Effort, intensity and position taking: Reconsidering obstruction in the pre-cloture senate

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 67-92

  Bawn, Kathleen ^a   Koger, Gregory ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

Author keywords

Cloture; Effort; Obstruction; Position taking; Preference intensity

Indexed keywords

EID: 36849056997     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629807084040     Document Type: Article

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