"The civilization of clashes": Misapplying the democratic peace in the middle east

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 122, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 533-554

  Ish Shalom, Piki ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38649100316     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2007.tb00608.x     Document Type: Article

References (152)

1. The term in the title was used by Niall Ferguson to characterize the culture of the Middle East in Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 106.
2. Jacques E.C. Hymans, "The Roots of the Washington Threat Consensus" in Betty Glad and Chris J. Dolan, eds., Striking First: The Preventive War Doctrine and the Reshaping of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 33-45;
3. Douglas Kellner, "Preemptive Strikes and the War on Iraq: A Critique of Bush Administration Unilateralism and Militarism," New Political Science 26 (September 2004): 417-440;
4. Stephen Peter Rosen, "An Empire, if You Can Keep It," The National Interest 71 (Spring 2003): 51-61.
5. Anne Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004);
6. Shaida B. Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
7. Michael Cox, "The Empire's Back in Town: Or America's Imperial Temptation - Again," Millennium 32 (February 2003): 1-27;
8. G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs 81 (September/October 2002), 44-60;
9. Niall Ferguson, "Hegemony or Empire?" Foreign Affairs 82 (September/October 2003), 154-161;
10. Robert Jervis, "The Compulsive Empire," Foreign Policy 137 (July/ August 2003): 83-87;
11. Jack Snyder, "Imperial Temptations," The National Interest 71 (Spring 2003): 29-40.
12. Michael Boyle, "Utopianism and the Bush Foreign Policy," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17 (April 2004): 81-103;
13. Michael J. Mazarr, "George W. Bush, Idealist," International Affairs 79 (May 2003): 503-522;
14. Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy," International Security 29 (Spring 2005): 112-156.
15. Edward Nell and Willi Semmler, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace in Iraq," Constellations 10 (September 2003): 425-436;
16. Stephen Pelletiere, America's Oil Wars (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004);
17. Research Unit for Political Economy, "Behind the War on Iraq," Monthly Review 55 (May 2003): 20-49;
18. Research Unit for Political Economy, Behind the Invasion of Iraq (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2003).
19. See also Piki Ish-Shalom, "Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic Peace and the Politics of Democratization," European Journal of International Relations 12 (December 2006): 565-598.
20. The two sets of writings started their life as articles and three years later were published as books: Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History? The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18;
21. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992);
22. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49;
23. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
24. Irving Kristol, "Defining Our National Interest," The National Interest 21 (Fall 1990): 16-25. Even though Kristol opposes democratization policies, his bafflement is typical.
25. Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1991), 8 (emphasis added).
26. See also Carl Gershman, "Freedom Remains the Touchstone," The National Interest 19 (Spring 1990): 83-86,
27. On the endorsing of the new agenda of democracy promotion, see also John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945-1994 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 184;
28. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 76.
29. Michael C. Williams, "What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory," European Journal of International Relations 26 (September 2005): 307-337.
30. Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 98-103.
31. Joshua Muravchik, "Conservatives for Clinton," The New Republic, 2 November 1992, 22.
32. Joshua Muravchik, "Lament of a Clinton Supporter," Commentary 96 (August 1993): 15-22.
33. The neoconservative commitment to the agenda of democracy promotion was reaffirmed again in 1997 with the establishment of The Project for a New American Century. This neoconservative think tank, chaired by William Kristol, declared in its statement of principles the "need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad." See "Statement of Principles," 3 June 1997, accessed at http://www.newamericancentury.org/ statementofprinciples.htm, 7 March 2006. The think tank kept calling for democracy promotion, and, furthermore, linked this cause to the democratic peace. Its September 2000 report, "Rebuilding America's Defenses," called for "secure[ing] and expand[ing] the 'zones of democratic peace'" (p. 2).
34. See "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century," September 2000, accessed at http://www. newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf, 7 March 2006.
35. Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place among the Nations: Israel and the World (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 243:
36. Benjamin Netanyahu, "Fighting Terrorism" (presented at the eighteenth annual John M. Ashbrook memorial dinner, Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, Ashland University, Ashland, Ohio, 3 May 2002), accessed at http://www.ashbrook.org/events/memdin/netanyahu/home_speech.html, 21 November 2005.
37. See, for example, Natan Sharansky, "Only Democracy Brings Peace," Wall Street Journal, 30 October 2000;
38. Natan Sharansky with Ron Dermer, The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), xix, 3.
39. th century. States that respect the human rights of their citizens are not likely to provoke hostile action against their neighbors." "Address by His Excellency, Binyamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel," 10 July 1996, accessed at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ getpage.cgi?position=all&page= H7161&dbname=1996_record, 9 March 2006.
40. See, for example, Charles Krauthammer, "Peace through Democracy," The Washington Post, 28 June 2002;
41. Ira Stoll, "Israel's Reagan? Natan Sharansky Understands that Liberty Is the Only Guarantee of Peace," The Wall Street Journal, 13 December 2002. The praises for Sharansky increased following his 2004 book, The Case for Democracy, which had a significant impact on President Bush,
42. See Arch Puddington, "Liberty for All," Commentary 118 (November 2004): 72-75;
43. Meirav Wurmser, "Democracy Defended: Natan Sharansky Explains Why Democracy Makes the World Safer," The Weekly Standard, 6 December 2004, 28-29.
44. For example: "The United States, which had mustered the world's most awesome military force to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, failed to see that mission through to its proper conclusion: the removal of Saddam from power in Baghdad," William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility" in Robert Kagan and William Kristol, eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 6. It should be noted that the neoconservative views were not monolithic; Irving Kristol, for example, was a fierce opponent of continuing the war.
45. See Irving Kristol, "Tongue-Tied in Washington," The Wall Street Journal, 15 April 1991.
46. Gary Schmitt, "A Case for Continuity," The National Interest 69 (Fall 2002): 11-13.
47. For Sharansky's linkage between democratization and the end of terror, see Natan Sharansky, "Democracy for Peace," 20 June 2002, accessed at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15187, filter.all/pub_detail.asp, 3 May 2006. For Netanyahu's linkage,
48. see Benjamin Netanyahu, "The Root Cause of Terrorism Is Tyranny," The Wall Street Journal, 19 April 2002. For the neoconservatives' linkage,
49. see Gerecht's remark: "The spread of democracy in the Muslim Middle East remains the only cure for the sacred terror of 9/11." Reuel Marc Gerecht, "Going Soft on Iraq," The Weekly Standard, 8 March 2004, 26-29.
50. See also Joshua Muravchik, "Freedom and the Arab World," The Weekly Standard, 31 December 2001/7 January 2002, 15-16;
51. Fred Barnes, "A Real Peace Process," The Weekly Standard, 5 May 2003, 9;
52. Amir Taheri, "After the Arab League," The Weekly Standard, 3 May 2004, 20-22.
53. See, for example, columns by Krauthammer: Charles Krauthammer, "Hoaxes, Hype and Humiliation," The Washington Post, 13 June 2003;
54. Charles Krauthammer, "Iraq: A Moral Reckoning," The Washington Post, 16 May 2003.
55. Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2003), vii.
56. See also William Kristol, "The 9/11 Election: Editorial," The Weekly Standard, 1 November/8 November 2004, 9.
57. Gerecht, "Going Soft," 27.
58. See also Reuel Marc Gerecht, "Not a Diversion," The Weekly Standard, 12 April/19 April 2004, 23-27.
59. Huntington was one of the early critics of Fukuyama; see Samuel Huntington, "No Exit - The Errors of Endism," The National Interest 17 (Fall 1989): 3-11.
60. Josef Joffe made this point in Commentary in criticizing Fukuyama's position;
61. see Josef Joffe, "Bosnia: The Return of History," Commentary 94 (October 1992): 24-29.
62. William Kristol, "The End of the Beginning," The Weekly Standard, 12 May 2003, 9. In a similar spirit, Stanley Kurtz asserted: "Islamic society may still adapt itself to democracy and capitalism. Yet at this point, to ignore the incompatibility between Islam and modernity is willful blindness."
63. See Stanley Kurtz, "The Terror of Islam," The Weekly Standard, 27 May 2002, 37-38.
64. Joshua Muravchik, "The Bush Manifesto," Commentary 114 (December 2002): 29.
65. See also Joshua Muravchik, "Hearts, Minds, and the War against Terror," Commentary 113 (May 2002): 25-30;
66. Joshua Muravchik, "The Richard Clarke Show," Commentary 117 (May 2004): 32-41.
67. Norman Podhoretz, "How to Win World War IV," Commentary 113 (February 2002): 19-29;
68. Ephraim Karsh, "Making Iraq Safe for Democracy," Commentary 115 (April 2003): 22-28;
69. Kurtz, "Terror of Islam," 38.
70. This is also evident in the February 24, 1997, special issue of the The Weekly Standard devoted to the rising power of China. The issue immediately followed a harsh review article on Huntington's determinism and pessimism that embodied the neoconservatives' disagreements with him;
71. see Robert Kagan, "Harvard Hates America," The Weekly Standard, 9 December 1996, 24-27.
72. Richard Pipes, "The West and the Rest," Commentary 103 (March 1997): 62-65.
73. Ibid., 63-64.
74. Ibid., 64.
75. Ibid., 65.
76. Norman Podhoretz, "In Praise of the Bush Doctrine." Commentary 114 (September 2002): 19-28 (emphasis in original).
77. Ibid.
78. A useful, although not updated, historical background can be found in Nils Petter Gleiditsch, "Democracy and Peace," Journal of Peace Research 29 (November 1992): 369-376.
79. Milestones in the early development of the democratic peace thesis are: the neglected first article by the criminologist Dean V. Babst, "Elective Governments: A Force for Peace," The Wisconsin Sociologist 3 (January 1964): 9-14;
80. his second and somewhat more widely circulated article, although in a popular journal, Dean V. Babst, "A Force for Peace," Industrial Research 14 (April 1972): 55-58;
81. and the first major publications in the international relations discipline: Peter Wallenstein, Structure and War: On International Relations 1820-1868 (Stockholm: Raben & Sjogern, 1973);
82. Rudolph J. Rummel, Understanding Conflict and War, vol. 4, War, Power, Peace (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 1979);
83. Rudolph J. Rummel, Understanding Conflict and War, vol. 5, The Just Peace (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 1981);
84. Rudolph J. Rummel, "Libertianism and Interstate Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (March 1983): 27-71;
85. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 205-235;
86. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part II," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Autumn 1983): 323-353;
87. Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986): 1151-1169;
88. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 624-638.
89. See, for example, Christopher Lane, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace" in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1996), 157-201;
90. David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace" in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, Debating the Democratic Peace, 202-238;
91. Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace" in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, Debating the Democratic Peace, 239-262;
92. Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic Peace': Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany" in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, Debating the Democratic Peace, 263-300;
93. Joanne Gowa, Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999);
94. Kurt T. Gaubatz, Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 1-3, 16-20, 104-124, 138-140;
95. Raymond Cohen, "Pacific Union: A Reappraisal of the Theory that 'Democracies Do Not Go to War with Each Other,'" Review of International Studies 20 (July 1994): 207-223;
96. Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," American Political Science Review 97 (November 2003): 585-602.
97. The division of the democratic peace theories into two major theories (or paradigms) holds true even when we examine specific explanatory variables shared by theories within the two different paradigms. Let us examine, for example, the explanatory reasoning operating in the variable of the abilities of the public in a democracy to translate their preferences into policies, and in our case, into peaceful resolution of conflict between democracies. This translation process is interpreted by structural theoreticians as incentives facing the elites, or better, as checks on the menu of policies available to the ruling elites. Hence, we find structuralists arguing that the survival of political leaders with large winning coalitions (namely, democracies) is dependent on successful policies. This means that democratic leaders will make larger efforts than will non-democratic leaders and hence, more often than not, will win against non-democrats and will not fight against other democrats. It should be noted that in this explanation, the preferences of the public are being translated into leaders' incentives via structural considerations. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 93 (December 1999): 791-807.
98. James Fearon, who conceptualizes the same elites' incentives by the term 'audience costs.' employs a similar structural logic. See James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88 (September 1.994): 577-592. Alternatively, the normative explanation of the democratic peace operationalizes the same translation process by focusing on its normative foundation, that is, transparency and bounded nature. The important elements in democracy, with regard to the translation from preferences to policies, are both the bounded nature of competition involved in deciding what policies will be chosen and executed, as well as the transparency of the process; both are democratic norms. Furthermore, this transparency is not limited to the democratic polity itself but is freely communicated between democratic polities. The translation of the public preferences to policies therefore causes pacification among democracies and is based on the democratic norms of the bounded and transparent nature of the political conflict.
99. See William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review 88 (March 1994): 14-32.
100. Yet, as Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue, democratization is not necessarily the surest way to achieve stabilty and peace. If democratization is pursued in the absence of proper political institutions, it might lead to both domestic and international violence. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
101. Charles Krauthammer, "The Bush Doctrine: ABM, Kyoto, and the New American Unilateralism," The Weekly Standard, 4 June 2001, 21.
102. Charles Krauthammer, "In Defense of Democratic Realism," The National Interest 77 (Fall 2004); 15-25.
103. Kaplan and Kristol, War over Iraq, 104.
104. See also Puddington, " Liberty for All," 74;
105. Adam Wolfson, "The Two Faces of Liberalism," The Weekly Standard, 18 October 2004, 20-22;
106. Clifford Kupchan, "Real Democratik," The National Interest 77 (Fall 2004): 26-37;
107. Max Boot, "What Next? The Bush Foreign Policy Agenda beyond Iraq," The Weekly Standard, 5 May 2003, 27-33;
108. Charles Lane, "The Democracy Wave: Has It Crested?" The Weekly Standard, 17 January 2000, 29;
109. Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Leftism on the Right," The Weekly Standard, 9 February 1998, 29;
110. Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Dictatorship and No Standards," The Weekly Standard, 8 February 1999, 27-29;
111. Todd Lindberg, "The Referendum on Neoconservatism," The Weekly Standard, 1 November/8 November 2004, 16-18;
112. William E. Odom, "NATO's Expansion: Why the Critics Are Wrong," The National Interest 39 (Spring 1995): 38-49.
113. Again, Krauthammer is a case in point: "until this administration conceived a radical war plan, executed it brilliantly, liberated the country and created from scratch the structures of democracy." Charles Krauthammer, "The Afghan Miracle: Why Isn't This Stunning U.S. Success Appreciated?" The Washington Post, 10 December 2004 (emphasis added).
114. Charles Krauthammer, "Free to Dance in Iraq," The Washington Post, 4 February 2005.
115. See also Paula Dobriansky, "Advancing Democracy," The National Interest 77 (Fall 2004): 71-78.
116. Dobriansky, "Advancing Democracy";
117. see also Peter Wehner, "The Wrong Time to Lose Our Nerve," The Wall Street Journal, 4 April 2006.
118. See Boot, "What Next?" 29-30;
119. Tom Donnelly and William Kristol, "More Caissons Rolling Along," The Weekly Standard, 9 February 2004, 7-8.
120. Kaplan and Kristol, War over Iraq, 104;
121. Puddington "Liberty for All," 74;
122. Wolfson, "The Two Faces of Liberalism," 20-22;
123. Kupchan, "Real Democratik," 35;
124. Boot, "What Next," 27;
125. Lane, "The Democracy Wave," 29;
126. Kaplan, "Leftism on the Right," 29;
127. Kaplan, "Dictatorship and No Standards," 27-29;
128. Lindberg, "Referendum on Neoconservatism," 16-18;
129. Odom, "NATO's Expansion," 43.
130. "President Discusses Freedom and Democracy in Kyoto, Japan," 16 November 2005, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/ 20051116-6.html, 6 March 2006.
131. See, for example, "Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy," 1 June 2002, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html, 6 March 2006;
132. th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy," 6 November 2003, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html, 6 March 2006;
133. "Remarks by the President on Winston Churchill and the War on Terror," 4 February 2004, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2004/02/20040204-4.html, 6 March 2006;
134. "Inauguration 2005," 20 January 2005, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html, 6 March 2006;
135. "State of the Union Address," 2 February 2005, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html, 6 March 2006;
136. "President Discusses War on Terror and Upcoming Iraqi Elections," 12 December 2005, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2005/12/20051212-4.html, 6 March 2006;
137. and "State of the Union Address," 31 January 2006, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html, 6 March 2006.
138. White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," 17 September 2002, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ nss.html, 1 October 2007.
139. Donnelly and Kristol, "More Caissons," 7.
140. Georg F.W. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 10.
141. Francis Fukuyama, "The Neoconservative Moment," The National Interest 76 (Summer 2004): 57-68.
142. Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2006).
143. In an earlier article, Krauthammer called for "nothing short of universal dominion": Charles Krauthammer, "Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World," The National Interest 18 (Winter 1989): 48-49.
144. Since then, he has somewhat moderated his aspirations: Krauthammer, "In Defense of Democratic Realism," 15-25;
145. Krauthammer, "Bush Doctrine," 21;
146. see also Boot, "What Next?" 27-33.
147. White House, National Security, 29.
148. Samuel Huntington, "The Great American Myth," (paper presented at the Grano Lecture Series on American Empire, Toronto, 10 February 2005), accessed at http://www.macleans.ca/topstories/politics/article.jsp?content= 20050214_100487_100487, 21 November 2005. Neither was it hidden from the conservative analysts of the Cato Institute; for their critique of the Bush administration's democracy promotion,
149. see, for example "Rebuilding Iraq: Prospects for Democracy," September/ October 2003, accessed at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/ v25n5/iraq.pdf, 1 October 2007.
150. Prominent realist theorists, including Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer, formed the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy to argue against the policies promoted by neoconservatism. See http://www. realisticforeignpolicy.org, accessed 1 October 2007.
151. See his famous letter to Mandell Creighton published in John E.E. Dalberg-Acton, ed., Historical Essays and Studies (London: Macmillan, 1907), 504.
152. A notable exception is Michael Ignatieff, who calls on the United States to meet its moral obligations, including by resorting to force. See Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2003).