Disasters and organisations: From lessons learnt to theorising

Safety Science

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 132-149

  Le Coze, Jean christophe ^a  

^a Parc Technologique ALATA   (France)

Author keywords

Accident; Investigation; Methods; Modelling; Models; Organisation; Theories; Theorising

Indexed keywords

GRAPHIC METHODS; HAZARDS; MANAGERS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

GRAPHICAL CLASSIFICATION; ORGANISATIONAL ACIDENTS; SAFETY MANAGERS;

ACCIDENT PREVENTION;

ACCIDENT; ANALYTIC METHOD; ARTICLE; DISASTER; HUMAN; LEARNING; MODEL; ORGANIZATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL;

EID: 36749042013     PISSN: 09257535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2006.12.001     Document Type: Article

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