Optimum electoral areas: Should Europe adopt a single election day?

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 8, 1999, Pages 1595-1619

  Sapir, André ^a,b   Sekkat, Khalid ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

International policy coordination; Political business cycles

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EUROPE;

EID: 0032872752     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00030-0     Document Type: Article

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