On optimal cartel deterrence policies

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 24, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 1231-1240

  Frezal, Sylvestre ^a  

^a NONE   (France)

Author keywords

Antitrust authority; D21; L13; L40; L41; Non stationary policy; random audit strategy

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; OPTIMIZATION; PUBLIC POLICY; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

ANTITRUST AUTHORITY; NON STATIONARY POLICY; RANDOM AUDIT STRATEGY;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 37849188992     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.011     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Aubert C., Rey P., and Kovacic W. The Impact of Leniency Programs on Cartels (2004)
2. Benoit J.-P., and Krishna V. Nash equilibria of finitely repeated game. International Journal of Game Theory 16 3 (1987) 197-204
3. IDEI Final Report for DG Competition, European Commission. The Economics of Tacit Collusion (Available at http://www.idei.asso.fr/Commun/WorkingPapers/2003%20Collusion.pdf).
4. Motta M., and Polo M. Leniency programs and cartel prosecution. International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier 21 3 (2003) 347-379 (3)
5. Rey, Patrick, 2001. Towards a Theory of Competition Policy, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, M. Dewatripont, L. P. Hansen, S. J. Turnovsky eds, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
6. Spagnolo Giancarlo, 2000. Optimal Leniency Programs, Stockholm School of Economics, Mimeo.