The successful laggards: Bulgaria and Romania's accession to the EU

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 114-144

  Noutcheva, Gergana ^a   Bechev, Dimitar ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Central and Eastern Europe; Domestic transformation; Enlargement; EU conditionality; Transition

Indexed keywords

EID: 38149002910     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: 15338371     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0888325407311793     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. Heather Grabbe, " Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process, " in The Politics of Europeanisation, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). and
2. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches ( London: Routledge, 2005 ).
3. Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 ).
4. Joel Hellman, " Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-Communist Transitions, " World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998). 203-34 ; and
5. Venelin Ganev, " The Dorian Gray Effect: Winners as State Breakers in Post-Communism, " Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34, no. 1 (2001). 1-25.
6. Richard Bronk, "Commitment and Credibility: EU Conditionality and Interim Gains," European Institute Working Paper 2002-02 ( London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2002 ).
7. Richard Bronk, "Commitment and Credibility: EU Conditionality and Interim Gains," European Institute Working Paper 2002-02, 2002 Ibid.
8. Heather Grabbe, " How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity, " Journal of European Public Policy 8 (2001). 1013-31.
9. Vachudova, Europe Undivided.
10. David Phinnemore, "Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of Frustration? " in Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition, ed. David Phinnemore and Duncan Light (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). 246.
11. David Phinnemore, in Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with TransitionIbid., 252.
12. European Commission, The PHARE Programme Annual Report 1995, COM(96) 360 final, 23 July ( Brussels: European Commission, 1996 ).
13. Karen Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 91-98 ; and
14. Dimitris Papadimitriou, Negotiating the New Europe: The European Union and Eastern Europe ( Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002 ).
15. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
16. Tom Gallagher, Theft of a Nation: Romania since Communism (London: Hurst, 2005). 110-39.
17. Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition (London: Routledge, 2001).
18. and Krassen Stanchev et al., Anatomiya na prehoda: stopanskata politika na Balgariya ot 1989 do 2004 (Anatomy of transition: Bulgaria's economic policy from 1989 to 2004) ( Sofia, Bulgaria: Ciela, 2004 ).
19. The two countries reached their respective 1989 levels in the mid-2000s.
20. See European Commission, Commission Opinion on Romania's Application for Membership of the EU, DOC 97/18, 15 July (Brussels: European Commission, 1997). and European Commission, Commission Opinion on Bulgaria's Application for Membership of the EU, DOC 97/11, 15 July ( Brussels: European Commission, 1997 ).
21. The Luxembourg European Council invited Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia to start accession negotiations with the EU.
22. In a speech delivered to the Romanian Parliament on 4 May 1999, while the NATO bombing campaign was still ongoing, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair stated, " At the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki in December, Great Britain is going to support an invitation being extended to Romania to begin negotiations to join the EU "; see 10 Downing Street, http://www.number-10. gov.uk/output/Page1312.asp (accessed 6 December 2005 ).
23. Gallagher, Theft of a Nation, 219-20.
24. Matthew Tejada, Bulgaria's Democratic Consolidation and the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant: The Unattainability of Closure ( Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem-Verlag, 2005 ).
25. See Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999 ( Helsinki, Finland: Helsinki European Council, 1999 ).
26. See European Commission, 2001 Regular Report (Brussels: European Commission, 2001). on Bulgaria's progress towards accession.
27. See European Commission, 2002 Regular Report (Brussels: European Commission, 2002). on Bulgaria's progress towards accession.
28. See European Commission 2004 Regular Report (Brussels: European Commission, 2004). on Romania's progress towards accession.
29. Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: The European Councils in Brussels and Copenhagen 2002 ( Brussels: EuroComment, 2004 ).
30. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania, COM(2002) 624 final, 13 November ( Brussels: European Commission, 2002 ).
31. See Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 12 and 13 December ( Copenhagen: Copenhagen European Council, 2002 ).
32. Interviews with Bulgarian government officials.
33. Interviews with EU officials.
34. See Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 16 and 17 December ( Brussels: Brussels European Council, 2004 ).
35. See Eurobarometer 63, July 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/eb/eb63/eb63_en.htm (accessed 26 November 2007 ).
36. See Annex IX of the Treaty of Accession for the specific commitments undertaken by Romania at the conclusion of the accession negotiations on 14 December 2004 (and referred to in Article 39 of the Protocol to the Accession Treaty), OJ 157/201, 21 June 2005.
37. For a discussion of the safeguard clauses, see Gergana Noutcheva, "Bulgaria and Romania's Accession to the EU: Postponement, Safeguards and the Rule of Law," CEPS Policy Brief N 102, May ( Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006 ).
38. European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness for Membership of Bulgaria and Romania, COM(2005) 534 ( Brussels: European Commission, 2005 ).
39. Olli Rehn, member of the European Commission, " May 2006 Monitoring Report on Bulgaria's and Romania's Progress towards Accession: Speaking Points, " presentation in the European Parliament, Strasbourg, France, 16 May 2006, SPEECH/06/306, http://www.europa.eu (accessed 21 November 2007 ).
40. See European Commission, Monitoring Report on the Preparedness for EU Membership of Bulgaria and Romania, COM(2006) 549 final, 26 September ( Brussels: European Commission, 2006 ).
41. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, " Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, " Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (August 2004). 669-87.
42. Featherstone and Radaelli, The Politics of Europeanisation; and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Politics of European Union Enlargement.
43. Bruno Schoenfelder, " Judicial Independence in Bulgaria: A Tale of Splendour and Misery, " Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 1 (2005). 61-92.
44. The Bulgarian judiciary includes both judges and prosecutors (prokurori) and investigators (sledovateli).
45. Schoenfelder, " Judicial Independence in Bulgaria." The prosecutor-general is nominated by the SJC and appointed for a period of seven years (longer than any elected politician) by the president. This choice reflected not only the willingness to break away from the past but also very much the shaky balance between the BSP and the UDF. Both parties saw an advantage of having an ally in the face of the judiciary, should a power shift occur at a future moment.
46. Ganev, " The Dorian Gray Effect."
47. Gallagher, Theft of a Nation; Dimitrov, Bulgaria; and R. J. Crampton, Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 212-36.
48. Administrative capacity was added as a formal membership criterion at the Madrid European Council (December 1995).
49. Antoaneta Dimitrova, " Europeanisation and Civil Service Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, " in The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier ( Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005 ).
50. Kostov's proactive strategy was driven by certain domestic considerations. Through the 1998 Law on State Administration, the UDF parliamentary majority attempted to impose a five-year embargo for people linked with the former Communist Party and its secret services to serve in the administration. However, the provision was struck down by the Constitutional Court in January 1999, with five out of twelve justices expressing dissenting opinions.
51. Importantly, the EC insists only on decentralisation with regard to the administration of the cohesion funds, which falls short of devolving revenue-collecting and norm-setting powers to the municipalities. On EU-driven decentralisation reforms in CEECs, see James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Clair Gordon, Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality ( Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 ).
52. SAR (Romanian Academic Society), "Is 2007 Feasible? The State of Romania's EU Accession," Policy Warning Report 3/2003, October ( Bucharest, Romania: SAR, 2003 ).
53. European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report.
54. On twinning arrangements in Romania, see Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, " Exporting Europeanisation to the Wider Europe: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in the Candidate Countries and Beyond, " Journal of South East European and Black Sea Studies 3, no. 2 (2003). 1-22.
55. See Ana-Maria Dobre, " The Dynamics of Europeanisation, Regionalisation and Regionalism: The Romanian Case of Regional Re-construction, " Sdosteuropa 53, no. 4 (2005). 540-56 ;
56. see also Claudia Barna, Hristo Panchugov, Marius Tatar, and Vladimir Todorakov, " Europeanization of Regions and the Partnership Principle: The Bulgarian Case, " Sdosteuropa 53, no. 4 (2005). 557-73.
57. For a survey of the judicial systems of all member states and candidate countries, see Centre for the Study of Democracy, The Court, the Prosecution and the Investigation in the EU Member States and Candidate Countries (in Bulgarian) ( Sofia, Bulgaria: Centre for the Study of Democracy, 2005 ).
58. See World Bank, Judicial Systems in Transition Economies ( Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005 ).
59. However, one has to bear in mind that judicial overload is not a problem limited to Bulgaria and Romania, but is observed across all of Central and Eastern Europe.
60. For an overview of the early stages of reform, see Open Society Institute, Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity ( Budapest, Hungary: Open Society Institute, 2002 ).
61. This changed only after the Truth and Justice coalition came to power in December 2004.
62. Later, prior to the elections in November 2004, transcripts of high-profile PSD discussions were leaked to the media which contained evidence that the case against Bsescu had been orchestrated by Nstase and his associates. See Secretele Psd: Stenogramele Guvernarii Social-Democrate (The secrets of PSD: The transcripts of the Social Democrat Government) ( Bucharest, Romania: Ziua, 2004 ).
63. Though rhetorically supportive of judicial reforms, Filchev and other high-ranking prosecutors routinely dismissed criticisms coming from outside, notably from U.S. Ambassador James Pardew and NATO lobbyist Bruce Jackson; they called the latter "an international trickster." Filchev's seven-year term expired in February 2006, and he was succeeded by presidential adviser Boris Velchev. Velchev undertook much more decisive steps in reforming the prosecution service, firing a number of corrupt magistrates, which earned him credibility in Brussels.
64. See "Konstitutsionnijat sad otpushi konstitutsionnata sadebna reforma" (The Constitutional Court unblocked judiciary reform), Mediapool, http://www.mediapool.bg (accessed 1 September 2005 ).
65. In the spring of 2006, Klaus Jansen, a German investigator despatched by the European Commission, dismissed the government's effort to overhaul the criminal justice system as well as the Bulgarian magistrates' "kiss my ass" (!) attitude. See " Country Briefings: Bulgaria, " The Economist, 18 May 2006.
66. Romania climbed up one position since 2005, while Bulgaria actually slid down two positions.
67. When European Commission Ambassador Jonathan Scheele criticised in December 2002 the PSD government for obstructing the disbursement of funds to opposition-run Bucharest, he was told by Adrian Nstase to "mind his own business." Gallagher, Theft of a Nation, 249. A similar scandal sprang up in Bulgaria in March 2005, when the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha government awarded a thirty-five-year concession on the Trakya highway to a Bulgarian-Portuguese consortium without public tender and open competition.
68. See data published at Vitosha Research, http://www.vitosha-research.com (Bulgaria; accessed 26 November 2007)
69. Romanian Academic Society, http://www.sar.org.ro (Romania; accessed 26 November 2007 ).
70. SAR, " Is 2007 Feasible? " 8.
71. Interview with a former employee at the European Commission Delegation to Romania, November 2006.
72. European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report, 12-13.
73. To the PSD's credit, the 2003 Constitution already had limited immunities.
74. The same month, incoming Prosecutor-General Boris Velchev set up a special anticorruption unit within the prosecution service.
75. In March 2006, he was forced to resign as a speaker of the Parliament's lower chamber and as head of the PSD.
76. Still, at times, the anticorruption mood also played into the hands of the pro-reform elites, as testified to by the rise to the presidency of Traian B?sescu in December 2004.
77. Ganev, " The Dorian Gray Effect "; and
78. Vachudova, Europe Undivided.