Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 207-216

  Méon, Pierre Guillaume ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Committee; Majority voting; Uncertainty; Volatility

Indexed keywords

EID: 37849185664     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-006-9002-0     Document Type: Article

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