Favoritism and reverse discrimination

European Economic Review

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 101-123

  Kim, Kwang ho ^a  

^a Korea Development Institute   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Election; Favoritism; Nepotism; Reverse discrimination; Term limits; Voting

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; NEPOTISM; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 37849185548     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.09.003     Document Type: Article

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