The 27 March 2003 billy-berclau accident: A technical and organisational investigation

2005 AIChE Spring National Meeting, Conference Proceedings

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 4071-4099

  Lecoze, Jean Christophe ^a   Dechy, Nicolas ^a   Lim, Samantha ^a   Leprette, Emmanuel ^a   Branka, Ruddy ^a  

^a INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L ENVIRONNEMENT INDUSTRIEL ET DES RISQUES INERIS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCIDENT PREVENTION; ACCIDENTS; CHEMICAL PLANTS; HAZARDOUS MATERIALS; LARGE SCALE SYSTEMS; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; RISK MANAGEMENT; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

DYNAMITE EXPLOSIONS; RISK LEVELS; SAFETY MANAGEMENT; TECHNICAL CAUSE ANALYSIS;

EXPLOSIONS;

EID: 22544460256     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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