Free persons and free choices

History of Political Thought

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 709-718

  Petti, Philip ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 38949135959     PISSN: 0143781X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. See P. Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Cambridge and New York, 2001);
2. P. Pettit, 'Agency-Freedom and Option-Freedom', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15 (2003), pp. 387-403.
3. Here I address only one aspect of the republican view: the insistence that the freedom of a person is primary. For recent, highly convergent statements of that view see P. Pettit, 'Republican Liberty: Three Axioms, Four Theorems', in Republicanism and Political Theory, ed. C. Laborde and J. Manor (Oxford, 2007);
4. and Q. Skinner, 'Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power', in ibid.
5. Hobbes excepted (see T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. E. Curley (Indianapolis, 1994), 21.8); he takes the freedom of a society or commonwealth to consist in its freedom in relation to similar bodies, in parallel to the freedom of an individual.
6. Hobbes again excepted (see T. Hobbes and J. Bramhall, Hobbes and Bramhall on Freedom and Necessity, ed. Vere Chappell (Cambridge, 1999), p. 91 ;
7. and P. Pettit, 'Liberty in Leviathan', Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 4 (2005), pp. 131-51). He takes it that my freedom of action is reduced only if I am blocked from taking the option that I have decided upon, and not otherwise: not, in particular, through any other option's being blocked.
8. H. Arendt, On Revolution (Harmondsworth, 1973);
9. T. Baldwin, 'MacCallum and the Two Concepts of Freedom', Ratio, 26 (1984), pp. 125-42;
10. C. Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge, 1985).
11. O. Patterson, Freedom in the Making of Western Culture (New York, 1991).
12. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1971).
13. P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997), ch. 2.
14. I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford, 1958);
15. G.C. MacCallum, 'Negative and Positive Freedom', Philosophical Review, 74 (1967), pp. 312-34.
16. P. Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford, 1995).
17. M. Taylor, Community, Anarchy and Liberty (Cambridge, 1982);
18. H. Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford, 1994);
19. I. Carter, A Measure of Freedom (Oxford, 1999);
20. M.H. Kramer, The Quality of Freedom (Oxford, 2003).
21. D. Miller, 'Constraints on Freedom', Ethics, 94 (1984), pp. 66-86.
22. Arendt, On Revolution; Baldwin, 'MacCallum and the Two Concepts of Freedom';
23. Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences.
24. R. Sugden, "The Metric of Opportunity', Economics and Philosophy, 14 (1998), pp. 307-37.
25. A. Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam, 1985).
26. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Curley, 21.18.
27. J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh, 1843), p. 503.
28. Pettit, Republicanism;
29. Q. Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998).
30. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Curley, 10.5.
31. W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (New York, 1978), p. 126.
32. Pettit, Republicanism;
33. P. Pettit, 'Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner', Political Theory (2002), pp. 339-56.
34. MacCallum, 'Negative and Positive Freedom'.
35. I benefited greatly from comments received when this paper was presented at a workshop organized by Martin Van Gelderen in the European University Institute, Florence, in January 2005.