Will competitive bidding decrease medicare prices?

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 74, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 839-856

  Katzman, Brett ^a   McGeary, Kerry Anne ^b  

^a KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DREXEL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 39349110885     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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