Color bind: Lessons from the failed homeland security advisory system

International Security

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 121-154

  Shapiro, Jacob N ^a   Cohen, Dara Kay ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 37349082849     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2007.32.2.121     Document Type: Review

References (138)

1. "Voters Unmoved by Terror Alerts," Time.com, August 6, 2004, http://www.time.com/time/election2004/article/0,18471,678367,00.html.
2. Corbett Riner, Liza Porteus, and Mike Emanuel, "Trail Tales: Color Code Conundrum," FoxNews.com, October 21, 2004, http://www.foxnews. com/story/0,2933,136190,00.html.
3. See, for example, Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2004);
4. Kenneth Allen, "The Homeland Security Advisory System: Threat Codes and Public Responses," testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong., 2d sess., March 16, 2004;
5. and Lawrence Freedman, "The Politics of Warning: Terrorism and Risk Communication," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 379-418.
6. "Homeland Security Advisory System," Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3, March 11, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2002/03/20020312-5.html.
7. Ibid.
8. Kees van den Bos, Henke A.M. Wilke, and E. Allan Lind, "When Do We Need Procedural Fairness? The Role of Trust in Authority," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 75, No. 6 (December 1998), pp. 1449-1458.
9. Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Military Affairs, "Readiness of the Commonwealth to Respond to Acts of War or Terrorism, 2003 Annual Report," p. 58.
10. Washington Military Department, Guidelines for the Implementation of the State of Washington Homeland Security Advisory System, February 31, 2003, p. 6;
11. and State of Louisiana Military Department, Louisiana Homeland Security Strategy, March 31, 2003, pp. 60-64. For a collection of state homeland security plans, see National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/State-Homeland-Security-Plans.asp.
12. Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Security Advisory System," http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/Copy_of_press_release_0046. shtm.
13. Department of Homeland Security, "Alert 03-25," http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Threat_Orange_052003 (accessed April 21, 2006; site discontinued).
14. Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Security Advisory System Increased to ORANGE for Financial Institutions in Specific Geographical Areas," http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/ IAIP_AdvisoryOrangeFinancialInst_080104.pdf (accessed April 21, 2006; site discontinued).
15. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission), "Forging America's New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland, Protecting Our Liberty," Fifth Annual Report to Congress (Arlington, Va.: RAND Corporation, December 15, 2003), p. D-7-2, http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/.
16. GAO, Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-05-33 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, January 2005), p. 40.
17. Adistinction between the public system and the private threat advisories and information bulletins first appears in a February 2004 GAO report, but the advisories and bulletins are treated as something separate from the HSAS system. GAO, Homeland Security Advisory System: Preliminary Observations Regarding Threat Level Increases from Yellow to Orange, GAO-04-453R (Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 26, 2004), p. 9.
18. See, for example, State of Michigan, "Homeland Security Advisory System," http://www.michigan.gov/homeland/0,1607,7-173-26812-,00.html.
19. GAO, Homeland Security: Communication Protocols and Risk Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory System, GAO-04-682 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, June 2004), pp. 12-13, 44. DHS's agency comments on this GAO report did not question its characterization of the HSAS.
20. See also GAO, Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security, pp. 39-40.
21. Clinton M. Jenkin, "Risk Perception and Terrorism: Applying the Psychometric Paradigm," Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2 (July 2006), http://hsaj.org/?article=2.2.6;
22. and Scott A. Behunin, "Homeland Security Advisory System," master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004.
23. U.S. Northern Command official, phone interview by Jacob Shapiro, April 5, 2006. Northeastern city and state homeland security officials, phone interviews by Jacob Shapiro, March 30 and April 11, 2006, respectively.
24. Cleared threat advisories and information bulletins used to be available at http:// www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme?70 (accessed April 21, 2006), but they were removed in early 2007. All of the cleared advisories deal with changes to the color-coded threat level. Most of the cleared information bulletins are very general.
25. Indeed, the information contained in DHS threat advisories often reaches state homeland security officials through multiple paths at the same time. Susan Reinertson, former homeland security adviser for North Dakota, phone interview by Jacob Shapiro, March 30, 2006.
26. Lee Herring, "How Would Sociologists Design a Homeland Security Alert System?" ASA Footnotes, April 2003.
27. Federal government official, phone interview by Jacob Shapiro, March 10, 2005.
28. Philip Shenon, "Color-Coded System Created to Rate Threat of Terrorism," New York Times, March 13, 2002.
29. Ann McFeatters, "Ridge Plans Ranking System for Alerts," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, December 19, 2001.
30. The following is based on a phone interview by Jacob Shapiro with a government official involved in the development of the HSAS while assigned to OHS, March 10, 2005.
31. American Psychological Association, APA Comment on Homeland Security Advisory System, April 26, 2002, http://www.apa.org/ppo/issues/shomesecure. html.
32. Partnership for Public Warning, "Comments to the Director of the FBI," April 25, 2002, http://www.ppw.us/ppw/docs/ppw_response.pdf.
33. U.S. Conference of Mayors, "Comments to the U.S. Department of Justice on the Administration of the New Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)," April 26, 2002.
34. Quoted in Philip Shenon and Eric Lichtblau, "U.S. Lowers Warning Level to 'Yellow' but Cautions That Serious Threat Remains," New York Times, February 28, 2003.
35. iPOLL Databank, "Survey by Harvard School of Public Health, Project on Biological Security and the Public and ICR - International Communications Research, March 21-March 25, 2003";
36. "Survey by Pew Internet & American Life Project, Federal Computer Week, and Princeton Survey Research Associates, August 5-August 11, 2003";
37. and "Survey by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics, January 7-January 8, 2004," http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html.
38. Philip Shenon, "Report Finds Threat Alerts in Color Code Baffle Public," New York Times, August 10, 2003.
39. Frances L. Edwards, San Jose emergency manager, interview by Jacob Shapiro, San Jose, California, March 2, 2005.
40. There is ample anecdotal evidence for this decline in confidence in the system. For example, the police department in Phoenix, Arizona, responded aggressively to the first orange alert on September 10, 2002, putting its officers on twelve-hour shifts. Subsequent alerts did not generate such unusual levels of security. See Kevin Johnson, "In Orange Terror Alerts, Wary Cities Hold Back," USA Today, July 2, 2003. Utah state officials followed a similar path, raising their state alert level for the first orange alert, but keeping it at yellow for subsequent alerts because of the lack of specific information.
41. See Behunin, "Homeland Security Advisory System," pp. 15-20. A similar pattern of increasing skepticism and decreasing activity in response to alerts emerged during interviews with local officials observing the TOPOFF 3 exercise, held April 5-6, 2005.
42. Shawn Reese, Homeland Security Advisory System: Possible Issues for Congressional Oversight, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, August 6, 2003), Order Code RL 32023.
43. Philip Shenon, "High Alerts for Terror Get Harder to Impose," New York Times, September 13, 2003.
44. Thomas Ridge, "Remarks Regarding Recent Threat Reports," U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Press Secretary, August 1, 2004.
45. Charlie Savage and Bryan Bender, "U.S. Cites Terror Threats to Financial Facilities, Ridge Raises Alert Level for Washington, NYC, Newark," Boston Globe, August 2, 2005.
46. iPOLL Databank, "Survey by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics, August 3-August 4, 2004," http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html.
47. Robb Willer, "The Effects of Government-Issued Terror Warnings on Presidential Approval Ratings," Current Research in Social Psychology, Vol. 10, No. 1 (September 2004), pp. 1-12, http://www.uiowa.edu/ ~grpproc/.
48. For the political psychology behind this phenomenon, see Rose McDermott and Philip G. Zimbardo, "The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts," in Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, and Zimbardo, eds., The Psychology of Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 818-851.
49. Quoted in Mimi Hall, "Ridge Reveals Clashes on Alerts," USA Today, May 10, 2005.
50. New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force, 2004/2005 Progress Report (State of New Jersey, 2006), April 20, 2006, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dsptf/NJDSPTF-04-05-021706.pdf.
51. Gilmore Commission, "Forging America's New Normalcy," p. 27.
52. U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, H.R.1817.RFS, sec. 223.
53. Tim Starks, "House Panel Considers Security Improvements, Including New Warning System," Congressional Quarterly Today, March 28, 2006.
54. Michael Chertoff, "Transcript from Secretary Michael Chertoff Press Briefing on the London Bombings," July 7, 2005.
55. Michael Chertoff, "Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff on Lowering the National Threat Level for the Mass Transit Sector," August 12, 2005.
56. From August 10 through August 14, the five major New York City newspapers ran a mere twenty-four stories containing the words "terror" and "alert," compared with thirty-four containing "terror" and "lines." Of the twenty-four, only six mentioned the color-coded alert system.
57. GAO, Homeland Security: Communication Protocols and Risk Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory System, pp. 46-47.
58. Australian Government, "National Counter-Terrorism Alert Level," http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/ AllDocs/F2ED4B7E7B4C028ACA256FBF00816AE9?OpenDocument.
59. "Australia Reviews Terror Alert Level after London Bombings," Agence France-Presse, July 8, 2005.
60. "Experts Call for Overhaul of Terror Alert System," Sydney Morning Herald, September 13, 2005;
61. and George Williams, "Balancing National Security and Human Rights: Lessons from Australia," Fulbright Public Lecture, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia, June 21, 2005.
62. GAO, Homeland Security: Communication Protocols and Risk Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory System, p. 45.
63. "MI5 Frequently Asked Questions: About Threats to National Security," http://www.mi5.gov.uk/textonly/Page367.html.
64. Ludo Block, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of French Counter-Terrorism," Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 2 (September 2005), pp. 6-8;
65. and French embassy in the United States, "France's Experiences with - and Methods Combating - Terrorism," http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/ terrorism.asp.
66. Alan Cowell, "The New Normal: Wary but Resilient," New York Times, September 25, 2005.
67. Efrat Weiss, "Passover Terror Warnings Up," YNET, Yediot Aharonot Online, April 9, 2006, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L- 3238110,00.html.
68. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "2005 Terrorism Review," http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-?Obstacle?to?Peace/Terrorism?and?Islamic? Fundamentalism-/2005?Terrorism?Review.htm.
69. Yossi Melman, "The Task Force Barked a Warning and Israelis Blithely Streamed South," Haaretz, October 10, 2004.
70. Notice this context differs from alerts for natural disasters in two key respects. First, hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods are not strategic actors. The probability of a natural event is not affected when an alert is issued. Second, the "intel" is publicly available, and sharing it does not risk reducing the government's ability to collect information on future events.
71. One key difference between terrorism alerts and systems warning of natural disasters is that when a weather alert is issued, the public can witness the warned-of event. Successful terrorism alerts may lead to nonevents, meaning the public learns nothing about the accuracy of the alert system.
72. Philip Zimbardo, "The Political Psychology of Terrorist Alarms," February 26, 2003, http://www.apa.org/about/division/terrorism. html.
73. For example, the primary effect of adding water to a lake would be to raise the water level; the secondary effect might be to add just enough weight to burst a dam, causing extensive downstream damage. Example from Robert F. Graboyes, "Secondary Effects Matter," Equilibria, Vol. 1 (1996/1997), http://www.rich.frb.org/pubs/equilibria/issue1/logic.html (accessed February 27, 2005; site discontinued).
74. For an intelligence-oriented discussion of this and other concerns, see Freedman, "The Politics of Warning."
75. This paradox is also identified in Bruce Schneier, "Do Terror Alerts Work?" Rake, October 2004.
76. It is discussed with respect to warnings about low-probability natural disasters in Michael H. Glantz, "Usable Science 8: Early Warning Systems: Do's and Don'ts," report of "Early Warning Systems" workshop, Shanghai, China, October 20-23, 2003.
77. More generally, the denominator is some nondecreasing function of N.
78. The arrest of "millennium bomber" Ahmed Ressam as he tried to enter the United States in December 1999 is entirely consistent with our analysis. First, contrary to much reporting on the incident, no evidence emerged at trial or in interviews with the arresting customs agents to suggest that they knew of any security alert. If an alert had been issued, it must have been issued through sufficiently secure channels that it was not entered into evidence at Ressam's trial. Suppose, for argument's sake, that this is what happened. The fact that a secret alert passed through official channels would motivate increased vigilance does not suggest that a general alert issued through public statements would have a similar galvanizing effect. See Mike Carter, "Clarke Book Has Errors about Arrest of Ahmed Ressam," Seattle Times, April 12, 2004.
79. Because alerts are rarely accompanied by specific intelligence, local authorities are likely to ignore HSAS in favor of actions based on the intelligence they are permitted to see. Behunin, "Homeland Security Advisory System," pp. 21-24. A related problem is that many local officials do not have access to the private "threat alerts" that accompany changes in the alert level. Northeastern city homeland security official, phone interview by Shapiro.
80. Margot Dudkevitch, "Bus Driver Foils Suicide Bombing," Jerusalem Post, February 7, 2002;
81. and Margot Dudkevitch, "Bus Driver Prevents Suicide Bombing," Jerusalem Post, February 20, 2002.
82. The related psychological problem of the diffusion of personal responsibility is detailed in the work of John M. Darley and B. Latane. See, for example, Darley and Latane, "Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility," Journal of Personal Social Psychology, Vol. 8 (1968), pp. 377-383. The authors thank Rose McDermott for pointing this out.
83. Wayne Turnbull, "A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Islamic Terrorism: The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network," master's thesis, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2003.
84. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "What Do We Know About the Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism?" in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements, and Failures (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
85. For analysis of how governments should take terrorists' ability to shift targets into account when making resource-allocation decisions for homeland security, see Robert Powell, "Defending against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources," American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 3 (August 2007), pp. 527-541.
86. For an analysis of how this same capability should influence government decisionmaking about sharing sensitive homeland security information, see Jacob N. Shapiro and David A. Siegel, "Is This Paper Dangerous? Balancing Secrecy and Openness in Counter-terrorism," Stanford University and Florida State University, 2007.
87. This is exactly the problem noted on the individual level in Scott D. Sagan, "The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security Forces May Lead to Less Nuclear Security," Risk Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 4 (November 2004), pp. 935-946.
88. For a discussion of this problem in the context of privately owned critical infrastructure, see Congressional Budget Office, Homeland Security and the Private Sector (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, December 2004), pp. 2-4.
89. Ashton B. Carter, Michael May, and William J. Perry, "The Day After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast in an American City," report based on April 19, 2007, workshop in Washington, D.C., hosted by the Preventive Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford Universities, May 31, 2007.
90. On using the alert system in a postattack setting, see "Preparing for the Worst," Online NewsHour, May 16, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/ newshour/bb/terrorism/jan-june03/cities_05-16.html.
91. For policy documents that treat HSAS as a postattack system, see Washington Military Department, Guidelines for Implementation of the State of Washington Homeland Security Advisory System.
92. Benigno E. Aguirre, "Homeland Security Warnings: Lessons Learned and Unlearned" (Newark: Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, 2003).
93. James Jay Carafano, "Alerting the Nation," testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Threats, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong., 2d sess., March 18, 2004.
94. Allen, "The Homeland Security Advisory System."
95. DHS Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Top Officials 3 Exercise (Washington, D.C.: Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, Department of Homeland Security, November, 2005), p. 30.
96. This is especially true, given that two years passed between these two major exercises.
97. Allen, "The Homeland Security Advisory System," p. 10.
98. GAO, Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. 40.
99. Mark Rosman, "Agencies Can Make Red Alert Specific to New Jersey Sites," Tri-Town News, March 27, 2003.
100. Edwards, interview by Shapiro; and Salvatore S. Lanzilotti, "Hawaii Medical Personnel Assessment, 2003" (Honolulu: Hawaii Department of Health, 2004).
101. Union Hospital and St. Barnabus Health Care System officials interviewed by Jacob Shapiro during TOPOFF 3 exercise, Union, New Jersey, April 5-6, 2005.
102. Lee Clarke, Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
103. Lee Clarke, "Oil-Spill Fantasies," Atlantic Monthly, November 1990, pp. 65-77.
104. Aguirre, "Homeland Security Warnings," p. 8.
105. The four are the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Coast Guard, and the Transportation Security Administration.
106. Ranking Tables for Metropolitan Areas: Population in 2000 and Population Change from 1990 to 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).
107. A similar perspective was reached independently in Louise K. Comfort, Mark Dunn, David Johnson, Robert Skertich, and Adam Zagorecki, "Coordination in Complex Systems: Increasing Efficiency in Disaster Mitigation and Response," International Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 62-80.
108. This definition combines elements from a variety of sources, including Simon A. Levin, "Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable," Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 40 (October 2002), pp. 3-19;
109. and Kevin Dooley, "Complex Adaptive Systems: A Nominal Definition," October 26, 1996, http://www.eas.asu.edu/?kdooley/ casopdef.html.
110. W. Brian Arthur, "Complexity and the Economy," Science, Vol. 284, No. 5411 (April 1999), pp. 107-109.
111. GAO, Public Health Response to Anthrax Incidents of 2001, Report 04-152 (Washington, D.C.: GAO), pp. 17-18;
112. Neely Tucker and Carol D. Leonnig, "For SW Area, Anthrax Discovery Arouses Anxiety," Washington Post, October 27, 2001;
113. and Leef Smith and Avram Goldstein, "Jittery Patients Pack Hospitals," Washington Post, October 26, 2001.
114. Doug Frisdma, Center for Biomedical Informatics, University of Pittsburgh, private communication with Jacob Shapiro, June 22, 2004.
115. Flynn, America the Vulnerable, pp. 65-66.
116. DHS Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Top Officials 3 Exercise, p. 30.
117. Julia Loughran, Thoughtlink, private communication with Jacob Shapiro, July 13, 2004. Thoughtlink provided contractor support for a number of DHS exercises in 2004.
118. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (Draft), December 2005. No final version has been issued.
119. Robert E. Pierre and Ann Gerhart, "News of Pandemonium May Have Slowed Aid," Washington Post, October 5, 2005.
120. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management in Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, Department of Homeland Security, March 2006), p. 21.
121. Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), pp. 109-111.
122. Ibid., p. 110.
123. Katrina also demonstrates the harsh reality that some disasters are so large that going on alert might not accomplish much.
124. Edwards, interview by Shapiro; Susan Reinertson, phone interview by Shapiro; and Northeastern state homeland security official, interview by Shapiro, April 11, 2006. Federal action plans have been circulated that contain improbable and empirically contradicted assumptions about how first responders will behave in the wake of an attack. See, for example, Lanzilotti, "Hawaii Medical Personnel Assessment, 2003."
125. Herman B. Leonard, "Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for and Responding to Future Katrina-Class Disturbances in the United States," testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Cong., 2d sess., March 8, 2006, pp. 5, 6, 10.
126. Chemical industry associations have even argued that more stringent state laws should be superseded by any new federal legislation, effectively seeking to implement the minimum feasible level of protection. See Dana A. Shea, Legislative Approaches to Chemical Facility Security, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, April 12, 2006), Order Code RL 33043, p. 21.
127. On incentives to minimize security expenditures, see Congressional Budget Office, Homeland Security and the Private Sector;
128. and Carl Pine, "EPA's Security Push Fails," Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, July 14, 2002.
129. For examples of the impact of chemical industry lobbying, see John Mintz, "Bush Seeks Voluntary Chemical Plant Security Steps," Washington Post, April 8, 2003; Frank J. Cilluffo, testimony before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity, House Homeland Security Committee, 109th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2005; and Bob Slaughter, testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Cong., 1st sess., July 13, 2005.
130. Kees van den Bos, Henke A.M. Wilke, and E. Allan Lind, "When Do We Need Procedural Fairness? The Role of Trust in Authority," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 75, No. 6 (December 1998), pp. 1449-1458.
131. Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990);
132. and John Braithwaite and Toni Makkai, "Trust and Compliance," Policing and Society, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1994), pp. 1-12.
133. E. Allan Lind and Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York: Plenum, 1988).
134. Tom R. Tyler and Peter DeGoey, "Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions," in Roderick M. Kramer and Tyler, eds., Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996), pp. 331-356.
135. GAO, Homeland Security Advisory System: Preliminary Observations Regarding Threat Level Increases from Yellow to Orange, p. 7.
136. U.S. government official, phone interview by Jacob Shapiro, March 10, 2005.
137. Jacob Shapiro and David Siegel identify a wide range of conditions under which sharing a government's private information can enhance counterterrorism efforts by supporting more effective prevention and target hardening. Shapiro and Siegel, "Is This Paper Dangerous?"
138. Department of Homeland Security, "Fiscal Year 2006 UASI Eligibility List," http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/FY06_UASI_Eligibility_List.pdf.