The Flexible-Salary Match: A proposal to increase the salary flexibility of the National Resident Matching Program

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 66, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 149-160

  Crawford, Vincent P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Market design; Matching markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 40149099542     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.09.001     Document Type: Article

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