The search for optimal organizational hierarchies with homogeneous manager cost functions

Automation and Remote Control

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 89-104

  Gubko, M V ^a  

^a TRAPEZNIKOV INSTITUTE OF CONTROL SCIENCES   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COST FUNCTIONS; HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; MANAGERS; OPTIMAL SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION;

OPTIMAL HIERARCHY COST; SUBOPTIMAL ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHIES;

HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS;

EID: 38849165379     PISSN: 00051179     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10513-008-1009-8     Document Type: Article

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