Project assignment rights and incentives for eliciting ideas

Management Science

Volumn 48, Issue 7, 2002, Pages 886-899

  Arya, Anil ^a,b   Glover, Jonathan ^a,b   Routledge, Bryan R ^a,b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Decentralization; Incentive problems; Promotion; Real options

Indexed keywords

COMPENSATION (PERSONNEL); DECISION MAKING; EMPOWERMENT OF PERSONNEL; INDUSTRY; INVESTMENTS; MANAGERS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SCHEDULING;

DECENTRALIZATION; INCENTIVE PROBLEMS; PROJECT ASSIGNMENT; PROMOTION; REAL OPTIONS;

PROJECT MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0036650711     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.48.7.886.2822     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Negotiated transfer pricing and divisional vs. Firm-wide performance evaluation
2. Information systems, incentives and the timing of investments
3. Hierarchical decentralization of incentive contracts
4. Scientific management at Merck: An interview with CFO Judy Lewent
5. A theory of responsibility in organizations
6. The organization of decentralized information processing
7. Uses, abuses, and alternatives to the net-present-value rule
8. Hierarchical computation of the resource allocation problem