incorporation of the notion in modern political theory, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 51 and n. 26.
19. Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1994), 169.
20. See also Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, 117; 528, n. 1 .
21. In the Prior Analytics, we find "propositions according to truth (kat'alê theian)" versus "propositions according to opinion" (ek tôn kata doxan protaseôn) (APr46a9-10;). In the Sophistical Refutations the adverb endoxôs is twice opposed to kata talêthes (SE 175a31-3). The phrases pros doxan, kata doxan, and doxastikôs are interchangeable (Top 162b31-3; APr43b8-9, 65a35-7; APo81b18-23).
22. I have not been able to see any clear-cut means of distinguishing the concept of aidôs and aiskhunê in Aristotle's writings; see Douglas L. Cairns, Aidôs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1993), 415 ; Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 194, n. 9; for shame as a moral emotion, see Paul Nieuwenburg, "Emotion and Perception in Aristotle's Rhetoric," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002): 86-100.
23. I have not been able to see any clear-cut means of distinguishing the concept of aidôs and aiskhunê in Aristotle's writings; see Douglas L. Cairns, Aidôs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1993), 415 ; Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 194, n. 9; for shame as a moral emotion, see Paul Nieuwenburg, "Emotion and Perception in Aristotle's Rhetoric," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002): 86-100.
24. I have not been able to see any clear-cut means of distinguishing the concept of aidôs and aiskhunê in Aristotle's writings; see Douglas L. Cairns, Aidôs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1993), 415 ; Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 194, n. 9; for shame as a moral emotion, see Paul Nieuwenburg, "Emotion and Perception in Aristotle's Rhetoric," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002): 86-100.
25. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 79-80.
26. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 79-80. If we take 'respectable differences of opinion' to be differences between respectable opinions, then the previous section may be taken to have shown how dialectic acquaints its participants with these. As concerns (self-reflectiveness about) moral commitments, these will be discussed in section 5. I shall forego discussing the point about modification of one's position by rational considerations, since bringing this into line with the internalist point of departure would be, if not impossible, far beyond the scope of this article.
27. Miles Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 78.
28. The qualification 'prospective' is from Williams, Shame and Necessity, 79, 87. 'Prospective shame', however, is ambiguous between (1) the prospect of shame and (2) shame at a prospective blow to one's reputation (as Aristotle makes room for it in his definition). It might be argued that (1) is not shame at all, but rather fear, namely, fear of shame. For Aristotle, however, the expectation of shame is not fear but itself shame (EE 1229a35-39).
29. John Cooper, "Some Remarks on Aristotle's Moral Psychology," in Reason and Emotion, ed. by John Cooper (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 242, rightly insists that this conception is "somehow part of or the result of a process of investigation into the truth about what is good." The application of dialectic to ethics is the paramount example of such an investigation.
30. This is why Aristotle feels free to treat wishes as equivalent to "hidden opinions" to "apparent opinions [phanerai doxai]" (SE 172b36-173a6).
31. 'To be chosen' (haireton) may be treated interchangeably with 'good' (agathon) (Top 116a3 and throughout).
32. For the role of deliberate choice (prohairesis) in the assessment of character, see section 4.
33. Actually, one of the premises of Eudoxus' argument, namely, that what all things aim at is the good, even figures in the exordium of the Nicomachean Ethics (EN 1094a1-3; see also EN 1095a14-5, 1097a5; Rh 1362a23, b5-9, 1363b12-4, 1365a1; Pol 1252a29, 1282b14-5; Top 116a19-20).
34. This confirms the point made in section 2, that what is at issue in the oppositon kata doxan-kat'alêtheian is not an epistemic distinction.
35. In the Nicomachean Ethics, this virtue is said to be anônumos, without a name (1127a14); however, in the Eudemian Ethics it is called alêtheia (1221a6, 1233b39-1234a3).
36. Recall that good repute consists in 'having something what all, or the good, or the (practically) wise aim at', and since wisdom is the ultimate constituent of eudaimonia, it stands to reason that that is one thing at least the good and the practically wise aim at.
37. Since an art, such as medicine, ranges over contraries, it is capable of producing both health, which is what medicine is essentially for, and illness, which results from what Aristotle calls an 'accidental' use of the art (Met 1046a36-b7, 1048a2-11).By the same token, the same difference between proper and improper use informs dialectic's 'counterpart', the art of rhetoric. Both are of contraries, but unlike other arts, they are so 'in like manner': both reason ad utramque partem, but rhetoric does so not in order to persuade others to do what is base, but that we get a more secure grip on the facts and to expose and confute those who reason with wrong purposes (mê dikaiôs). Just as in the case of dialectic the subvertive use lies in deliberate choice, so it is with rhetoric (Rh 1355a29-36, b17-21).
38. Deliberate choice is the upshot of a process of deliberation triggered by a wish, which in Aristotle's terminology is (rational) desire for the good or what appears so or, alternatively, desire for the end (telos). Both deliberation and deliberate choice upon which deliberation terminates are for 'the things toward the end' (ta pros to telos). Hence, reconstructing a deliberate choice on the basis of an action allows us to infer to the state of his character (EE 1228a15-8). Arousing an impression in others that he is a wise man falls in the category of 'the things toward the end', since that is what deliberate choice ranges over. What this boils down to in practice is that he deliberately chooses to proffer arguments that instill in others a false impression or appearance (Met 1025a1-6).
39. It is notoriously difficult to give an English equivalent of paideia; perhaps the German Bildung comes closest to it; see John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 84.
40. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, 28: "Aristotle does not explicitly say that the discipline forming an educated person's [Irwin's translation of pepaideumenos] view of other disciplines is dialectic; but this seems the most likely candidate."
41. In this connection, the concept of direction of fit is not meant to have the technical sense it has the philosophy of mind and language.
42. Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2002), 121.