Global governance and the democratic deficit: Stifling the voice of the South

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 217-238

  Glenn, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; DEVELOPING WORLD; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; IMF; WORLD BANK; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION;

EID: 38349092474     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: 13602241     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436590701806798     Document Type: Article

References (98)

1. For an in depth analysis of contemporary patterns of trade and foreign direct investment, see J Glenn, Globalization: North-South Perspectives, London: Routledge, 2007.
2. SG Brooks & WC Wohlforth, 'Hard times for soft balancing', International Security, 30 (1), 2005, pp 76-77.
3. N Woods, 'The role of institutions', in D Held & A McGrew (eds), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, p 29.
4. See also R Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, p 88.
5. Or, as John Ruggie puts it, the 'unbundling of territoriality'. JG Ruggie, 'Territoriality and beyond: Problematizing modernity in international relations', International Organization, 47 (1), 1993, p 171.
6. A Hurrell, 'Power, institutions, and the production of inequality', in M Barnett & R Duvall (eds), Power in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 35.
7. See FW Scharpf, Governing in Europe: E.ective and Democratic?, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p 6.
8. See also Scharpf, 'Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state', Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (1), 1997, pp 18-36 (emphasis in original).
9. J Stiglitz & A Charlton, Fair Trade For All: How Trade Can Promote Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 82.
10. The above is a summary of findings by S Mitchell, 'Stifling the whispers: Current "voice reform" proposals at the IMF', p 1, at www.jubileeresearch.org/news/IMFvrp.pdf, accessed 5 May 2007.
11. D Woodward, 'IMF voting reform: Need, opportunity and options', paper prepared for the G24 Technical Meeting, 12 March 2007, at www.g24.org/ wood0307.pdf, accessed 5 May 2007.
12. International Monetary Fund, 'Reform of IMF quotas and voice: Responding to changes in the global economy', Issues Brief, 2 (7), 2007, at www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2007/041307.pdf, accessed 5 May 2007, p 3.
13. Woodward, 'IMF voting reform', pp 2, 18.
14. C Thomas, 'Global governance, development and human security: Exploring the links', Third World Quarterly, 22 (2), 2001, p 172.
15. S Mitchell, 'Stifling the whispers, p 4.
16. Ekklesia, News Brief, at www.ekklesia.co.uk/node/5074, accessed 9 May 2007.
17. K Guha & C Giles, 'IMF expects to win reform vote', Financial Times 17 September 2006, at www.FT.com, accessed 8 May 2007.
18. Similar dominance by these countries can be seen in the Board of Directors at the World Bank.
19. O McDonald, 'Struggling to be heard - democratising the World Bank and IMF', conference presentation, Christian Aid UK, available online at www.debtireland.org/resources/conference-re- Democratising-WB-IMF-Olivia-McDonald.htm, accessed 8 May 2007.
20. J Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, London: Penguin, 2002, p 227.
21. This requires consensus rather than unanimity, in other words some states may abstain. See G Winham, 'The evolution of the global trade regime', in J Ravenhill (ed), Global Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp 87-117.
22. MKoenig-Archibugi, 'Mapping global governance', in D Held & AMcGrew, Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p 55.
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24. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, p 42.
25. R Hague, M Harrop & S Breslin, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, p 52.
26. The IMF's blueprint for parliamentary accountability, quoted in Christian Aid, Struggling to be Heard: Democratising the World Bank and IMF, at www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/309worldbank/ struggling.pdf, p16, accessed 14 May 2007.
27. A Hurrell, 'Power, institutions, and the production of inequality', p 53.
28. G Mohan, 'Globalisation and governance: The paradoxes of adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa', in E Kofman & G Youngs, Globalization: Theory and Practice, London: Pinter, 1996, p 290 (emphasis in original).
29. F Cheru, 'The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative: Old wine in a new bottle?' in A McGrew & N Poku (eds), Globalization, Development and Human Security, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, p 73.
30. World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000, cited in J Pender, 'From "structural adjustment" to "comprehensive development framework": Conditionality transformed?', Third World Quarterly, 22 (3), 2001, p 407.
31. Pender, 'From "structural adjustment" to "comprehensive development framework"', p 397.
32. For an overview of the reactions to these proposals, see A Fraser, 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Now who calls the shots?', Review of African Political Economy, 104 (5), 2005, p 318.
33. C Thomas, Global Governance, Development and Human Security, London: Pluto Press, 2000, p 64.
34. Christian Aid, Struggling to be Heard, p 6.
35. F Cheru, 'The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative', p 75.
36. For more on the conditions applied, see Oxfam, Do The Deal, London: Cafod, Action Aid UK and Oxfam, 2005.
37. C Thomas, 'Globalization and development in the South', in Ravenhill, Global Political Economy, p 336.
38. Stiglitz & Charlton, Fair Trade for All, p 73.
39. Ibid, p 83.
40. Ibid, p 77.
41. Thomas, 'Globalization and development in the South', pp 328-329.
42. Thus avoiding another cause of in.ation. Devaluing a currency may lead to an increase in exports, but it also leads to domestic in.ation as internal prices increase to re.ect world prices (domestic prices x exchange rate = world prices).
43. Although the details di.er in my version, the three-fold classi.cation is taken from Thomas, 'Globalization and development in the South', pp 328-329.
44. Frances Stewart & Albert Berry, 'Globalization, liberalization, and inequality: Expectations and experience', in A Hurrell & N Woods, Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p 167.
45. Ibid, p 167.
46. Ibid, pp 150-151.
47. Ibid.
48. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, p 71.
49. R Kaplinsky, Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, pp 228-229.
50. A Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, p 172.
51. Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation, and the Fight against Poverty, London: Oxfam, 2002, p 151.
52. UNCTAD, Development and Globalization, Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2004, p 61
53. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2004, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2004, p 55, Table 2.4.
54. A Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World, p 172. For an overview of current issue concerning this institution
55. see N Woods (ed), 'Special Issue: Understanding Pathways through Financial Crises and the Impact of the IMF', Global Governance, 12 (4), 2006.
56. B Milanovic, 'The two faces of development', World Development, 31 (4) 2003, p 673, Table 3. WENAO stands for Western Europe, Northern America and Oceania.
57. UNDP, Making Global Trade Work for People, Virginia: Earthscan Publications Ltd.
58. Human Development Report 1998: Consumption for Human Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p 37.
59. UNDP, Making Global Trade Work For People, p 30.
60. W Grant, 'Agricultural trade', in D Kelly & E Grant (eds), The Politics of International Trade in the Twenty-First Century: Actors, Issues and Regional Dynamics, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005, p 93.
61. Ibid, pp 92-106.
62. G Monbiot, 'The worst of times', Guardian, 3 September 2003, p 21.
63. J Stiglitz & A Charlton, 'The Doha round is missing the point on helping poor countries', Financial Times Asia, 13 December 2005, p 15.
64. See C Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982
65. M Woo-Cumings, The Developmental State, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999
66. J Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991
67. and R Wade, Governing The Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
68. The figures quoted are for exports compared to Hoogvelt's figures for total trade. Given that this book is interested in wealth creation for developing countries, world exports are chosen. However, if one uses total trade the trends described here are roughly the same. See WTO, International Trade Statistics: 2004, Geneva: WTO, 2004.
69. See Jarrod Wiener's excellent account of the lead-up to the signing of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). J Wiener, 'GATS and the politics of "trade in services"', in Kelly & Grant, The Politics of International Trade in the Twenty-First Century, pp 144-163.
70. Grant, 'Agricultural trade', p 97.
71. B Gunnell, 'Trade: What we want', New Statesman, 22 October 2001, pp 23-24.
72. L Elliott, 'Stop treating debtors as poor cows', Guardian, 23 September 2002
73. and 'Unpicking cotton subsidies', The Economist, 30 April 2005.
74. M Khor, 'Preliminary comments on the WTO's Geneva July decision', Third World Network, 2005, p 6, at http://www.twnside.org, accessed 3 August 2005.
75. I Taylor, '"Advice is judged by results, not by intentions": Why Gordon Brown is wrong about Africa', International Affairs, 81 (2), 2005, p 307. For example, for Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa it is estimated that it would increase their GDP by up to 0.6%.
76. See Elliott, 'Stop treating debtors as poor cows'.
77. Bijit Bora, Lucian Cernat & Alessandro Turrini, Duty Free and Quota-Free Access for LDCs: Further Evidence from CGE Modeling, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2002, p 3.
78. The Gleneagles Communiqué, 2005, Section on Africa, Article 22 (c).
79. L Puri, Towards a New Trade 'Marshall Plan' for Least Developed Countries, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2005, p 27.
80. Ibid, pp iv, 30.
81. J Kirsher, 'Keynes, capital mobility and the crisis of embedded liberalism', Review of International Political Economy, 6 (3), 1999, pp 317-322.
82. WTO, Doha Declarations, Geneva: WTO, 2001, Ministerial Declaration (2), p 2.
83. Y Akyüz, The WTO Negotiations on Industrial Tari.s: What is at Stake for Developing Countries, Geneva: Third World Network, 2005, at http://www.twnside.org, accessed 3 August 2005, p 28.
84. Stiglitz & Charlton, 'The Doha round is missing the point on helping poor countries', p 15.
85. M Sanchanta, 'Japan pledges aid for trade', Financial Times Asia, 10 December 2005, p 1.
86. PWilkin, 'Solidarity in a global age - Seattle and beyond', paper presented to the International Studies Association Conference, Los Angeles, March 2000, cited in Thomas, 'Global governance, development and human security', p 173.
87. WTO, Doha Declarations, Ministerial Declaration (2), p 2.
88. The Gleneagles Communiqué, Conclusion, Section 35.
89. Monbiot, 'The worst of times', p 21.
90. Stiglitz & Charlton, 'The Doha round is missing the point on helping poor countries', p 15.
91. Quoted in 'In the twilight of Doha', The Economist, 29 July, p 67.
92. The first UNCTAD conference convened in Geneva (1964) declared the 1960s to be a development decade. See Rorden Wilkinson, 'WTO and the regulation of international trade', in Kelly & Grant, The Politics of International Trade, p 19.
93. W Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, p 327.
94. Thomas, Global Governance, p 64.
95. DFID, Economic Partnership Agreements: Making EPAs Deliver for Development, London, 2005, pp 1, 3.
96. A Balls, 'IMF dilemma as new loans start to decline', Financial Times Asia, 28 December 2005, p 4.
97. The IBRD earned $1.7 billion in interest from the region, amounting to 36% of its total. See 'Fading brands: Development bankers face growing competition' and "Hugo Chavez moves into banking', The Economist, 12-18 May 2007, pp 55-56.
98. M Wolf, 'The world needs a tough and independent monetary fund', Financial Times Asia, 22 February, 2006, p 15.