Quine, Putnam, and the 'Quine-Putnam' indispensability argument

Erkenntnis

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 113-127

  Liggins, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 36749057377     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-007-9081-y     Document Type: Review

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