Performance measurement manipulation: Cherry-picking what to correct

Review of Accounting Studies

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 119-139

  Arya, Anil ^a   Glover, Jonathan ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Incentives; Manipulation; Performance measurement

Indexed keywords

EID: 37849017097     PISSN: 13806653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-007-9042-3     Document Type: Article

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