Changing behaviours in defence acquisition: A game theory approach

Journal of the Operational Research Society

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 225-230

  Gardener, T ^a   Moffat, J ^b  

^a CORDA ^*  (United Kingdom)

^b DEFENCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Defence acquisition; Game theory

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; COST ACCOUNTING; PUBLIC POLICY;

DEFENCE ACQUISITION; DEFENCE CONTRACTS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 38749136245     PISSN: 01605682     EISSN: 14769360     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jors.2602476     Document Type: Article

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