RLUIPA, distress, and damages

University of Chicago Law Review

Volumn 74, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 1443-1473

  Larson, Jennifer D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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EID: 38049153547     PISSN: 00419494     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20141867     Document Type: Note

References (180)

1. Moskowitz v Wilkinson, 432 F Supp 947, 948 (D Conn 1977), citing Cruz v Beto, 405 US 319 (1972).
2. Ho Ah Kow v Nunan, 12 F Cases 252, 254 n 2 (Cir Ct Cal 1879), quoting Thomas M. Cooley, Recent American Decisions: Ho Ah Kow v. Matthew Nunan, 18 Am L Reg 676, 685-68 (1879).
3. "[T]he value of a right is a function of the consequences that will be brought to bear when the right is violated." Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum L Rev 857, 904 (1999) (discussing rights and remedies as two parts of a whole). The Supreme Court and Levinson may not quite agree on this idea, but Levinson's article is an interesting and reasoned discussion of the relationship between rights and remedies.
4. Pub L No 106-274, 114 Stat 803, codified at 42 USC § 2000cc (2000).
5. 42 USC § 2000cc-1(a).
6. 42 USC § 2000cc-2(a).
7. Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321 (19%), codified in relevant part at 42 USC §§ 1997a-1997h (2000).
8. 494 US 872 (1990).
9. 435 US 247 (1978).
10. See id at 259.
11. 477 US 299 (1986).
12. See id at 308-10.
13. 17 Stat 13 (1871), codified as amended at 42 USC § 1983 (2000).
14. 435 US at 253 (explaining the function of § 1983) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).
15. See id at 254-55 (discussing the compensation principle as reflected in § 1983 damages).
16. See id at 255-57 (noting that there were many lawyers in Congress in 1871 who would have been familiar with this basic concept of tort law).
17. Id at 259 (alteration in original), quoting Bivens v Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan concurring).
18. Carey, 435 US at 258.
19. Id.
20. Id at 259.
21. Id at 263-64 ("[W]e foresee no particular difficulty in producing evidence that mental and emotional distress actually was caused by the denial of procedural due process itself."). The denial of a prisoner's right to freely exercise his religion is especially likely to cause mental and emotional distress, regardless of what other loss accompanies the deprivation. Not every loss, however, is accompanied by distress. See, for example, Kerman v City of New York, 374 F3d 93, 124 (2d Cir 2004) (finding that "the jury could have been persuaded that Kerman suffered no more than minimal psychic or emotional damage" from his false imprisonment). Kerman was, according to testimony, "witty" during his experience. Id.
22. Carey, 435 US at 264.
23. Id.
24. Id at 262-63 (explaining that while serious harm to one's reputation almost inevitably produces mental and emotional distress, not every minor departure from due process will do the same). Although defamation law did not provide a good analogy for due process violations, First Amendment claims may be a better fit. See Stachura, 477 US at 314 (Marshall concurring) (quoting Carey's proposition that what makes damages appropriate for the violation of one constitutional right will not necessarily apply to a different right).
25. See Meyer v Teslik, 411 F Supp 2d 983, 989 (WD Wis 2006) (holding that missing just three services caused more than de minimis harm and did not preclude a claim under RLUIPA).
26. Vanscoy v Hicks, 691 F Supp 1336, 1338 (MD Ala 1988) (awarding compensatory damages to a prisoner who had been denied access-once-to the prison chapel).
27. See 477 US at 310. In his concurrence, Justice Marshall stressed that nevertheless, substantial damages could properly be awarded "simply upon a showing" of the deprivation of a right (to vote, in one instance) "without requiring any further demonstration of damages." Id at 314 (Marshall concurring) (emphasis added).
28. Id at 311 (majority).
29. Carey, 435 US at 264.
30. Stachura, 477 US at 311 n 14.
31. Id.
32. Id at 313 (Marshall concurring) (quotation marks omitted).
33. See id at 315.
34. Id at 316.
35. See id at 313 ("[T]he violation of a constitutional right, in proper cases, may itself constitute a compensable injury.").
36. See id at 311 (majority). See also Vanscoy, 691 F Supp at 1338 (acknowledging the difficulty of putting a monetary value on one missed opportunity to worship).
37. Presley v Edwards, 2007 WL 174153, *8 (MD Ala) (holding that the requisite causal connection was not present with regard to some of the defendants).
38. See, for example, Kahane v Carlson, 527 F2d 492, 495-96 (2d Cir 1975) (holding that the prison was required to provide a kosher diet); Barnett v Rodgers, 410 F2d 995, 1003 (DC Cir 1969) (reversing and remanding the district court's dismissal of a religion-based challenge to the prison's meal system, with instructions to evaluate the system's constitutionality); Gallahan v Hollyfield, 516 F Supp 1004, 1006 (ED Va 1981) (enjoining prison officials from requiring a Cherokee Indian prisoner to cut his hair); Moskowitz v Wilkinson, 432 F Supp 947, 951-52 (D Conn 1977) (holding that a rule prohibiting beards in prison was unconstitutional as applied and that imposing disciplinary sanctions for the inmate's refusal to comply with the policy was also unconstitutional). Another district court in the Fourth Circuit recently acknowledged Gallahan as binding precedent for a case brought under RLUIPA protesting a prison grooming policy. The policies were sufficiently different - unlike in Gallahan, the prisoner was not compelled to cut his hair, although he was punished for not doing so - that the court found the judgment of prison officials merited deference and denied injunctive relief. See Ragland v Angelone, 420 F Supp 2d 507, 521-22 (WD Va 2006) (supplemental opinion). See also note 126, describing the current circuit split over RLUIPA's effect on grooming policies.
39. See, for example, Geiger v Jowers, 404 F3d 371, 375 (5th Cir 2005) (refusing to grant injunctive relief because the plaintiff had not "shown or even alleged a likelihood of future harm"), citing City of Los Angeles v Lyons, 461 US 95 (1983).
40. Shidler v Moore, 446 F Supp 2d 942, 946 (ND Ind 2006) (emphasis added), quoting Kyle v Patterson, 196 F3d 695, 697 (7th Cir 1999).
41. Carey, 435 US at 266.
42. Smith v Wade, 461 US 30, 52 (1983). When the threshold for punitive damages was lower than that for compensatory damage, courts could and did award punitive damages without the showing necessary for compensatory damages. Id at 53.
43. Id at 56.
44. Id at 54-55. See also id at 55 n 21 ("[A]fter Carey punitive damages may be the only significant remedy available in some § 1983 actions where constitutional rights are maliciously violated but the victim cannot prove compensable injury.").
45. Geiger, 404 F3d at 375 (denying an injunction where there was no threat of future violations).
46. Smith, 494 US at 874.
47. Id at 878.
48. Id.
49. 374 US 398 (1963).
50. Id at 403 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (finding a violation of the Free Exercise Clause when appellant was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because her religion forbade her from working on Saturday).
51. Smith, 494 US at 879 (quotation marks omitted).
52. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 S Ct Rev 1, 1.
53. See id at 12 (discussing how the state may burden "disfavored religions" with laws that are formally neutral, but have a different impact or lack exceptions).
54. Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (1993), codified in relevant part at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq (2000).
55. 107 Stat at 1488.
56. 42 USC § 2000bb(b)(1) (stating that the purpose of the statute is "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Venter, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) . . . and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened").
57. See 42 USC § 2000bb-1(b).
58. 521 US 507 (1997).
59. Id at 512.
60. See id at 532-36. RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal government and continues to be the standard for federal prisons. Cases evaluating RLUIPA claims have often looked to RFRA cases for guidance. See, for example, Agrawal v Briley (Agrawal III), 2006 US Dist LEXIS 88697, *19-32 (ND Ill), citing Webman v Federal Bureau of Prisons, 441 F3d 1022 (DC Cir 2006).
61. See Cutter v Wilkinson, 544 US 709, 714 (2005).
62. See 42 USC § 2000cc(a)(1). The provisions on land use prohibit government from imposing land use regulations "in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution." Id.
63. RLUIPA applies to people in "state-run institutions - mental hospitals, prisons, and the like." Cutter, 544 US at 720. As of this writing only one published case has been brought on behalf of a person in a mental institution. See In re L.A., 2006 Vt 118, 912 A2d 977. The patient refused medicine because it would interfere with his religious beliefs. The court had difficulty distinguishing sincere belief from delusion and held that consequences "must be real, and not imaginary or delusional." Id at 981.
64. RLUIPA applies when "the substantial burden [on free exercise] is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance," 42 USC § 2000cc-1(b)(1), and when "the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes," 42 USC § 2000cc-1(b)(2). The Supreme Court held that "RLUIPA's institutionalized-persons provision [is] compatible with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise." Cutter, 544 US at 720. RLUIPA has been challenged under the Spending Clause provision as well, but without success. Every circuit court of appeals to rule on the issue has held that RLUIPA "fits comfortably within Congress' Spending Clause authority." Madison v Virginia, 474 F3d 118, 124 (4th Cir 2006). See also Cutter v Wilkinson, 423 F3d 579, 584-90 (6th Cir 2005) (finding that RLUIPA does not violate the Spending Clause); Benning v Georgia, 391 F3d 1299, 1305-08 (11th Cir 2004) (same); Charles v Verhagen, 348 F3d 601, 606-10 (7th Cir 2003) (same); Mayweathers v Newland, 314 F3d 1062, 1066-70 (9th Cir 2002) (same).
65. 42 USC § 2000cc-1(a). Recently the Supreme Court declined to resolve a circuit split over the interpretation of "substantial burden." For a general discussion of the split and the particular case denied certiorari, see generally Scott Budzenski, Comment, Tug of War: The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Circuits - The Fifth Circuit's Input on the Struggle to Define a Prisoner's Right to Religious Freedom in Adkins v. Kaspar, 80 St John's L Rev 1335 (2006).
66. 42 USC § 2000cc-1(a). Noting that the government exerts tremendous control over the exercise of religion in state-run institutions, the Court has admitted that "RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government's permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion." Cutter, 544 US at 721.
67. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text. The reach of the Spending Clause is enormous. Courts have held that the incarceration program bears the burden of showing that it does not receive federal funds, and even private companies are considered surrogates of the state and act under color of law. See Coronel v Walker, 2006 WL 2923152, *5-6 (ND Miss) (assessing defendant corporation's relationship with the State of Hawaii and noting that the defendant institution "should bear the burden of proving facts to establish any exemption from [RLUIPA's] terms"). The Commerce Clause too has wide application. For instance, many RLUIPA cases deal with diet claims. See note 121 and accompanying text. Food resources nearly always cross state lines at some point; likewise for religious paraphernalia. For an example of a case relying on food crossing state lines, see Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US 294, 298-305 (1964) (holding that Ollie's Barbecue was subject to the Civil Rights Act because it served food that "moved in commerce" and that such food was subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause). For a discussion of the idea that "if every effect on interstate commerce were enough to trigger federal authority, there would be nothing that Congress could not regulate," see David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U Chi L Rev 324, 348 (1985). For a recent decision finding that the Commerce Clause provides an insufficient jurisdictional hook for allowing damages from officials in their private capacities, see Daker v Ferrera (Daker II), 475 F Supp 2d 1325, 1342-17 (ND Ga 2007). This case is discussed again in note 152.
68. See James E. Robertson, A Saving Construction: How to Read the Physical Injury Rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 26 SIU L J 1, 19-20 (2001) (providing the case law background for § 1983 claims). After Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167 (1961), § 1983 claims for "tort-like harms" became eligible for damages. Robertson, 26 SIU L J at 19.
69. See, for example, Holt v Sarver, 309 F Supp 362, 373-81 (ED Ark 1970) (describing prison conditions and deeming them "cruel and unusual"). For a discussion of prison reform after 1960, see generally Jonathan A. Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War: American Prison Law after Twenty-Five Years 1962-1987, 37 Am U L Rev 41 (1987).
70. For a history of § 1983 actions before PLRA's enactment and the impetus for the Act, see generally Allison Cohn, Comment, Can $1 Buy Constitutionality?: The Effect of Nominal and Punitive Damages on the Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury Requirement, 8 U Pa J Const L 299 (2006).
71. Also see generally Corbett H. Williams, Note, Evisceration of the First Amendment: The Prison Litigation Reform Act and Interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) in Prisoner First Amendment Claims, 39 Loyola LA L Rev 859 (2006) (describing a circuit split in interpreting PLRA either broadly to preclude all First Amendment claims for damages or more narrowly to allow some claims to proceed).
72. For a more complete discussion of the provisions of PLRA, see generally Peter Hobart, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Striking the Balance between Law and Order, 44 Vill L Rev 981 (1999).
73. 42 USC § 1997e(e).
74. See Part III.B.
75. See generally Ann H. Mathews, Note, The Inapplicability of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to Prisoner Claims of Excessive Force, 77 NYU L Rev 536 (2002). PLRA is actually comprised of two separate provisions, each with a decidedly different emphasis and purpose. First, PLRA contains the STOP provisions, which limit the circumstances under which courts may enter injunctions against unconstitutional prison conditions such as overcrowding, and which ostensibly were intended to "get the federal courts out of the business of running jails." Id at 547-48. Second, PLRA contains provisions that establish new procedural requirements for prisoners' civil suits designed "to curtail abusive prisoner tort, civil rights, and conditions litigation." Id.
76. See Jennifer Winslow, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury Requirement Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant To?, 49 UCLA L Rev 1655, 1657 (2002) ("Pro-ponents of the PLRA touted it as a way to clamp down on frivolous and malicious prisoner lawsuits, and promised that it was not designed to prevent inmates from pursuing meritorious claims.").
77. 42 USC § 2000cc-2(e) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to amend or repeal the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.").
78. 42 USC § 2000cc-3(g).
79. Thus, RLUIPA "does not preclude an award of relief. . . unless such relief is not 'appropriate.'" Agrawal v Briley (Agrawal II), 2004 US Dist LEXIS 16997, *44 (ND Ill). Regardless of the manifold religions prisoners practice, complaints converge. Prisoners wish to exercise their religious beliefs in some way which may or may not be familiar to prison officials, and they are thwarted in this effort by prison policies or individual actors. Complaints regarding religious restrictions on food, grooming policies, services, and religious items of various kinds (paraphernalia) dominate the field of RLUIPA claims. For examples, see notes 121-26, 132.
80. See Madison v Virginia, 474 F3d 118, 130-31 (4th Cir 2006) ("[A]ppropriate relief ordinarily includes injunctive and declaratory relief.").
81. Agrawal II, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 16997 at *45. Subsequently, the court awarded $1 in nominal damages and reserved punitive damages to be ascertained by a jury. Agrawal v Briley (Agrawal III), 2006 US Dist LEXIS 88697, *66 (ND Ill). Another court, however, upheld an award of over $300,000 to the plaintiff, including $15,000 for mental or emotional damages. Siggers-El v Barlow, 433 F Supp 2d 811, 815-20 (ED Mich 2006).
82. Borzych v Frank, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 82289, *9 (WD Wis) (quotation marks omitted), citing Hernandez v Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 490 US 680, 699 (1989).
83. Hughes v Rowe, 449 US 5, 9 (1980) ("It is settled law that the allegations of such a complaint, 'however inartfully pleaded' are held 'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'") (citation omitted). Because Smith changed the standard for what constitutes a First Amendment violation, see Part II.A, it is much more difficult for prisoners to state a colorable First Amendment claim.
84. See, for example, Pratt v Corrections Corporation of America, 124 Fed Appx 465, 467 (8th Cir 2005) (remanding a case claiming First Amendment violations for consideration under RLUIPA); Fulbright v Evans, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 40240, *19 (WD Okla) (raising a RLUIPA claim sua sponte); Wolfe v Ferguson, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 40978, *69-78 (WD Ark) (examining a claim under RLUIPA sua sponte). Courts are not consistent in construing First Amendment claims as either RFRA or RLUIPA claims. Compare Wesley v Sniezek, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 15671, *4-5 (ND Ohio) (failing to find a claim for RLUIPA violation although the complaint implied that the plaintiff was Muslim); Wickner v Symmes, 2007 WL 426795, * 3-10 (D Minn) (failing to construe the complaint to include an RLUIPA claim); McRoy v Cook County Department of Corrections, 366 F Supp 2d 662, 672-83 (ND Ill 2005) (failing to construe First Amendment claims as RLUIPA claims), with Parks-El v Fleming, 2007 US App LEXIS 534, *7 (4th Cir) (remanding for the district court to reconsider the plaintiffs "RLUIPA claim and, by extension, his free exercise claim").
85. In over one hundred RLUIPA cases studied for this Comment, only one was brought by a female prisoner: Fayson v Earle, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 81567 (D Del) (holding that the denial of halal meals for a Muslim inmate gives rise to an RLUIPA claim).
86. Levinson, 99 Colum L Rev at 888 (cited in note 3) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (theorizing that there is a right-remedy relationship of "remedial substantiation, meaning just that the practical value of a right is determined by its associated remedies").
87. 42 USC § 1997e(e).
88. Allah v Al-Hafeez, 226 F3d 247, 252 (3d Cir 2000) (citing a Department of Justice brief and argument, where the Department had intervened in the suit).
89. See id; Rowe v Shake, 196 F3d 778, 781-82 (7th Cir 1999); Canell v Lightner, 143 F3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir 1998). But see Napier v Preslicka, 314 F3d 528, 534 (11th Cir 2002) (holding proper the dismissal of a suit alleging Fourth Amendment violations but no physical injury). Yet note the tension with Stachura: "[I]njury to a First Amendment-protected interest could itself constitute compensable injury wholly apart from any emotional distress[,] . . . anxiety[,] and anguish suffered by plaintiffs." 477 US at 315 (Marshall concurring) (quotation marks omitted) (finding that a circuit court opinion correctly stated the law of damages for a constitutional tort).
90. See, for example, Allah, 226 F3d at 253 (holding that § 1997e(e) does not bar nominal damages or punitive damages premised on the violation of a right).
91. Canell, 143 F3d at 1213 (emphasis added). Canell was brought before RLUIPA was enacted; the same claims would now be brought under RLUIPA either in addition to or instead of First Amendment claims. Canell's vitality was reaffirmed by Oliver v Keller, 289 F3d 623, 627 n 5 (9th Cir 2002) ("Nothing in our holding today disturbs our prior holding in Canell.") In Oliver, the court addressed an issue involving confinement and the Fourteenth Amendment, not religious freedom. Id at 626.
92. Shaheed-Muhammad v Dipaolo, 138 F Supp 2d 99 (D Mass 2001).
93. Id at 107 (emphasis omitted) (declining to find that § 1997e(e) prevents all recovery for emotional harm).
94. Id, citing Stachura, 477 US at 308 n 11.
95. Shaheed-Muhammad, 138 F Supp 2d at 108 (describing violations of abstract rights).
96. Id, citing West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 642 (1943).
97. 133 F3d 459 (7th Cir 1997). Zehner was brought by prisoners who had been exposed to asbestos and were seeking damages for mental and emotional distress, but who had no physical injuries. Id at 460.
98. Id at 462. Otherwise, the court thought, qualified immunity might often be unconstitutional. Id.
99. 196 F3d 778 (7th Cir 1999). Both Rowe and Owen v Lash, 682 F2d 648 (7th Cir 1982), were First Amendment cases relating to prisoners' freedom to correspond. Neither court distinguished one First Amendment right from another.
100. Rowe, 196 F3d at 781 (explaining that a prisoner is entitled to judicial relief even when the only injury is the violation of a First Amendment right).
101. Id at 781-82 ("Rowe does not allege that he suffered any additional injury as a consequence of his mail being delayed, nor must he. . . . A prisoner is entitled to judicial relief for a violation of his First Amendment rights aside from any physical, mental, or emotional injury he may have sustained.").
102. 226 F3d 247 (3d Cir 2000).
103. Id at 250. The plaintiff emphasized that the loss was of his First Amendment right.
104. Id at 251, citing Stachura, 477 US at 311 n 14.
105. See 477 US at 310, 312 (holding that damages based on the abstract value of rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages and that the erroneous instructions were not harmless).
106. See Part I.B.
107. Calhoun v Detella, 319 F3d 936, 940 (7th Cir 2003) (citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit recognized its holding in Rowe, but held that absent physical injury for an Eighth Amendment violation only nominal and punitive damages were available. Id at 940-41.
108. Siggers-El, 433 F Supp 2d at 816 (finding that "§ 1997e(e) is unconstitutional as applied").
109. See id. The physical injury must be more than de minimis, id; this conclusion seems to be the consensus across the circuits. See, for example, Harris v Garner, 190 F3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir 1999) (holding that PLRA requires more than de minimis injury); Siglar v Hightower, 112 F3d 191, 193 (5th Cir 1997) (same); Young v Medden, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 6885, *54 (ED Pa) (same). The Siggers-El court also recites a hypothetical from the plaintiffs brief demonstrating that a sadistic prison guard could inflict psychological torture resulting in catastrophic emotional harm that would be noncompensable under § 1997e(e)'s physical injury requirement. See 433 F Supp 2d at 816.
110. For additional views on the constitutional problems of PLRA, see generally Sharon I. Fiedler, Comment, Past Wrongs, Present Futility, and the Future of Prisoner Relief: A Reasonable Interpretation of "Available" in the Context of the PLRA, 33 UC Davis L Rev 713 (2000) (discussing the background of PLRA and the provisions of § 1997e(a)).
111. Calhoun, 319 F3d at 940 (emphases added).
112. As of this writing, few published opinions have awarded monetary damages under RLUIPA. See, for example, Perez v Frank, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 27441, *47-48 (WD Wis) (holding that compensatory damages are unavailable, awarding nominal damages of $9, and sending the question of punitive damages to trial); Agrawal III, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 88697 at * 65-66 (awarding $1 in nominal damages, reserving punitive damages to be determined by a jury, and finding compensatory damages barred by § 1997e(e)).
113. See generally Williams, 39 Loyola LA L Rev 859 (cited in note 70).
114. See, for example, Marsh v Granholm, 2006 WL 2439760, *1, 14 (WD Mich) (adopting the magistrate's opinion, which noted that individual liability for damages under RLUIPA is an unsettled issue); Daker v Ferrero (Daker I), 2006 US Dist LEXIS 94593, *24 (ND Ga) (same); Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v County of Sutter, 326 F Supp 2d 1140, 1162 (ED Cal 2003) (same).
115. Only a handful of RLUIPA claims have presented any sort of injury. See, for example, Boles v Neet, 402 F Supp 2d 1237, 1245 (D Colo 2005) (finding that the plaintiff suffered an eye injury). See also cases cited in note 154.
116. See Siggers-El, 433 F Supp 2d at 815-17 (awarding the plaintiff $15,000 in compensatory damages). The court stated that "since First Amendment violations rarely, if ever, result in physical injuries, construction of the PLRA against recovery of damages would defeat congressional intent and render constitutional protections meaningless." Id at 816. The record does not make clear the basis for the original claim.
117. See, for example, Kretchmar v Beard, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 49530, *15-17 (ED Pa) (dismissing the suit for failure to state a claim - the prisoner desired hot instead of cold Kosher meals).
118. See note 112 and accompanying text.
119. See note 126 for a short discussion of a split on grooming policies.
120. In particular, courts have varied in how they evaluate "substantial burden"; how they evaluate the belief (as merely sincere, as central to the religion, or as part of the mainstream doctrine); and how much deference to give prison officials, which goes to the "least restrictive means" requirement. See note 83 for examples of these differing approaches to construing claims brought under the First Amendment as RLUIPA claims and vice versa.
121. The differences among courts on the various aspects of damages are noted below.
122. Cases holding that prisons must respect inmates' religious diet restrictions stretch back to before Smith. See, for example, French v Owens, 777 F2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir 1985) (affirming the district court ruling requiring "safe, sanitary and nutritious food" for inmates); Ross v Coughlin, 669 F Supp 1235, 1241 (SDNY 1987) (finding it well established that "prison authorities must accommodate the rights of prisoners to receive diets consistent with their religious beliefs"), citing Kahane v Carlson, 527 F2d 492, 495 (2d Cir 1975). Ross was a First Amendment case, evaluated under Turner v Safley, 482 US 78, 89-91 (1987).
123. See, for example, Sample v Lappin, 424 F Supp 2d 187, 195 (DDC 2006) (allowing the RLUIPA claim for a prisoner who believed wine to be a necessary part of his religious diet); Fulbright v Evans, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 40240, *46 (WD Okla) (finding reasons for refusal to provide inmate a kosher diet to be de minimis); Agrawal v Briley (Agrawal I), 2003 US Dist LEXIS 21365, *7-8 (ND Ill) (declaring that the defendants "were placing a 'substantial burden' on plaintiffs exercise of his religion by making him choose between religious observance and adequate nutrition"). See also Levitan v Ashcroft, 281 F3d 1313, 1319-20 (DC Cir 2002) (holding that First Amendment protection for religious beliefs does not require the beliefs to be "mandatory," where Catholic inmates had sued to be allowed Communion wine). But see Baranowski v Hart, 486 F3d 112, 125 (5th Cir 2007) (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment because the government's interest in controlling costs outweighed the plaintiff's interest in a kosher diet); Andreola v Wisconsin, 211 Fed Appx 495, 498-99 (7th Cir 2006) (denying a RLUIPA charge where the prison provided an inmate with kosher meals, but refused to allow him to prepare his own food in the prison kitchen); Edelkind v Neustrom, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 52407, *27-35 (WD La) (dismissing RLUIPA claims for a prisoner who was denied kosher meals while transitioning into the prison). Prisoners may be required to meet prison officials half way: "Neither the Constitution nor Islam requires that [the plaintiff] receive Kool-Aid® or the same meals as other inmates." Mallory v Winchester, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 90581, *6 (ND Ind) (dismissing RLUIPA claims). Yet when diet restrictions extend even to handling certain foods, prisons must still respect the prisoner's beliefs. See, for example, Williams v Bitner, 359 F Supp 2d 370, 372-73, 378 (MD Pa 2005) (holding that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on RLUTPA claims when they forced a Muslim prisoner to handle pork when working in the prison kitchen).
124. See, for example, Buchanan v Burbury, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 48244, *23-24 (ND Ohio) (issuing a preliminary injunction to a Sabbatarian who had been required to worship with Protestants). But see Baranowski, 486 F3d at 124-25 (holding that denial of services for Jewish inmates-when no rabbi or approved volunteer was present - did not place a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion); Price v Caruso, 451 F Supp 2d 889, 896-98 (ED Mich 2006) (denying injunction where the prisoner wanted to be transferred to another prison to have a quorum for services). See also McManus v Bass, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 24272, * 28-29 (ED Va) (withholding judgment on the issue of injunctive relief for the plaintiff, who had been removed from the list for kosher meals).
125. Visiting prisoners was considered an important act of charity in early modern Europe. See Brian Pullan, Catholics, Protestants, and the Poor in Early Modern Europe, 35 J Interdiscipl Hist 441, 443-44 (2005). For an early American reference, see Commonwealth v Drake, 15 Mass 161, 161 n (a) (1818) (referring to "the chaplain of the jail").
126. Of the RLUIPA claims studied for this Comment, those protesting denial of religious services are some of the most variable and difficult for prison officials to accommodate. Some prisoners merely seek permission to attend services more often, while others vehemently object to the type of religious services they are offered. See, for example, Bloch v Samuels, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 53732, *20-23 (SD Tex) (denying claims under RLUIPA and RFRA to a plaintiff asking permission to go to daily Mass); Buchanan, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 48244 at *23-24 (finding a violation of RLUIPA and granting a preliminary injunction where a prison misclassified Sacred Name Sabbatarians as Protestant Christians and forced them to worship together). Security concerns are always paramount in a prison setting. See, for example, Salgado v Grams, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 86788, *2-3 (WD Wis) (finding it reasonable to prohibit an inmate from attending religious services when the Latin Kings gang had placed a hit on him); Marsh v Granholm, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 59203, *3 (WD Mich) (finding "serious safety concerns" where a convicted murderer requested to hold Wiccan ceremonies in private, outdoors: "[T]he mere fact of Plaintiffs incarceration is at odds with the ability to engage [in such] behavior"). But see Smith v Beauclair, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 56561, *19-23 (D Idaho) (allowing a claim for injunctive relief to proceed where defendants did not adequately consider possible accommodation for a Cherokee Sacred Fire ritual).
127. The Ninth Circuit has held that a strict grooming policy violated RLUIPA, but the Eleventh has found otherwise. Compare Warsoldier v Woodford, 418 F3d 989, 999-1001 (9th Cir 2005) (finding the government's arguments unconvincing in light of demonstrated alternatives), with Brunskill v Boyd, 141 Fed Appx 771, 776 (11th Cir 2005) (deciding without discussion that a grooming policy did not violate RLUIPA). Protests against grooming policies have been brought primarily by Muslim prisoners who wanted to grow beards, and Native Americans, Rastafarians, and Nazarites who, because of sincerely held religious beliefs, did not want to cut their hair. See, for example, Thunderhorse v Pierce, 418 F Supp 2d 875, 894-95 (ED Tex 2006). Prisoners today no longer find courts as sympathetic as they once were. See, for example, Ho Ah Kow v Nunan, 12 F Cases 252, 253 (Cir Ct Cal 1879) ("The maltreatment consisted in having wantonly and maliciously cut off the queue of the plaintiff, a queue being worn by all Chinamen, and its deprivation being regarded by them as degrading and as entailing future suffering."). The court held, in conferring judgment on the plaintiff: A treatment to which disgrace is attached, and which is not adopted as a means of security against the escape of the prisoner, but merely to aggravate the severity of his confinement, can only be regarded as a punishment additional to that fixed by the sentence. If adopted in consequence of the sentence it is punishment in addition to that imposed by the court; if adopted without regard to the sentence it is wanton cruelty. Id at 254 (emphasis added). See also Moskowitz v Wilkinson, 432 F Supp 947, 949-50 (D Conn 1977) (ruling that the "showing of a belief or practice deeply rooted in religious doctrine is sufficient to trigger the Government's obligation under the Constitution to justify its restriction as reasonably necessary in support of an important or substantial interest"). Grooming remains a contentious issue. See, for example, Thompson v Scott, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 21742, *23-24 (SD Tex) (ordering trial to determine if a policy requiring hair to be cut to one-eighth inch was the least restrictive means available); State v Whitaker, 2007 Ohio App LEXIS 781, *17-19 (vacating a sentence imposed when an inmate of a residential program refused to cut his hair for religious reasons, and the prisoner showed that the program did not consider less restrictive means of preserving security). For a further discussion of grooming policies in prisons, see generally Mara R. Schneider, Note, Splitting Hairs: Why Courts Uphold Prison Grooming Policies and Why They Should Not, 9 Mich J Race & L 503 (2004) (arguing that grooming policies infringe the constitutional right to free exercise of religion).
128. 418 F3d 989 (9th Cir 2005).
129. See id at 1001.
130. Id at 992.
131. Id at 1001. After comparing the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDC) with other prison systems - including the federal prison system - with less restrictive policies, it drew the conclusion that the "CDC has utterly failed to demonstrate that the disputed grooming policy is the least restrictive means necessary to ensure prison safety and security." Id at 999-1002. See also Watts v Director of Corrections, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 56193, *13-18 (ED Cal) (following Warsoldier, but holding that officials were entitled to qualified immunity); Von Staich v California Department of Corrections, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 73110, *15-17 (ND Cal) (same). The CDC changed its grooming regulations in response to Warsoldier. See David v Giurbino, 2007 WL 925802, *2 (SD Cal) (discussing changes in grooming regulations resulting from RLUIPA).
132. See Warsoldier, 418 F3d at 1002. But see Hoevenaar v Lazaroff, 422 F3d 366, 371-72 (6th Cir 2005) (reversing the district court's injunction enjoining the prison from cutting a Native American inmate's hair). In a typical example of the uncertain state of RLUIPA jurisprudence, the Sixth Circuit did not employ the same "least restrictive means" test that the Ninth Circuit used. Compare id at 369-72, with Warsoldier, 418 F3d at 998-1001.
133. Cases involving clothing and religious items are plentiful. See, for example, Hammons v Jones, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 7720, *11-13 (ND Okla) (holding that denying access to prayer oils imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's exercise of religion); Boles v Neet, 402 F Supp 2d 1237, 1246 (D Colo 2005) (allowing plaintiff to seek damages for injury suffered when the plaintiff was not allowed to wear a yarmulke when leaving the prison for eye surgery). See also Fayson v Earle, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 81567, *3 (D Del) (noting that the plaintiff was allowed to wear her headscarf); Thunderhorse, 418 F Supp 2d at 891-92 (holding that the confiscation of a crystal from a Native American inmate did not violate RLUIPA). Some requests are obviously dangerous but others are relatively benign. Compare Corey v South Carolina Department of Corrections, 2007 WL 29024, *8-9 (D SC) (finding that the prison's strong interest in keeping a possible weapon out of the hands of a maximum security inmate justified denying his request for a rosary), with Benning v Georgia, 391 F3d 1299, 1313 (11th Cir 2004) (affirming that prisoner had an RLUIPA claim for being refused permission to wear a yarmulke). Although the court in Corey applied an incorrect standard to the request, requiring the rosary to be necessary to the plaintiffs practice of religion rather than part of a sincerely held belief, see 2007 WL 29024 at *8, the same result would probably have been reached under RLUIPA's standard. In spite of RLUIPA's language of compelling interest and least restrictive means, courts continue to show considerable deference to prison officials and the scope of deference shown to sincere belief in the prisoner, or expertise in security in prison officials, remains extremely uncertain.
134. See, for example, Smith v Haley, 401 F Supp 2d 1240, 1243 (MD Ala 2005) (noting that prison officials changed their policy after suit was brought; they recognized Odinism as an official religion, allowed for a designated place of worship where the prisoner could "conduct his [rites]," allowed the prisoner to wear a necklace with a religious emblem - Thor's Hammer - and allowed him to light a candle).
135. See, for example, Price, 451 F Supp 2d at 900-01 (holding that the plaintiff's transfer to another facility had mooted his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, but not his claims for compensatory damages); Haley, 401 F Supp 2d at 1243 (finding that all but one of the plaintiff's claims became moot after the prison had changed its policies).
136. Limbaugh v Thompson, 2006 WL 2642388, *4 (MD Ala) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (holding that claims were mooted due to policy changes, and "because the defendants are government officials, the court may confidently presume that the defendants will continue to allow the plaintiffs and other Native American inmates in the general population to participate in sweat lodge ceremonies"). But see Acoolla v Angelone, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 62574, *37 (WD Va) (noting the court's deep concern about the possibility of prison officials continuing to impose punishments despite a court order, and specifically giving plaintiff leave to reopen the case if he were ever disciplined again with the same issue).
137. Shidler v Moore, 446 F Supp 2d 942, 947 (ND Ind 2006) (quotation marks omitted).
138. Id (quotation marks omitted).
139. The Eleventh Amendment grants states immunity from lawsuits filed against them by citizens of another state. The Supreme Court has recognized that immunity also applies to non-consensual suits against a state filed by its own citizens. See Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 14-15 (1890); Blatchford v Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 501 US 775, 779 (1991); Alden v Maine, 521 US 706, 712-13 (1999).
140. See, for example, Bilal v Lehman, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 89430, *14-15 (WD Wash). Much, of course, turns on what a court determines a reasonable person would have known. In fact, "[t]he qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id at *15, quoting Malley v Briggs, 475 US 335, 341 (1986).
141. See generally, for example, Agrawal v Briley (Agrawal III), 2006 US Dist LEXIS 88697 (ND Ill).
142. 474 F3d 118 (4th Cir 2006).
143. See id at 122-23. The Madison court held that states did not waive their Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for RLUIPA cases because Congress did not "expressly and unequivocally" condition the use of federal prison funds on a state's waiver of immunity against money damages. Id at 130. See also Agrawal III, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 88697 at *20-21, citing Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356, 364 (2001) and Cherry v University of Wisconsin System Board of Regents, 265 F3d 541, 554 (7th Cir 2001). Congress did not make funding for prisons expressly conditional on waiving immunity to claims under RLUIPA; and because RLUIPA lacks language such as "a State shall not be immune," the fact that RLUIPA "creates a cause of action against the states and applies where a state accepts federal funding" does not mean the state waives immunity by accepting funding. Agrawal III, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 88697 at *25-26. RLUIPA contains one provision for when it applies, and another creating a cause of action. The court explained that "nothing in RLUIPA explicitly ties the two provisions together . . . or explicitly declares that states cannot assert sovereign immunity . . . . Indeed, RLUIPA never mentions immunity at all." Id.
144. Madison, 474 F3d at 131.
145. Id.
146. Id, citing United States v Nordic Village, Inc, 503 US 30, 34 (1992).
147. Agrawal III, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 88697 at *32. See also James v Price, 2005 WL 483443, *2 (ND Tex) (finding that Texas had not waived its sovereign immunity to claims for monetary relief).
148. See James, 2005 WL 483443 at *2 (reasoning that a "suit against an official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the state"). See also Limbaugh, 2006 WL 2642388 at *6 (holding, parallel to Agrawal III, that Alabama had not expressly waived its immunity to claims for monetary damages); Blount v Johnson, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 90979, *7 n 2 (WD Va) (holding without explanation that an officer was not liable in his official capacity).
149. James, 2005 WL 483443 at *2.
150. Bilal, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 89430 at *14-15 (WD Wash), citing Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982).
151. See, for example, Morris-El v Menei, 2006 WL 1455592, *6 (WD Pa) (finding that the facts predated RLUIPA, but that official conduct would have been reasonable under RLUIPA and thus qualified immunity barred any damages); Haley, 401 F Supp 2d at 1246-50 (holding that the defendants were qualifiedly immune from damages despite violating RLUIPA by denying the prisoner a crystal); Charles, 220 F Supp 2d at 953-54 (holding that prison officials violated RLUIPA by denying the plaintiff prayer oils but are protected against damages by qualified immunity).
152. See Lovelace v Lee, 472 F3d 174, 196 n 7 (4th Cir 2006) (leaving open the question of damages for claims against officials in their personal capacity and collecting district court cases to illustrate a split in authority on the question).
153. See, for example, Daker v Ferrero (Daker I), 2006 US Dist LEXIS 94593, *30-31 (ND Ga) (evaluating the possibility of compensatory damages from individuals in their personal capacity). But see Daker v Ferrero (Daker II), 475 F Supp 2d 1325, 1333-34, 1346 (ND Ga 2007) (holding that RLUIPA does not authorize suit against prison officials in their individual capacities). Daker II is the first published RLUIPA opinion to analyze the constitutionality of suits against officials in their individual capacities by specifically taking into account that the jurisdictional hooks are the Spending and Commerce Clauses. The opinion is thorough, but the analysis under the Commerce Clause may be problematic because it relies heavily on a Supreme Court opinion of uncertain implications, United States v Morrison, 529 US 598 (2000). The Daker II court concluded that allowing damages against prison officials in their individual capacities "would unmoor RLUIPA from its firm grounding in the Spending Clause . . . and engender debate about whether it regulates localized, non-economic conduct that does not substantially affect interstate commerce." 475 F Supp 2d at 1347. Because this construction would not accord well with Morrison, it would raise constitutional questions and therefore the court concluded that RLUIPA does not authorize money damages actions against prison officials in their individual capacities. See id. But see Agrawal III, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 88697 at *8-15, 32-47 (finding damages available against officials in their individual capacities). The Agrawal III court relies extensively on analogy between RLUIPA and its predecessor, RFRA, which courts have held does allow damages against officials in their individual capacities, see, for example, Jama v INS, 343 F Supp 2d 338, 374 (D NJ 2004) (reading "RFRA to allow for individual capacity suits . . . against individual defendants"); Mack v O'Leary, 80 F3d 1175, 1177 (7th Cir 1996) (holding that a prisoner could sue state officials in their individual capacities), vacd and remd on other grounds as O'Leary v Mack, 522 US 801 (1997). In Mack, "Judge Posner noted that RFRA says nothing about remedies except that a person . . . may . . . obtain appropriate relief against a government." Agrawal III, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 88697 at *38, quoting Mack, 80 F3d at 1177 (omissions in original) (quotation marks omitted).
154. See Daker I, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 94593 at *30-31.
155. Two cases where severe weight loss was considered physical harm are Pratt v Corrections Corporation of America, 124 Fed Appx 465, 467 (8th Cir 2005) (holding that sufficient physical injury had been alleged to allow plaintiff to proceed with claims for damages), and Wolff v New Hampshire Department of Corrections, 2007 WL 586687, *4-5 (D NH) (allowing a RLUIPA claim for a prisoner who lost forty-nine pounds living on bread and water for a year after being denied a kosher diet). For another example of physical harm, see Boles, 402 F Supp 2d at 1246 (permitting a plaintiff to bring a claim for compensatory damages for mental anguish and emotional distress resulting from an eye injury). Some courts acknowledge injuries that are not easily categorized. See, for example, Meyer v Teslik, 411 F Supp 2d 983, 989 (WD Wis 2006) (noting that being banned from "engaging in a specific religious practice [and deprived] of the opportunity to participate in the only group worship services offered during a three month period is no de minimis deprivation"); Wolfe v Ferguson, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 40978, *78 (WD Ark) (finding that denying access to feathers infringed plaintiffs constitutional rights, and therefore also his statutory rights under RLUIPA).
156. Kyle v Patterson, 196 F3d 695, 697 (7th Cir 1999).
157. See, for example, Warsoldier, 418 F3d at 995-96 (recounting "a series of punishments" aimed at forcing compliance).
158. i57 See, for example, Royal v Kautzky, 375 F3d 720, 722-25 (8th Cir 2004) (holding that nominal and punitive damages are available under § 1997e(e)); Thompson v Carter, 284 F3d 411, 418 (2d Cir 2002) (same); Searles v Van Bebber, 251 F3d 869, 878-81 (10th Cir 2001) (same).
159. But compare the cases cited in note 157 with Jordan v Miami-Dade County, 439 F Supp 2d 1237, 1242 (SD Fla 2006) (holding that only nominal, not punitive, damages are available under § 1997e(e) without an allegation of physical injury); Williams v Lyon, 2006 WL 1207725, *4 (D Vt) (denying punitive damages because the injury was inflicted without evil intent or reckless indifference to constitutional rights).
160. Shidler, 446 F Supp 2d at 946-47, quoting Kyle, 196 F3d at 697.
161. Moskowitz, 432 F Supp at 948, citing Cruz v Beto, 405 US 319 (1972).
162. See, for example, Arroyo Lopez v Nuttall, 25 F Supp 2d 407, 410 (SDNY 1998) (awarding $5,000 in punitive damages to a prisoner who was shoved to the ground while he was praying).
163. The land use provisions of RLUIPA are not affected by PLRA.
164. See Part IV.B, especially note 154.
165. This claim is particularly strong because of the background of RLUIPA, while it might be weaker for statutes with a more tenuous connection to a constitutional right.
166. Mayweathers v Newland, 314 F3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir 2002).
167. See, for example, Edelkind v Neustrom, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 52407, *28-29 (WD La). Edelkind's RLUIPA and First Amendment claims were conflated and both evaluated under the standard of mere reasonableness, rather than RLUIPA's requirement of a compelling governmental interest and a showing that the interest is accomplished by the least restrictive means. A recent First Circuit case confirmed that courts must seriously evaluate whether or not the policy meets the least restrictive means requirement. In a stinging opinion, the court of appeals admonished the district judge that deference to prison officials does not mean a rubber stamp for their policies. See Spratt v Rhode Island Department of Corrections, 2007 US App LEXIS 8021, *19 (1st Cir).
168. 42 USC § 2000cc-2(e).
169. See 141 Cong Rec S7524 (May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen Dole) ("Prisoners have filed lawsuits claiming such grievances as . . . being served creamy peanut butter instead of the chunky variety they had ordered."). For an analysis of the congressional intent behind RLUIPA, see generally Anh Nguyen, Comment, The Fight for Creamy Peanut Butter: Why Examining Congressional Intent May Rectify the Problems of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 36 Sw U L Rev 145 (2007) (proposing two interactive interpretations of PLRA's physical injury requirement).
170. 42 USC § 2000cc-2(a).
171. RLUIPA cases almost invariably involve some sort of loss, often of proper diet, desired services, or access to paraphernalia.
172. Courts have determined the value of such losses. See, for example, Arroyo Lopez v Nuttall, 25 F Supp 2d 407, 410 (SDNY 1998) (awarding $2,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages when a prisoner was shoved during prayer). See also Jackson v Verdini, 2005 Mass Super LEXIS 279, *4 n 1 (mentioning a previous settlement of one such claim for $20,000).
173. In unusual situations, where the violation is caused by egregious behavior, a court might award punitive damages as well. The Supreme Court, however, has recently insisted that punitive damages be tied to compensatory damages in some rational proportion. The implications of such a rule are unclear for cases where only nominal instead of compensatory damages are awarded. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co v Campbell, 538 US 408, 429 (2003).
174. See Clark v Briley, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 21350, *4 (ND Ill).
175. See, for example, Bloch v Samuels, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 53732, *6 (SD Tex) (demanding an aggregate of over $30 million in damages); Edelkind, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 52407 at *2 (demanding $11 million); Spavone v City of New York, 420 F Supp 2d 236, 238 (SDNY 2005) (demanding about $700,000). But see Smith, 401 F Supp 2d at 1242 (seeking $500 from each defendant). Few cases mention the amounts sought, but indications are that prisoners are not always realistic about what their injuries are worth.
176. Many cases may settle once a court determines that a violation has occurred; very few cases are available showing damages awarded to prisoners for violations of their First Amendment rights. For an example of highly specific damage calculations, see Lowrance v Coughlin, 862 F Supp 1090, 1120 (SDNY 1994) (awarding compensatory damages ($132,000) and punitive damages ($25,000) to a prisoner who had been punitively transferred).
177. 42 USC § 2000cc-1(a).
178. Smith v Beauclair, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 56561, * 37 (D Idaho).
179. Id.
180. RLUIPA cases allege violations of a variety of religions including not only Islam, Judaism, and Roman Catholicism, but also Hinduism, Buddhism, Odinism, Wicca, and even atheism. The only claim possibly brought by a Protestant Christian was Granguillhome v Utah Board of Pardons, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 88996, *5 (D Utah) (alleging preferential treatment by the Pardon Board for members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints). Whether or not Congress considered Wiccans and Buddhists when it passed RLUIPA, the protections the statute affords are faithful to the original goals of the First Amendment: to preserve the right to freely exercise one's religion, whatever it may be.