Altruism and the political economy of income taxation

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 455-469

  Kranich, Laurence ^a  

^a STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3843102232     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00078     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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