Democratic deliberation within

Philosophy and Public Affairs

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 81-109

  Goodin, Robert E ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

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EID: 0002710712     PISSN: 00483915     EISSN: 10884963     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2000.00081.x     Document Type: Article

References (144)

1. Represented by Aristotle's "deliberative speaking" (Rhetoric, bk. 1, chs. 3-4).
2. Found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 4
3. Hobbes's Leviathan, ch. 6.
4. Stuart Hampshire, Justice Is Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
5. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 4-5.
6. Henry Richardson, "Democratic Intentions," in Deliberative Democracy, ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 349-82.
7. Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (1987): 338-68.
8. Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34 at pp. 21-23
9. "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy & Difference, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 95-119 at pp. 99-100.
10. Seyla Benhabib, "Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy," Constellations 1, no. 1 (April 1994): 26-52.
11. John S. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
12. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
13. As in Peter Laslett, "The Face to Face Society," in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. Peter Laslett, 1st series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956), pp. 157-84.
14. Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 67-68.
15. Contenting ourselves with getting all the positions on the table, as distinct from all persons to the podium, is one way of mitigating these problems. My proposals constitute one way of doing that.
16. James Madison thought that "a democracy… must be confined to a small spot" whereas "a republic may be extended over a large region," precisely because "in a democracy the people meet and exercise government in person" whereas "in a republic they administer it by their representatives and agents" (Federalist # 14). See similarly Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973)
17. Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (New York: Basic Books), chs. 19-20. Even face-to-face assemblies cease being deliberative when they become too large, with speech-making replacing conversation and rhetorical appeals replacing reasoned arguments.
18. As Madison (or perhaps Hamilton) wrote in The Federalist # 55, "In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passions never fail to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob."
19. Cf. Cicero, De Officiis, II.48
20. Madison, The Federalist # 62 and 63.
21. After the fashion of Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).
22. See, more generally, Gilbert Ryle, "Imagination," in The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), ch. 8.
23. Aristotle, Politics, 129a13.
24. Harold J. Herman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 448-49.
25. Even today, juries are virtually the sole institutions that "regularly call upon ordinary citizens to engage each other in a face-to-face process of debate"; Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury (New York: Basic Books, 1994), p. 8.
26. Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, "Directly-deliberative Polyarchy," European Law Journal 3, no. 4 (Dec 1997): 313-42.
27. See similarly: Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers et al., Associations and Democracy, ed. E. O. Wright (London: Verso, 1995);
28. Paul Hirst, Associative Democracy (Oxford: Polity, 1994);
29. Seyla Benhabib, "Deliberative Rationality," p. 35;
30. Iris Marion Young, "Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy," in Intersecting Voices (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 60-74.
31. Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England (1716)
32. quoted in A.W.B. Simpson, "The Common Law and Legal Theory," in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 2nd series, ed. A.W.B. Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp.77-99 at p. 96.
33. See also Berman, Law in Revolution, p. 449.
34. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Oxford: Polity, 1996; originally published 1992), ch. 8.
35. See similarly John S. Dryzek, "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization," American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 475-87.
36. Cohen and Sabel, "Directly-deliberative Polyarchy," p. 326.
37. See, respectively: Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," pp. 31-32;
38. Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), esp. ch. 6;
39. John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp. ch 4.
40. Something like this is suggested by Iris Marion Young, "Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group Political Conflict," in The Rights of Cultural Minorities, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995), pp. 155-77 at p. 157.
41. Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, trans. Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955), esp. pp. 125-95.
42. To be sure, deliberators genuinely deliberate in these processes. The only question - what is signaled by calling the process "ersatz" - is the extent to which the deliberations of the subset can adequately substitute for those of the whole.
43. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861), ch. 5;
44. in Richard Wollheim, John Stuart Mill, Three Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 142-423 at p. 228.
45. In Lord Boothby's delightful formulation, "Ideally, the House of Commons should be a social microcosm of the nation. The nation includes a great many people who are rather stupid, and so should the house"; quoted in A. H. Birch, "The Nature and Functions of Representation," The Study of Politics, ed. Preston King (London: Frank Cass, 1977), pp. 265-78 at p. 268.
46. Thus, for example, in their deliberations behind the closed doors of the Philadelphia Convention, the Founding Fathers self-consciously couched their arguments in terms of what "ought to occur to a people deliberating on a Government for themselves,… in a temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before them"; James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (New York: Norton, 1966; originally published 1840), entry for 26 June 1787, pp. 193-94.
47. Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
48. Bernard Manin, Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), esp. ch. 6.
49. Madison, Federalist # 62 and 63.
50. James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991)
51. The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).
52. Anna Coote and Jo Lenaghan, Citizens' Juries: Theory into Practice (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997).
53. Jon Elster, "Introduction," in Deliberative Democracy, ed. J. Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 8-9.
54. James Tully, "The Agonic Freedom of Citizens," Economy & Society 28, no. 2 (May 1999): 101-22.
55. Cf. Fishkin's, Voice of the People, p. 220, report of deliberative polls done for three different local public utilities in Texas. There he is pleased to report that in all three cases the shift in opinion, preto post-deliberation, was in the same direction. But the absolute numbers nonetheless diverged wildly. In one case, half the respondents thought post-deliberation that "investing in conservation" was the "option to pursue first" whereas in another case under a third thought so. In one case, over a third still thought post-deliberation that "renewable energy" should be the top option, whereas in another case less than a sixth thought so. Clearly, these deliberating groups ought not be regarded as interchangeable. Neither, in consequence, does this evidence inspire confidence in the general strategy of "ersatz deliberation," treating smaller deliberative groups as microcosms capable of literally "substituting" for deliberation across the whole community.
56. Harry Kalven, Jr., and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 474. Even where mock juries come to the same verdicts, they do so through very different lines of collective reasoning.
57. At most, they might be taken as "recommendations" to be fed back into those broader community-wide deliberations (Fishkin, Voice of the People, p. 162).
58. Limiting the length of interventions is the more modern way, limiting the number of them the older. British parliamentary practice traditionally was that "none may speak more than once to the matter"; Thomas Jefferson, Parliamentary Pocket-Book, sec. 180
59. reprinted in Jefferson's Parliamentary Writings, ed. Wilbur Samuel Howell, 2nd series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 47-162 at p. 89.
60. Jefferson's Parliamentary Writings, Ibid., pp. 89-90.
61. Omitting gratuitous insults, groundless threats, and so on; see Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).
62. Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). "Seconds" played a similar role in the code dueletto. 35. As arguably we do with germaneness rules in the legislative case, for example.
63. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Oxford: Polity, 1989; originally published 1962), esp. pp. 31-43;
64. "The Public Sphere" (trans. S. and E Lennox), New German Critique 3 (1964): 49-55;
65. Between Facts and Norms, esp. chs. 7-8.
66. See also Charles Taylor, "Modernity and the Rise of the Public Sphere," Tanner Lectures on Human Values 14 (1993): 203-60.
67. Even there they engaged directly but not particularly deeply, judging from William Hazlitt's contemporaneous account, "On Coffee-house Politicians," in Table Talk, or Original Essays (New York: Chelsea House, 1983; originally published 1869), pp. 261-83. There he writes that coffeehouse politicians "are like an oyster at the ebb of the tide, gaping for fresh tidings" (p. 263). Among them, "The Evening Paper is impatiently expected and called for at a certain critical minute: the news of the morning becomes stale and vapid by the dinner-hour…. It is strange that people should take so much interest at one time what they so soon forget: - the truth is, they feel no interest in it at any time, but it does for something to talk about. Their ideas are served upto them, like their bill of fare, for the day" (p. 262). In coffeehouses, "People do not seem to talk for the sake of expressing their opinions, but to maintain an opinion for the sake of talking…. It is not conversation, but rehearsing a part" (pp. 268-69). "Men of education and men of the world… know what they have to say on a subject, and come to the point at once. Your coffee-house politician balances between what he heard last and what he shall say next; and not seeing his way clearly, puts you off with circumstantial phrases, and tries to gain time for fear of making a false step" (p. 269).
68. Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 42.
69. British parliamentary practice prohibits reading out of written speeches for precisely that reason: "When orators confine themselves to reading out what they have written in the silence of their study, they no longer discuss, they amplify. They do not listen, since what they hear must not in any way alter what they are going to say. They wait until the speaker whose place they must take has concluded. They do not examine the opinion he defends, they count the time he is taking and which they regard as a delay. In this way there is no discussion…. Everyone sets aside whatever he has not anticipated, all that might disrupt a case already completed in advance. Speakers follow one another without meeting; if they refute one another it is simply by chance. They are like two armies, marching in opposite directions, one next to the other, barely catching a glimpse of one another, avoiding even looking at one another for fear of deviating from a route which has already been irrevocably traced out." Benjamin Constant, "Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments," in Political Writings, trans. and ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; originally published 1815), ch. 7, p. 222.
70. On uptake see J.G.A. Pocock, "Verbalizing a Political Act: Toward a Politics of Speech," Political Theory 1 (1973): 27-45.
71. J. L. Austin, "Other Minds," in Philosophical Papers, ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 76-116 at p. 115.
72. Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
73. David Lewis, "Scorekeeping in a Language Game," Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979): 339-59.
74. Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson, "Loose Talk," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86 (1986): 153-71.
75. That is how "conversational implicature" works: G. Paul Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in The Logic of Grammar, ed. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Encino, CA: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 64-75
76. Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. pp. 22-40, 138-44, 269-82.
77. On related disputes in cognitive science, see: Gregory Currie, Meeting of Minds: Thought, Imagination, and Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);
78. Christopher Peacocke, ed., Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, Proceedings of the British Academy # 83 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1994)
79. esp. Martin Davies, "The Mental Simulation Debate," pp. 99-127;
80. Martin Davies and Tony Stone, "Folk Psychology and Mental Simulation," in Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Anthony O'Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, for the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 1998), pp. 53-82.
81. Jane Heal, "Understanding Other Minds from the Inside," in Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, ed. O'Hear, pp. 83-100. "Lightly theorized," but still nonetheless theorized: we need some grounds for supposing they are like us in relevant respects, for example.
82. Ned Block, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). "Folk psychologists" assume we attribute to others the same sort of psychology of beliefs and desires which, upon introspection, we find that we ourselves have; and we assume that they will act on their peculiar beliefs and desires in standard sorts of ways, under standard sorts of provocations, just as we ourselves would do.
83. See Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, "In Defense of Folk Psychology," Philosophical Studies, 57 (1990), 7-30;
84. Philip Pettit, The Common Mind, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), esp. chs 1-2,4, and postscript;
85. David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996).
86. Habermas elaborates: "Discourse ethics rests on the intuition that the application of the principle of universalization, properly understood, calls for a joint process of 'ideal role taking.' It interprets this idea of G. H. Mead in terms of a pragmatic theory of argumentation. Under the pragmatic presupposition of an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse among free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understandings of self and world of all others." See Jürgen Habermas, "Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism," Journal of Philosophy 92 (March 1995): 109-31 at p. 117.
87. As Iris Marion Young aptly remarks, a propos Habermas, it is not just a matter of intellectually registering the perspective of the others but rather of "imaginatively" projecting oneself into their position; "Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder and Enlarged Thought," in Intersecting Voices, pp. 38-59 at p. 39.
88. For philosophical treatmens, see Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), esp. chs 3-4;
89. Gregory Currie, Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995);
90. and Elaine Scarry, "On Vivacity: The Difference between Daydreaming and Imagining-under-Authorial-Instruction," Representations 52 (Fall 1995): 1-26.
91. It may well be that one's own "sense of oneself is similarly constructed out of some such internal narrative. See, e.g., Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), esp. ch. 2
92. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
93. Kimberly K. Smith, "Storytelling, Sympathy and Moral Judgment in American Abolitionism," Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (1998): 356-77.
94. Such is the claim of Elaine Scarry, "The Difficulty of Imagining Other People," in For Love of Country, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), pp. 98-110 at p. 105.
95. This, and the political implications flowing from it, form recurring themes in the writings of Martha Nussbaum: Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990);
96. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995);
97. Cultivating Humanity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
98. George Steiner, "Literature and Post-History" (1965), in Language and Silence (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), pp. 413-24 at p. 420.
99. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1954; originally published 1927), ch. 5, p. 184.
100. Aristotle, Poetics, 1459a17-1459b8.
101. Conduct the experiment for yourself. Is it not ever so much easier to imagine yourself Jean Valjean, given all that Hugo has told us about him, than it is to imagine yourself a generic "prisoner of the Bastille" on the basis of what historians have told us about that place and its denizens? Intellectually, generalizations maybe easier, both to convey and to grasp; but emotionally and imaginatively, we respond better to more fully described particulars than generalities which abstract from the details that make those particulars more evocative.
102. Bernard Crick, Essays on Politics and Literature (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989), p.17.
103. Steiner, "Humane Literacy" (1963), in Language and Silence, pp. 21-9 at p. 29.
104. Wayne C. Booth, The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 485. Cf. Scarry's claim that "it is impossible to hold rich multitudes of imaginary characters simultaneously in the mind"; and she may well be right that, "presented with the large number of characters one finds in Dickens or in Tolstoy, one must constantly strain to keep them sorted out"
105. ("The Difficulty of Imagining Other People," p. 104). But it is not at all hard to recall a large number of characters and situations, drawn from many different novels. We do that all the time.
106. T. S. Eliot, "The Social Function of Poetry," in On Poetry and Poets (London: Faber & Faber, 1958; originally published 1943), pp. 15-25. Eliot goes on to claim that poetry conveys "some fresh understanding of the familiar, or the expression of something we have experienced but have no words for, which enlarges our consciousness or refines our sensibility" (p. 18); "The genuine poet… discovers new variations of sensibility which can be appropriated by others…. In expressing what other people feel he is also changing the feeling by making it more conscious; he is making people more aware of what they feel already, and therefore teaching them something about themselves" (p. 20).
107. See similarly William Wordsworth, "Observations Prefixed to 'Lyrical Ballads'" (1820), in What Is Art? ed. Alexander Sesokske (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 261-74.
108. Steiner, "Literature and Post-History," p. 420.
109. Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin, eds., Justice Between Generations: Philosophy, Politics and Society, 6th series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). Other communicatively inert interests that we arguably ought take into account might include those of other peoples and other species.
110. Robert E. Goodin, "Enfranchising the Earth, and Its Alternatives," Political Studies 44 (Dec. 1996): 835-49.
111. As Alan Ryan writes, "In the absence of a real, physically present interlocutor…, you the reader are at the mercy of my ideas about what this conversation is about…. [Y]ou cannot redirect the conversation as you would wish"; "In a Conversational Idiom," Social Research 65 (Fall 1998): 473-89 at p. 473.
112. Michael F. Schober, "Conversational Evidence for Rethinking Meaning," Social Research 65 (Fall 1998): 511-34.
113. Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Situating the Self (Oxford: Polity, 1992), pp. 148-77. Note that it is not just the "peculiar" that presents a challenge, though: any departure from our own way of thinking requires a stretch of the imagination which is, to some greater or lesser extent, difficult to achieve.
114. Ryan, "In a Conversational Idiom," p. 473.
115. As Averill Harriman famously did, in ostentatiously switching off his hearing aid when Soviet negotiators launched into one of their standard harangues. I owe this anecdote to my old friend and teacher Robert Ferrell.
116. As in Charles Tilly's respresentation of conversation as "continuously negotiated communication"; Tilly, "Contentious Conversation," Social Research 65 (Fall 1998): 491-510 at p. 495.
117. Michael F. Schober and Herbert H. Clark, "Understanding by Addressees and Overhearers," Cognitive Psychology 21 (1989): 211-32
118. confirming a speculation by Jean-Paul Sartre, What Is Literature? trans. Bernard Frechtman (London: Methuen, 1950), p. 50.
119. If only in their atypicality: in a representative sample, the fact of diversity ought be represented even if not all the diverse components can be individually represented.
120. They inevitably reflect the "generalized" more than the "concrete" other, in all the other's concrete forms, in the terms of Benhabib, "The generalized and the concrete other."
121. Michel de Montaigne, "On the Art of Conversation," in The Essays of Michel de Montaigne, trans. and ed. M. A. Screech (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1991; originally published 1580), bk. 3, essay 8, pp. 1044-69 at p. 1045.
122. Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence: Democracy and Group Representation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
123. That is precisely what Phillips calls for: "group representation." See esp. Politics of Presence, ch. 6.
124. Young, "Together in Difference."
125. Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other."
126. J. E. Malpas, Place and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
127. True, in situations of great heterogeneity we might find it hard to imagine ourselves in a very different other person's position: but that compromises our capacity for understanding what the other is asserting, in external-collective deliberations, just as much as it compromises our capacity for imagining ourselves as her for internal-reflective deliberative purposes.
128. Herbert A. Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology and Political Science," American Political Science Reviews (1985): 293-304 at p. 302.
129. And if they internalize some but not all other perspectives, there is of course then a risk that their internal-reflective deliberations will be biased accordingly.
130. Sartre, What Is Literature? ch. 3.
131. In terms of democratizing culture (or, rather, of enlisting cultural artefacts in the service of democracy), it is not so much a matter of "high culture" against "low" as it is of "broad" against "narrow."
132. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), ch. 8.
133. Dick Netzer, The Subsidized Muse: Public Support for the Arts in the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
134. Edward C. Banfield, The Democratic Muse: The Visual Arts and the Public Interest (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
135. Carnegie Commission on the Future of Public Broadcasting, A Public Trust (New York: Bantam, 1979).
136. Ronald Dworkin, "Can a Liberal State Support Art?," in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 221-33.
137. Murray Edelman, From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
138. Robert McC. Adams, "Forums, not Temples," American Behavioral Scientist 42 (1999): 968-76.
139. Harry Brighouse, "Neutrality, Publicity and Public Funding of the Arts," Philosophy & Public Affairs 24, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 36-63
140. Dworkin, "Can a Liberal State Support Art?"
141. Karl Lowenstein, "Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European Democracies," Columbia Law Review 38 (1938): 591-622, 725-74.
142. Scarry, "The Difficulty of Imagining Other People," p. 104.
143. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 6.
144. As, lore has it, was the traditional practice of the Cabinet Secretary in Britain.