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Volumn 88, Issue 3, 1994, Pages 577-592

Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 84974201121     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2944796     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (1506)

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