A light-weight distributed scheme for detecting ip prefix hijacks in real-time

ACM SIGCOMM 2007: Conference on Computer Communications

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 277-288

  Zheng, Changxi ^b   Ji, Lusheng ^a   Pei, Dan ^a   Wang, Jia ^a   Francis, Paul ^b  

^a AT AND T LABS RESEARCH   (United States)

^b School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

BGP; Detection; Hijacking; Interception; Routing

Indexed keywords

HIJACKING DETECTION SERVICES; INTERCEPTION; PREFIX HIJACKING;

DATA ACQUISITION; DATA TRANSFER; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; REAL TIME SYSTEMS; ROUTING PROTOCOLS;

INTERNET PROTOCOLS;

EID: 36949036650     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1282380.1282412     Document Type: Conference Paper

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