Does democracy lower growth volatility? A dynamic panel analysis

Journal of Macroeconomics

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 562-574

  Yang, Benhua ^a  

^a TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Democracy; Ethnic heterogeneity; Fragmentation; Volatility

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949092297     PISSN: 01640704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2007.02.005     Document Type: Article

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